Plaintiffs’ lawyers pursuing a class action for a global price-fixing conspiracy will have to get formal opt-in from class members abroad, if yesterday’s jurisdictional decision stands in Airia Brands v. Air Canada.
|Charles Wright says he disagrees with the court’s analysis on jurisdiction.|
Despite a possibly “real and substantial” connection to Canada — the test established in the Supreme Court of Canada’s Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda decision — defence counsel successfully argued that Ontario’s courts had no jurisdiction to include in the proceeding foreign class members who had not specifically opted in, defined as “absent foreign claimants.”
Armed with reams of expert opinions, lawyers for the airlines convinced Leitch that foreign courts in many of the 100-plus countries from which plaintiff class members derived would not respect the Van Breda test giving Canadian courts jurisdiction.
As a result, nothing would prevent a class member in one of those other countries from re-litigating the matter and subjecting the defendants to double jeopardy.
As the decision states: “I am satisfied that jurisdiction over class members can only be established if they are present in Ontario or have consented in some way to the jurisdiction of this court. I therefore, find that this court does not have jurisdiction simpliciter over absent foreign claimants.”
It’s a decision that stands in sharp contrast to Van Breda, where Canadian courts were able to claim jurisdiction, for a case involving injuries on a Cuban resort, based on a test establishing “real and substantial connection” to Canada.
Charles Wright, the Siskinds LLP lawyer who launched the class action in Canada, says he disagrees with the court’s analysis on jurisdiction, which finds that the plaintiffs connection to Canada is not strong enough to account for the possibility of double recovery.
Wright says that the decision essentially shuts the door to the most likely avenue for justice for foreign claimants on the off chance they might pursue an alternative, and highly unlikely, avenue for justice.
“We believe our courts in Canada follow the rules of law and provide justice,” he says, “and if other courts abroad, some other day, choose to find that that’s not so and won’t respect the judgment, that’s really a decision for them to make and that doesn’t impact on whether this court properly takes jurisdiction.”
Wright says the decision on jurisdiction will most likely be appealed. Even if it’s upheld, though, it will not prevent plaintiffs’ lawyers from sending out notices to potential foreign claimants to get formal opt-in from them.
Jurisdictional issues aside, Wright suggests the defendants’ real strategy — one that has proven successful so far — is to drag the case on and make it more difficult for class members to participate, in the hopes of reducing liability for their clients.
“Our argument was that this was a fairly clear effort to avoid liability to these people. It wasn’t really about the potential for double jeopardy or that they shouldn’t have to face a multiplicity of lawsuits. It was about the desire to not have to compensate some people at all.
“The defendants hope is that maybe people won’t see or understand the notice and won’t respond to it, and therefore won’t opt in,” says Wright. “So the real hope is — which is what we argued and what we will argue on appeal — is that they will avoid any liability to those people.”
Ultimately, however, Wright says the court’s decision on jurisdiction may backfire on the defendants:.
“If, in fact, the result of this decision is a notice that goes out that causes people to see them in 20 different jurisdictions, and they have to obtain counsel in all of those places and defend themselves, it’s not actually a good result for them.”
When bringing a motion to set aside default judgment defendants better have good evidence and respond quickly, according to a recent Ontario Superior Court decision.
In Marina Bay Sands Pte, Ltd. v. Jian Tu aka Tu Jian, Justice Sean Dunphy wrote on Aug. 7:
The Superior Court is not a sandbox playground where ‘do-overs’ can be expected on demand. The stakes are high and this is no time to keep powder dry. If there is any reason the judgment ought not to stand, any and all reasons must be diligently and properly placed before the court.”
In the Marina Bay case, the defendant, Jian Tu, created a claim to set aside default judgment on what Dunphy called “two slender straws” — a procedural argument based on the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the underlying contract in favour of Singapore laws and courts, and a “bald, second-hand assertion” of failure to receive the statement of claim by means of the substituted service authorized by an order of the court.
Tu brought a motion to set aside the default judgment dated June 28, 2014, and to strike the statement of claim or for leave to file a statement of defence.
Marina Bay, a Singapore hotel, issued the statement of claim on Feb. 18, 2014, for amounts owing under a credit agreement between it and the defendant. The amount claimed was the Canadian dollar equivalent of SGD $9,940,683, plus prejudgment interest arising from advances made in February 2013 that the defendant had failed to repay.
The debts arose from markers given to support gambling at the plaintiff’s casino. A credit history obtained by the plaintiff showed Marina Bay was not the only casino the defendant has obtained credit from — there was a list of other casinos in Ontario and abroad.
Marina Bay had difficulty serving the statement of claim. Three unsuccessful attempts at service were made between March 6 and March 15, 2014, at an address in Markham, Ont. The process server received no reply.
Several other attempts were made to the same address.
On June 28, 2014, default judgment was obtained in the amount of the Canadian-dollar equivalent of SGD $11,127,028.62 plus $2,000 for costs, both amounts bearing post-judgment interest at the rates of 13 per cent and three per cent respectively.
Marina Bay proceeded to register writs of seizure and sale on July 21, 2014, and made a number of attempts to serve the judgment upon Tu via regular and registered mail and courier on several dates from July 23, 2014 to Jan. 2015.
Tu claimed he did not reside at the Markham property during the time the statement of claim was said to be delivered.
The case raised the following issues to be determined:
a) Is the existence of an “exclusive jurisdiction” clause in the contract underlying the default judgment sufficient grounds to warrant setting aside a default judgment?
b.) Does a bare hearsay allegation that the defendant failed in fact to receive a copy of the statement of claim warrant the exercise of the court’s discretion to set aside default judgment under Rule 19.08(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure?
Dunphy said he did not accept “the evidence that the defendant in fact had no notice of the claim.”
He noted that Marina Bay has been unpaid for almost three years on its liquidated claim, and “had to engage lawyers in Ontario to track down the defendant and has now found property that he owns and has secured a judgment.”
Bald, hearsay statements to that effect which have been made without explanation of the circumstances carry little weight in these circumstances. . . . Secondly, there is a great distinction to be drawn in my mind between an irregularly obtained default judgment and a properly obtained judgment following substituted service in accordance with a validly-obtained order of the court. In the latter case, the judgment is regular. While the interests of justice may well favour setting such a judgment aside if credible evidence is led to establish that the alternative to personal service employed was actually ineffective, such is not automatically the case. Even if I accepted the defendant’s assertion (which I do not), the defendant would have still to explain his delay in responding to the judgment and to provide the court with some indication that he has a bona fide defence on the merits."
Dunphy dismissed the motion with costs.
A former senior Conservative Senate staffer who reposted a defamatory statement about Ottawa human rights lawyer Richard Warman has been ordered to pay $10,000 in damages.
In a decision issued by the Ontario Superior Court July 30, Justice David Corbett ordered Michael Veck to pay Warman the money after finding Veck had no legal defence for posting an article about him that was “obviously defamatory.”
However, on July 31, a bankruptcy trustee for Veck wrote to Warman’s lawyer and the court providing a notice of stay of proceedings, indicating all legal actions were stayed.
“I’ve asked the trustee to immediately withdraw the notice of stay of proceedings and am reviewing the information provided to determine my next steps,” Warman told Legal Feeds via e-mail Tuesday.
Warman added he intends to pursue the $10,000 libel judgment and costs “to the fullest extent possible.”
The case arises in the context of a debate over the relationship between laws against hate speech and the principles of freedom of speech. Warman is an advocate against far-right and neo-Nazi hate speech.
In March 2009, Veck republished an article first published by the National Post and written by former columnist Jonathan Kay about Warman that was untrue. Warman says the article was posted to a Stanford University web site forum catering to leaders in politics, academia, the military, and journalism.
The original article by the National Post was retracted after Warman issued a libel notice.
Both Kay and the newspaper subsequently settled a libel action against them. Veck republished the article more than a year after the newspaper removed it from its web site.
In his decision, Corbett wrote:
“I find the impugned article posted by Mr. Veck is defamatory of Mr. Warman. I find that Mr. Veck has no legal defence for publishing this defamatory article. . . .”
Corbett went on to say a message Veck posted as a retraction and apology on the same web site “did not cure the damage caused by the defamatory article and should not serve to reduce damages awarded to Mr. Warman.”
Veck’s “apology” posted to the web site was as follows:
“I previously published material here that attacked the personal and professional reputations of Mr. Richard Warman. Mr. Richard Warman states that these allegations were false, and so I wish to retract them and apologize.”
Mr. Veck is not assisted in these defences by the fact that a substantial portion of his article was a repetition of Mr. Kay’s article in the National Post. A defendant cannot escape liability by publishing statements originally published by someone else. Put prosaically by Lord Denning fifty years ago:
“Our English law does not love tale-bearers. If the report or rumour was true, let him justify it. If it was not true, he ought not to have repeated it or aided in its circulation. He must answer for it just as if he had started it himself.”
In an e-mail exchange with Legal Feeds Veck confirmed he no longer works in Canadian politics, but declined to comment further on the matter.
|Anne Jacob is appointed to the Superior Court of Quebec.|
In several instances the appointments are said to be filling new positions created by Bill C-31.
Guy R. Smith, a sole practitioner in Ottawa, was appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada to replace Justice Joe E. Hershfield, who elected to become a supernumerary judge as of June 1, 2015.
Smith had been a sole practitioner since 2014. Previously, he had been the judicial affairs adviser for the federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada from March 2009 to July 2014. He practised administrative law, constitutional law and litigation with Perley-Robertson Hill & McDougall LLP from 1997 to 2005 and as a sole practitioner from 1991 to 1997. He was called to the Ontario bar in 1988.
Alberta Provincial Court Judge Robin Camp has been appointed to the Federal Court to replace Justice Yves de Montigny, who has been elevated to the Federal Court of Appeal.
Camp received his law degree in South Africa and successfully completed challenge exams to re-qualify to practise in Canada in 1998. He was appointed a judge of the Provincial Court, Criminal Division, in 2012. Prior to his appointment, he had been a lawyer at JSS Barristers from 2004 and a managing partner from 2008 to 2012. His main area of practice was commercial litigation. He was called to the Alberta bar in 1999.
E. Susan Elliott, a lawyer with Good Elliott Hawkins LLP in Kingston, Ont. has also been appointed to the Federal Court. She replaces Justice Mary.J.L. Gleason, who has been elevated to the Federal Court of Appeal.
Elliott was called to the Ontario bar in 1981. She had been at Good Elliott Hawkins (formerly Good & Elliott) since 1981, and during that time she had been general counsel, legal line of business, Teranet Inc. She also served as treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada; as well as hearing commissioner, part time, for the Rent Review Commissioner of Ontario and a smalls claims court judge since 2009.
Sylvie Roussel, a lawyer with the Security Intelligence Review Agency in Ottawa, is appointed to the Federal Court as well, replacing Justice Marie-Josée Bédard, who was appointed to the Superior Court of Quebec.
Roussel was called to the Ontario bar in 1987. She had been senior general counsel with the Security Intelligence Review Agency since 2007. Previously, she had practised with the firm Noël & Associés, s.e.n.c.. Her main areas of practice were public/constitutional law, criminal law, Charter Law and human rights law.
Fredricton’s Ann Marie McDonald, a lawyer with McInnes Cooper LLP, is also headed to the Federal Court. She replaces Justice R.T. Hughes, who elected to become a supernumerary judge, effective Sept. 1, 2015.
McDonald was called to the bar of New Brunswick in 1994. She became an associate with McInnes Cooper in 2000 and a partner in 2002, practising primarily in the areas of commercial litigation, employment law, administrative law and general litigation.
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|The Crown’s comments ‘ were made on purpose in order to paint a very negative opinion of the accused,’ says Elliott Willschick.|
In this case, Haiden Suarez-Noa had conceded he had stabbed his wife with a knife, according to Reid. But in open court and with the jury absent, defence counsel suggested he expected to raise a defence of provocation, Reid noted. Following the opening address and reading of an agreed statement of facts, however, the defence brought an application for a mistrial.
In the opening address, the Crown made references to personality traits the could disguise “deep uncontrolled rage” and went on to note that most people are able to push back against their instincts given “the norms of our society.” She then discussed an older movie, Impulse, in which people return to their “most feral instincts” due to a water supply issue in a small town.
“That ladies and gentlemen, is what this trial is about: the difference between reasonable human beings and animals,” prosecutor Kimberly Rogers told the jury.
“That characterization of the accused was both highly improper and was of such a nature that it could not be erased from the minds of the jurors even with a significant correcting instruction,” wrote Reid.
“The fairness of the trial process was irremediably compromised.”
Toronto criminal defence lawyer Elliott Willschick agrees.
“The Crown’s comments were beyond inflammatory and prejudiced the trial considerably. There is no way the jury could forget such inflammatory comments,” he says.
“Normally, the Crown makes their opening address to the jury so that they can outline the case and explain how the process works,” he adds, suggesting the situation in Suarez-Noa wasn’t necessarily an isolated incident.
“Inappropriate comments do arise and the courts accord leniency to those who make them,” says Willschick, distinguishing this case from another one in which the court found a reference to “Mr. Guilty” to be inadvertent.
“The comments in R v. Suarez-Noa were made on purpose in order to paint a very negative opinion of the accused,” says Willschick.
Reid’s other big concern was Rogers’ reference to the fact Suarez-Noa would raise the defence of provocation and her instruction to the jurors that they must consider whether the facts “accord with the accused’s version of events or belie it.”
“It may be that the accused will rely on the defence of provocation,” wrote Reid.
“It also may be that the accused will testify or call evidence in his defence. However, those are decisions for the accused to make in due course. It is highly inappropriate for Crown counsel to advise the jury of the defence position without a prior agreement, and particularly implying to the jury that the accused will testify.”
In the end, Reid found “the combination of rhetorical over-zealousness, personal opinion, argument, negation of the accused’s right to silence and implied reversal of the onus of proof combine to make a mistrial the only available option. The fairness of the trial was irreparably damaged beyond the possibility of redemption through a correcting instruction.”
Charn Gill, one of the defence counsel for Suarez-Noa, says the Crown’s actions left him “dumbfounded.”
“I’ve never seen a Crown go so far astray from what they’re supposed to do in an opening statement,” says Gill, who notes he quickly moved forward with the mistrial application after hearing the opening address.
Gill calls the situation a “colossal waste of resources” given the one month set aside for the trial. The goal now is to try to find time in November, he notes.
“I’m surprised the Crown attorney’s office is allowing the Crown to continue,” says Gill, suggesting that while inappropriate comments sometimes arise in opening statements, the accumulation of circumstances in Suarez-Noa was rare. “I think it was a rare thing that you’d make that many mistakes,” he says.
A Vancouver family lawyer with Jenkins Marzban Logan LLP, Grace Choi has been appointed a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Family Division, to replace Justice R. Crawford, who elected supernumerary status in August of 2014.
The Dalhousie graduate was admitted to the B.C. bar in 1993 and in Ontario in 1996. She became an accredited family law mediator in 2013 and was appointed Queen’s Counsel in 2014.
Federal Court Justice Denis Gascon, who also sat on the Competition Tribunal, has been named chairman of the Competition Tribunal to replace Justice D.J. Rennie, who in turn has been appointed to the Federal Court of Appeal. Gascon was appointed to the Federal Court on Feb, 26, 2015. Prior to that, he joined Ogilvy Renault (now Norton Rose Fulbright Canada) in 1989, where he became a partner in 1997.
Recently retired Canadian Forces legal adviser Patrick K. Gleeson, has been appointed to the Federal Court to fill a new position created by Bill C-11.
After being admitted to the bar of New Brunswick in 1994, he joined the Office of the Assistant Judge Advocate General in Halifax as a legal adviser and worked in different directorates until 2000. He became the JAG’s Director of Legal Services, where from 2005 he served as the senior legal adviser.
Cilian Sheahan, of Poole Althouse in Corner Brook, N.L., has been appointed as a judge of the Newfoundland and Labrador’s Supreme Court, Trial and Family Division to replace Justice R.A. Fowler who will move to supernumerary status this month.
He was called to the N.L. in 2000 and appointed Queen’s Counsel in 2013. Sheahan’s areas of practice were corporate and commercial law, municipal, labour and employment law and corporate estate planning. In 2004, he joined the Canadian Forces as a legal officer.
Following the resignation of Justice V.A. Schuler, Justice Andrew M. Mahar of the Nunavut Court of Justice in Iqaluit, will become a judge of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories.
Mahar is called to the bars in Ontario, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories. Clinic Director of the Kitikmeot Law Centre of the Northwest Territories Legal Aid Clinic. He has mostly practised as a sole practitioner but was also Clinic Director of the Kitikmeot Law Centre of the Northwest Territories Legal Aid Clinic in Cambridge Bay.
Sylvia Corthorn, a lawyer with Kelly Santini LLP/SRL in Ottawa, will replace Justice L.D. Ratushny of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Ratushny has been elected to supernumerary status, which had come in effect in June last year.
Corthorn was called to the bar in 1984 and has mainly practised in the areas of personal injury law, medical and dental malpractice, insurance defence litigation, and commercial and estate litigation.
Superior Court of Quebec Justice Charles Ouellet moves from the districts of Saint-François and Bedford, with residence in Cowansville, to the districts of Saint-François and Bedford, with residence in Sherbrooke. Ouellet will replace Justice Y. Tardif who has elected supernumerary status effective June 1. He was originally appointed to the Superior Court of Quebec in 2011.
Also in Quebec, Serge Gaudet, a lawyer with Langlois Kronström Desjardins in Montréal will replace Justice J. Lanctôt as puisne judge of the Superior Court of Quebec. Justice Lanctot has elected supernumerary status.
Gaudet was called to the bar in 1987. His main areas of practice were civil and commercial litigation.
A lawyer with Bouchard Page Tremblay in Quebec, Simon Hebert is appointed to Superior Court of Quebec to replace a by Justice M. Fortin, who has resigned.
Mostly a class action counsel, Heber was called to the bar in 1989. He has also been an officer with the Canadian Armed Forces since 1983
Chantal Tremblay, who is a lawyer with McCarthy Tétrault LLP in Montreal, also joins the Superior Court, taking over for Justice A. Denis.
Called to the bar in 1995, Tremblay is a former Quebec managing partner at McCarthys. Her main areas of practice were commercial litigation, class actions, professional liability, insurance law, environmental law, medical liability and disciplinary law.
Finally, Alexandre Bouchar a lawyer with the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions has also been appointed to the Superior Court. He will be replacing Justice C. Champagne, who elected to supernumerary status.
Bouchar was called to the bar in 1996. He joined the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions in 2010, and was previously a sole practitioner from 1995 to 2010.
Saskatchewan provincial court Judge Jeffery D. Kalmakoff in Regina has elevated to the court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan. Justice D.P Ball of Regina has elected supernumerary status on May 9, 2014.
Prior to his appointment Saskatchewan Court of Justice in 2009, Kalmakoff was a Crown prosecutor with the Public Prosecutions Division of the Saskatchewan Ministry and Attorney General in Regina between 1996 and 2009. He was called to the bar in 1994.
Don R. Sommerfeldt, a counsel with Dentons Canada LLP in Edmonton, is the newest appointed judge of the Tax Court of Canada to replace a resignation by Justice G. Sheridan.
He was called in Alberta in 1978 and to the bar of New York in 2004. Sommerfeldt has been with Dentons Canada LLP (formerly Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP) since 2000 practising taxation, estate planning, and pensions.
A lawyer with McInnes Cooper in Halifax, Henry A. Visser, is also appointed to the Tax Court to replace Justice D. Cambell who elected supernumerary status as of this year, June 19., will take over.
Visser mainly practised tax law, corporate law, commercial law, labour law, and employment law. He was admitted to the bar of Nova Scotia in 1995 and to P.E.I. in 1998
|Police cannot base an informed waiver of the right to counsel on the tone of a response, says the court. (Photo: Shutterstock)|
The issue before the court was whether Ouimet’s Charter rights were violated when he was informed of his right to a lawyer and he responded “yeah yeah” in what police described as a dismissive tone.
“That is to say, that yeah, yeah, meant no,” wrote Abrams in his May 15 ruling, in outlining the position of police and the Crown.
Ouimet was stopped by Cornwall police on suspicion of being impaired. After his response to police, the officer made no further attempt to see if Ouimet wanted to contact a lawyer. Ouimet was charged after he refused to provide a breath sample.
Provincial Court Justice Bruce McPhee convicted Ouimet and accepted the testimony of police as to what “yeah yeah” meant.
In the appeal of that decision, Abrams agreed with the arguments of Ouimet’s lawyer James Foord, that an informed waiver of the right to counsel cannot be based on the tone of an affirmative response.
“The appellant may have actually been flippant, cavalier, dismissive and even annoying in his dealings with the officer, but tone of speech and attitude cannot, in the absence of further inquiry, be used to lower the high standard required for a clear and unequivocal waiver of an accused’s right to counsel,” wrote Abrams.
The Superior Court decision is a reminder of a straightforward obligation for police, says Foord, a partner at Foord Davies LLP in Ottawa.
“We are talking about a fundamental right, when someone is at a power disadvantage,” says Foord. “It would not take very much effort for an officer to inquire further, if there is any ambiguity” to a question about whether someone is waiving a right to counsel.
“Yeah, yeah” can have more than one meaning, Foord agrees. But that is why police have to ask follow up questions, he says.
Abrams, who was an RCMP officer for 18 years before entering the practice of law, rejected the Crown’s submission that the evidence should be admitted because the officer was acting in good faith.
“Though perhaps not a flagrant breach, this misconduct amounts to a serious infringement of the appellant’s Charter rights. The officer should have known his Charter obligations during this routine impaired driving investigation. The conduct here is in the category of behavior from which the court should be concerned to disassociate itself,” Abrams wrote.
|The mandatory nature of victim surcharges is ‘impractical and illogical,’ says Anthony Moustacalis. (Photo: Robin Kuniski)|
The provisions have a disproportionate effect on low-income offenders and those with disabilities, with “no perceivable positive benefit for government or society,” says Daniel Santoro, who is representing the appellants.
Speaking about the legislation in general and not the backgrounds of his clients, the surcharges “further entrench people in the cycle of poverty,” says Santoro, a lawyer at Doucette Boni Santoro Furgiuele in Toronto.
The president of the Ontario Criminal Lawyers’ Association says it will seek to play a role in the appeal.
“We are committed to intervene on this issue,” says Anthony Moustacalis.
The mandatory nature of the surcharges is “impractical and illogical,” he adds, saying that discretion on whether they should be imposed, should be returned to trial judges.
If leave is granted, it will be the first time a provincial Court of Appeal has been asked to decide the constitutionality of the amendments enacted in 2013 as part of the Increasing Offenders’ Accountability to Victims Act.
At the time they were announced, then-justice minister Rob Nicholson described the reason behind the changes, which was to hold offenders accountable to victims.
“A victim surcharge is an additional penalty imposed on convicted offenders at the time of sentencing,” Nicholson told a House of Commons committee.
The ruling by Glass in R v. Tinker Judge Bondoc & Mead, stemmed from a Crown appeal and it is the first Superior Court decision in Ontario on the issue.
The four defendants had all been convicted of relatively minor offences and were of “limited financial resources,” noted Glass. One of the accused for example, is legally blind, lives on social assistance, and has $31 left over after paying her monthly rent.
Glass concluded the surcharges are not punishment.
“It is not in the form of a penalty. It flows from a conviction for a crime, but it is not a sanction in its own right,” he wrote. Instead, it is “a sum of money established to be a consequence of breaking the law,” stated Glass, who compared it to a DNA order.
The provisions leave it up to each province to determine the collection mechanisms. In the case before Glass, the Crown agreed to allow the defendants two years to pay surcharges ranging from $200 to $300.
Glass, who earns $308,000 annually as a Superior Court judge, stated that if the defendants do not put aside enough money to pay, they are the “author of their own misfortune,” for any future sanctions.
The surcharges have been criticized by provincial court judges across the country and in some cases they have waived payment.
Last year in Saskatchewan, the Crown was successful in obtaining a writ of mandamus in the Court of Queen’s Bench, which ordered the provincial court judge to impose the surcharge. The sentencing judge’s actions were “defiant and improper” ruled Chief Justice Martel Popescul in granting the Crown’s request.
The most exhaustive ruling on the surcharges was issued in July 2014, by Ontario provincial court Justice David Paciocco, who found in R v. Michael that the provisions violated s. 12 of the Charter.
The defendant, who had addiction issues, was homeless and lived on $250 per month in social assistance, was facing $900 in surcharges for offences that included breaching court orders and for trying to shoplift a bottle of alcohol
The three Crown attorneys in the provincial court trial, led by Dallas Mack, argued the surcharges are not disproportionate and even if Michael could never pay, he would not face additional time in jail.
Paciocco observed that while the Crown agreed that Michael is unlikely ever to be able to seek credit or find the money to apply for a criminal pardon, he is still expected under the law to pay the surcharge.
“If Mr. Michael cannot pay that victim surcharge because of his poverty, the effect is that he will be perpetually disqualified from applying for full integration and formal forgiveness,” wrote Paciocco, who noted that an offender cannot apply for a pardon if surcharge money is still owed.
The Crown filed an appeal of Paciocco’s finding that the surcharges breached the Charter. It abandoned its appeal, on the eve of the hearing in Superior Court last month, after Glass issued his decision, which is currently binding on provincial court judges in Ontario.
Judges on the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del. and Ontario Superior Court of Justice held an unprecedented joint cross-border trial on the dispute, with the courtrooms linked by video. The legal battle has raged for years through numerous courts, chewing up more than $1 billion in fees for lawyers and other advisors.
Nortel filed for bankruptcy in 2009 and sold its global operations and patents, raising the cash in dispute. In the years that corporate entities in Canada, the United States and Europe have fought over the funds, retirees and bond investors have awaited repayment.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross and Justice Frank Newbould said in separate opinions that each regional business would receive cash to pay its creditors based on their claims against it as a percentage of the overall claims worldwide.
The judges said in their simultaneous opinions that a pro rata division was the most fair and satisfactory way to split the money.
Gross wrote in his 130-page opinion that the various regional business “have lost sight of the irrationality of their respective positions” and left “no virtually no middle ground.”
The Canadian unit had argued it should receive about 83 per cent of the money, because it was the legal owner of many of the assets sold. The European businesses wanted the money divided based on each region’s contribution toward creating the value of the assets that were sold. As the U.S. unit saw things, it deserved 73 percent of the cash based on its beneficial ownership model.
Lawyers for the U.S., Canadian and European units of Nortel did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
“It would not be going out on a limb to say that the rulings get appealed regardless of what they contain,” wrote Kevin Starke, an analyst with CRT Capital in a note published before the opinions.
He said a “middle ground” ruling was best in terms of wrapping up the cases without dragging them out for more than another year.
Nortel was once among the world’s largest tech companies. Its stock market valuation swelled to $260 billion and Nortel employed nearly 100,000 at its peak, before the bursting of the telecom bubble and accounting problems.
In his decision, Newbould gave kudos to the court reporters, technical staff and lawyers who all worked on the complex cross-border case. As well he had praise for his U.S. counterpart.
“I want to thank Judge Gross for his courtesies and good humour. It has been a pleasure to work with him. Without such a good relationship and the trust that we developed for each other, this trial and its conclusion would not have been possible.”
Read more on the nuts and bolts of how the case was conducted in next week’s Law Times.
|Justice Marianne Rivoalen is the new associate chief justice of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench (Family Division).|
Rivoalen was appointed a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench for Manitoba (Family Division) in 2005. Prior to that, she was a senior counsel and team leader of aboriginal law services with the Department of Justice Canada as well as the indian residential school litigation counsel as well as a long-practising litigation lawyer with Aikins,MacAulay & Thorvaldson in Winnipeg. She has also been an arbitrator with the Manitoba Labour Board, deputy chief commissioner of the Residential Tenancies Commission in Winnipeg, and a litigation lawyer with Pitlabo & Hoskin in Winnipeg.
Richard F. Southcott, vice president and general counsel at Irving Shipbuilding Inc. in Halifax, has been appointed to the Federal Court to fill a new position created by Bill C-11.
Southcott was called to the bar in 1993, then joined Stewart McKelvey in Halifax as an associate, practising marine law and commercial litigation. He became a partner in 2001, and was the regional managing partner from 2008 until 2013, when he joined Irving Shipbuilding.
Also from Halifax, R. Lester Jesudason has been appointed to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Family Division. He replaces Justice R. James Williams, who elected to become a supernumerary judge as of April 18.
Jesudason was called to the bar in 1997, then joined Blois Nickerson & Bryson LLP in Halifax as an associate, practising civil litigation and insurance law. He became a partner in 2002. He has been chairman of the Nova Scotia Police Review Board and active with various bar associations.
In Saint John, N.B., Marie-Claude Blais is the newest judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick, Trial Division. She replaces to replace Justice Peter Glennie who went supernumerary April 22.
Blais was called to the bar of Quebec in 1995 and New Brunswick in 1998. She was appointed Queen’s Counsel in 2010. She has been counsel with McInnes Cooper since 2014. Prior to that, she had been minister of education and early childhood development for the province of New Brunswick. She was also the first woman to serve as attorney general and minister of justice and consumer affairs for New Brunswick. She was also a lawyer with LeBlanc Maillet, where she practised corporate and business, family, and real estate law.
In Ontario, Superior Court Justice Lois B. Roberts has been elevated to the Court of Appeal. She fills the spot left when Justice George Strathy was named chief last June.
Roberts was appointed to the Superior Court in 2008. Prior to her appointment, she was a lawyer with Genest Murray LLP and Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, practising commercial litigation, employment law, and human rights law.
Toronto lawyer Kenneth G. Hood fills Roberts spot on the Superior Court. He was called to the bar in 1982 and was a certified specialist in civil litigation.
Hood was counsel with Schneider Ruggiero LLP since 2010. Prior to that, he was worked with firms Lawrence Lawrence Stevenson LLP in Brampton, Ont., Glaholt LLP in Toronto, Dingwall McLaughlin and Woolley Dale & Dingwall (later changed to Dale and Dingwall).
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