

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: *Gill v. Hain Celestial Canada*,
2025 BCSC 1395

Date: 20250722
Docket: S246625
Registry: Vancouver

Between:

Harjit Singh Gill

Plaintiff

And

**Hain Celestial Canada, Hain Celestial Group,
Encorp Pacific, Ledcor Industries Inc.,
Grand Lodge of BC and Yukon (Freemason), Taylor Swift**

Defendants

Before: The Honourable Justice S. Ramsay

Reasons for Judgment

The Plaintiff, appearing in person:

H. Gill

Counsel for the Defendant, Hain Celestial
Canada and Hain Celestial Group:

J. Sanderson

Counsel for Encorp Pacific:

L. Whittaker

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Counsel for Grand Lodge of BC and Yukon
(Freemason):

S. Hillman

Place and Date of Hearing:

Vancouver, B.C.
May 14 and 26, 2025

Place and Date of Judgment:

Vancouver, B.C.
July 22, 2025

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW..... 3

DOES THE NOCC DISCLOSE A REASONABLE CLAIM? (RULE 9-5(1)(A)) 5

 Pleading deficiencies..... 6

 No prospect of success 7

IS THE NOCC “UNNECESSARY, SCANDALOUS, FRIVOLOUS, OR VEXATIOUS”? (RULE 9-5(1)(B))..... 10

WILL PERMITTING THE CLAIM TO PROCEED AS PLEADED IN THE NOCC “PREJUDICE, EMBARRASS, OR DELAY” A FAIR TRIAL? (RULE 9-5(1)(C)) 12

IS THE NOCC OTHERWISE AN ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT? (RULE 9-5(1)(D)) 13

CONCLUSION REGARDING STRIKE APPLICATIONS 14

SHOULD I GIVE MR. GILL LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED PLEADING? 14

CONCLUSION..... 16

Overview

[1] The plaintiff, Mr. Gill, believes that he is a victim of human trafficking. The theory underlying his claim is complicated. In summary, Mr. Gill says that he is both a fiction and a non-fiction, made up of four distinct and separate entities. He alleges that these different entities have been trafficked by the defendants to this proceeding. He says the defendants' wrongdoing was revealed to him through a complex system of secret signs and social media messages.

[2] The defendants, Hain Celestial Canada and Hain Celestial Group (together, "Hain"), Encorp Pacific, Ledcor Industries Inc., and Grand Lodge of BC and Yukon (Freemason), say that Mr. Gill is an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) litigant. They each apply to strike his notice of civil claim ("NOCC") pursuant to Rule 9-5(1) of the *Supreme Court Civil Rules*. The defendants say the NOCC discloses no material claim. They say Mr. Gill's claims are vexatious and unintelligible, and that permitting them to proceed would encumber a fair trial and be an abuse of court process.

[3] Mr. Gill denies that he is an OPCA litigant. He says he has legitimate legal claims that he should be able to pursue in this proceeding.

[4] Given the factual and substantive overlap among the applications, I heard them together. The plaintiff also names Taylor Swift as a defendant in the proceeding, but she had not been served with the NOCC at the time I heard the applications and did not participate in the hearing. However, it is apparent that the issues raised in the applications also arise in respect of the claim against Ms. Swift. I therefore raised with Mr. Gill the prospect of the Court striking the claim against Ms. Swift of its own motion and gave him the opportunity to make submissions in that regard.

[5] Whether Mr. Gill should be permitted to continue with his claim against the defendants (including Ms. Swift) turns on the following issues, any one of which may be determinative:

1. Does the NOCC disclose a reasonable claim? (Rule 9-5(1)(a))
2. Is the NOCC “unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious”? (Rule 9-5(1)(b))
3. Will permitting the claim to proceed as pleaded in the NOCC “prejudice, embarrass, or delay” a fair trial? (Rule 9-5(1)(c))
4. Is the NOCC otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court? (Rule 9-5(1)(d))

[6] If I conclude that the NOCC should be struck, a fifth issue arises:

5. Should I give Mr. Gill leave to file an amended pleading?

[7] Mr. Gill is not represented by legal counsel. He appeared in person at the hearing and was respectful and generally followed court rules and procedures. As a self-represented litigant without legal training, I have given his application responses and submissions a flexible and generous interpretation. Having done so, I conclude there is no question the NOCC must be struck. It discloses no reasonable claim. It is an example of a pleading that is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious. If Mr. Gill’s claim proceeds as pleaded, a fair trial will be impossible. The allegations made in the NOCC constitute an abuse of court process. Taken together, the problems with the NOCC overwhelmingly support an order that it be struck.

[8] The problems with the existing NOCC stem from the problematic underlying theory of Mr. Gill’s case. Except for a potential constructive dismissal claim against Encorp, Mr. Gill should not have leave to file an amended NOCC because there is no possibility that amendments will resolve the problems with the existing NOCC.

[9] Mr. Gill might have a legitimate constructive dismissal claim against Encorp. However, I believe there is substantial risk that if I give him leave to file an amended NOCC in that regard, he will continue to also advance human trafficking and related claims against Encorp. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate to require that Mr. Gill obtain leave of the Court to file an amended NOCC if he wants to pursue a constructive dismissal claim against Encorp.

Does the NOCC disclose a reasonable claim? (Rule 9-5(1)(a))

[10] The defendants rely on Rule 9-5(1)(a), which provides that a NOCC may be struck if “it discloses no reasonable claim”. They say that much of the NOCC is unintelligible and discloses no legitimate legal claim against them. To the extent the NOCC includes a cause of action known to law, they say Mr. Gill has not clearly pleaded the necessary facts in support. Mr. Gill does not plead that he was employed by Ledcor, only that he worked at Ledcor construction sites while employed by another company. Ledcor adds Mr. Gill’s constructive dismissal claim against it would in any event be statute-barred. Hain adds that any claim Mr. Gill might have regarding his employment with Hain falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.

[11] Mr. Gill says the NOCC contains “overwhelming facts” to support his allegations (Gill written argument, p. 18). He denies that he has pleaded unintelligible facts; rather, he says these facts are necessary, because they “[showcase] how the defendants planned and orchestrated the human trafficking” (application response to Ledcor’s application, Part 4, para. 4). He says there is no merit to Hain’s jurisdiction argument, because “the current essential part” of his claim against Hain “is their conduct after the layoff which goes to dominance and control in engaging in the human trafficking” (Gill written argument, p. 11).

[12] In support of the relief he seeks, Mr. Gill relies on various case authorities, labour and employment law, the Constitution, the *Criminal Code*, admiralty and maritime law, and the *Federal Courts Act* and *Federal Court Rules*. He says these authorities and legislation give rise to legal principles that support his claims.

[13] I do not accept Mr. Gill’s position. The NOCC discloses no reasonable claim because it does not meet pleadings requirements, and because it is plain and obvious that, with one narrow exception, the claims Mr. Gill advances have no prospect of success.

Pleading deficiencies

[14] A NOCC must concisely set out the material facts giving rise to the claim, the relief sought against each named defendant, and a summary of the legal basis for the relief sought: Rule 3-1(2)(a)–(c). Mr. Gill’s NOCC does not meet these requirements.

[15] The Statement of Alleged Facts in Part 1 of the NOCC consists of 43 paragraphs. Some of those paragraphs contain coherent alleged facts about the plaintiff’s background and employment history. However, much of Part 1 cannot be described as a “concise statement of ... material facts”, as required by Rule 3-1(2)(a). Instead, Mr. Gill makes many allegations of fact that are unintelligible, incapable of proof, or both. For example, Part 1 includes long explanations of “a new concept of Truth for the planet, called Truth of H” and of the signs and symbols allegedly associated with that new truth.

[16] Other alleged facts in Part 1 are intelligible, but have no apparent relevance to the claims against the named defendants or the defendants Mr. Gill now advises he wishes to add to the claim (13 Management, United Steel Workers Union, Saint Paul’s Hospital, and Providence Healthcare). These pleaded facts consist of allegations about a poisoning (para. 12), an unrelated appeal proceeding (para. 13), and social media videos of an NFL cheerleader (para. 14).

[17] Finally, Part 1 includes various assertions of legal liability for criminal offences and negligence without articulating coherent, provable facts in support of the allegations (paras. 39, 41, 43). Mr. Gill says he will amend the NOCC to add a statement clarifying the nature of his claim (Gill written argument, p. 23). The proposed amendment does not resolve the problem; it repeats Mr. Gill’s various assertions of legal liability and criminal behaviour in a single paragraph, but does not

include any material facts in support of those allegations. This offends Rule 3-7(9), which requires that conclusions of law “not be pleaded unless the material facts supporting them are pleaded”.

[18] With one exception, Part 2 of the NOCC fails to set out the relief sought against each named defendant, as required by Rule 3-1(2)(b). While para. 45 specifically relates to one defendant (it seeks an order “to arrest” all of Ms. Swift’s assets), the bulk of Part 2 is contained in para. 44, which asserts that the “court shall sign the order that will be presented by the plaintiff to the court, which includes amounts in dollar figures for damages relating to” various claims. Mr. Gill says that he will amend para. 44 “to add words to disclose which defendants are being alleged to have caused each of the damages listed in this section” (Gill written argument, p. 23). I agree that amendment would address the concern that the NOCC does not comply with Rule 3-1(2)(b). It would not, however, resolve the other difficulties with the NOCC discussed in these reasons.

[19] Finally, Part 3 of the NOCC does not properly set out a summary of the legal basis for Mr. Gill’s claims, as required by Rule 3-1(2)(c). For the most part, Part 3 simply contains a list of cases, legislation, and areas of law, with no explanation of how the listed items support Mr. Gill’s claims. To the extent Mr. Gill articulates a legal basis in Part 3, it is not legally sound (for example, he denies that the common law applies to him), or it describes something outside Supreme Court jurisdiction (for example, paras. 59–62 describe matters under Federal Court jurisdiction).

[20] While the problems described above are technical pleadings issues that could conceivably be resolved by amendments to the NOCC, there are more fundamental problems with Mr. Gill’s claims, discussed below.

No prospect of success

[21] I must assume that the facts Mr. Gill pleads are true for the purpose of the Rule 9-5(1)(a) analysis. If there is a chance Mr. Gill’s claim could succeed based on these facts, I should not strike it: *Sahyoun v. Ho*, 2015 BCSC 392 at para. 57.

[22] Mr. Gill says his claim is “principally” about “Child/Human Trafficking” and related *Criminal Code* offences (Gill written argument, p. 1). In his written argument, he explains that he is pursuing a civil claim for damages caused by the defendants’ criminal activity. The claim turns on Mr. Gill’s allegation that he is not a person, but is instead a non-fiction with four separate personas. He explained in oral submissions that it is these personas that have been trafficked.

[23] In the NOCC, Mr. Gill describes a confusing and mostly unintelligible series of alleged facts about the “Truth of H” and various related signs and symbols. These alleged facts apparently relate to the trafficking of his personas. To the extent I can make any sense of the facts alleged by Mr. Gill, and assuming those facts to be true, they do not support any recognized civil claim against the defendants. His claim that he is a non-fiction made up of multiple personas that have been trafficked by the defendants (and/or subjected to other criminal offences committed by them) has no prospect of success.

[24] The only claim known in law that I can discern from the NOCC that might have a reasonable prospect of success arises from Mr. Gill’s allegations of constructive dismissal. The other claims—the principal claims, as Mr. Gill describes them—relate to Mr. Gill’s allegation that he is the victim of human trafficking and other criminal offenses committed by the defendants. These claims are premised on the theory that Mr. Gill has four personas and on various other confusing and unprovable alleged facts. They are not claims that are known in law, at least not in the way Mr. Gill conceives of them.

[25] While Mr. Gill says his constructive dismissal allegations are part of his broader human trafficking claim, I have considered whether the NOCC discloses an independent claim for constructive dismissal against any of the defendants.

[26] Mr. Gill does not allege any employment relationship with Grand Lodge or Ms. Swift. There is therefore no prospect that Mr. Gill could succeed in a constructive dismissal claim against either of them.

[27] Mr. Gill pleads that from January 2, 2018, to July 12, 2019, he was employed by Trades Labour Corporation, and in that capacity, he worked at various Ledcor construction sites. Ledcor could not have constructively dismissed Mr. Gill, because Ledcor was not Mr. Gill's employer. In any event, I agree with Ledcor that any potential employment claim against them is well past the expiry of the limitation period. For these reasons, there is no prospect of Mr. Gill succeeding in a constructive dismissal claim against Ledcor.

[28] Mr. Gill pleads he was employed by Hain from December 18, 2023, to June 7, 2024. His allegation of constructive dismissal against Hain appears to be related to alleged workplace safety issues and harassment by his supervisor. The difficulty with this claim is that Mr. Gill was a unionized employee and constructive dismissal falls within the scope of the collective agreement.

[29] Mr. Gill says the collective agreement does not apply, because the constructive dismissal was part of Hain's trafficking of him. There is no merit to this argument. The essential character of Mr. Gill's constructive dismissal claim necessarily arises out of the factual setting of his employment. It is therefore covered by the collective agreement and the Court has no jurisdiction: *Moznik v. Richmond (City)*, 2006 BCSC 1848 at paras. 23–24; *Belik v. Purolator Courier Ltd.*, 2007 BCSC 579 at para. 13. There is therefore no prospect of Mr. Gill succeeding in a constructive dismissal claim against Hain in this Court.

[30] Finally, Mr. Gill pleads that from February 2022 to January 1, 2023, he worked for Encorp. Encorp does not deny that it employed Mr. Gill, but argues that Mr. Gill has not pleaded any reasonable claim arising out of that employment relationship. I agree with Encorp that Mr. Gill's allegations of workplace slander and bullying are problematic because they are not supported by any material facts and, in any event, damages for "health and safety issues" is not a proper legal claim.

[31] However, Mr. Gill has pleaded that while employed by Encorp, they maintained and did not rectify unsafe work conditions. He further pleads that he "advised Encorp that the terms of employment have been violated and thus the

employment is terminated” (Part 1, para. 22). While not expressly stated, I understand this to be an allegation that the unsafe work conditions are what violated the terms of employment, amounting to constructive dismissal. In my view, while the claim as pleaded suffers from the pleading deficiencies described above, it cannot be said that there is no prospect of Mr. Gill’s constructive dismissal claim against Encorp succeeding if it was properly pleaded.

Is the NOCC “unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious”?
(Rule 9-5(1)(b))

[32] The defendants say the NOCC is “unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious” within the meaning of Rule 9-5(1)(b), including because Mr. Gill is an OPCA litigant.

[33] OPCA litigants “employ a collection of techniques and arguments to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of governments, corporations and individuals”: *Arbabi v. McLelland*, 2024 BCSC 91 at para. 30, citing *Meads v. Meads*, 2012 ABQB 571 at para. 1. The defendants say that the NOCC contains many paragraphs that include the typical indicia of OPCA litigants, which are described at length in *Meads*.

[34] I agree with the defendants that the NOCC contains some of the indicia of OPCA claims. Mr. Gill has adopted a “double/split person” strategy and states his name in duplicate forms using only upper-case letters. He pleads that he is not a person, and that legal personhood is a fiction. He relies on admiralty law. The NOCC denies the Court’s jurisdiction.

[35] Mr. Gill says that he is not an OPCA litigant. I acknowledge that he did not engage in the unusual in-court conduct typically associated with OPCA litigants. He was respectful and his conduct was appropriate. I also observe that some of the more common indicia of OPCA claims are absent from the NOCC.

[36] However, the question of whether the NOCC is “unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious” does not turn on whether Mr. Gill is or is not an OPCA

litigant. The indicia of OPCA claims are “telltale fingerprints that are typically found in OPCA litigation, and that, if identified, may warrant closer review and specific court procedures”: *Meads* at para. 202. Regardless of whether Mr. Gill’s theory of his claim is based on OPCA techniques and arguments or has some other source, what matters is that the content of his NOCC is unusual and warrants closer review.

[37] A pleading may be unnecessary, frivolous, or vexatious if it “is so confusing that it is difficult to understand what is pleaded”: *Willow v. Chong*, 2013 BCSC 1083, para. 20. The alleged facts pleaded to support Mr. Gill’s theory that he has been trafficked have that quality. The legal basis pleaded by Mr. Gill is also confusing. The relationship between much of what Mr. Gill has pleaded in Part 3 and the claims he is advancing is not obvious. Even where I can make out a connection between the legal basis and Mr. Gill’s claims, it is difficult to understand the relevance of what he has pleaded. Mr. Gill’s submissions and written argument do not provide clarity; to the contrary, they reinforce the incoherence of the NOCC.

[38] A pleading is also unnecessary or vexatious if it does not advance a claim known in law: *Willow* at para. 20. As already explained, the only claim known in law that I can discern from the NOCC is Mr. Gill’s allegations of constructive dismissal.

[39] The defendants also say that Mr. Gill’s denial of the Court’s jurisdiction is inherently frivolous and vexatious. They say that alone is sufficient to warrant striking his claim.

[40] Mr. Gill says that I should not be concerned about statements in the NOCC that deny the Court’s jurisdiction, because he is aware that the Court assumes jurisdiction and he is not asking for a ruling on whether the Court has jurisdiction over him. I do not agree with Mr. Gill’s submission.

[41] Even if Mr. Gill is not seeking a ruling on jurisdiction, his entire claim is still premised on the Court not having jurisdiction. He pleads that “common law lacks jurisdiction to oppose the court orders” he presents (Part 1, para. 2). He pleads that the “court does not have jurisdiction to refuse any court order requested by the

plaintiff” (Part 1, para. 3). He pleads that “common law does not apply to the plaintiff” (Part 1, para. 4). He pleads that the court “shall sign the order that will be presented by the plaintiff to the court” (Part 2, para. 44). He pleads that “the courts have no jurisdiction to not approve an order presented to the court by the plaintiff” (Part 3, para. 58).

[42] A claim that is grounded in assertions that the Court does not have jurisdiction, as Mr. Gill’s claim is, is “clearly invalid and cannot be a basis for litigation”; the claim is “intrinsically frivolous and vexatious”: *Meads* at para. 556.

[43] I have no hesitation in concluding that the NOCC is scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious, given the problems described above.

Will permitting the claim to proceed as pleaded in the NOCC “prejudice, embarrass, or delay” a fair trial? (Rule 9-5(1)(c))

[44] The defendants say the NOCC also offends Rule 9-5(1)(c), which provides that a pleading may be struck if it may prejudice, embarrass, or delay a fair trial. They argue that Mr. Gill’s claim is so unintelligible that it will encumber a fair trial. They say they are prejudiced because the NOCC includes irrelevant facts and is calculated to confuse them.

[45] Pleadings that are prolix, confusing, and unintelligible are embarrassing within the meaning of Rule 9-5(1)(c): *Hutcheson v. British Columbia*, 2020 BCSC 1986 at para. 23. Where it is impossible to “provide a reasonable and concise response” to a pleading because of how it is drafted, the pleading is embarrassing: *Hutcheson* at para. 23.

[46] I do not believe that Mr. Gill made a calculated decision to draft the NOCC in a way that would confuse the defendants and make it difficult to defend themselves. I accept that Mr. Gill truly believes the allegations he has made. I have no doubt that the pleadings make sense *to him*. I do not think he intends to confuse the defendants.

[47] That said, as already explained, much of the NOCC is unintelligible. This makes any meaningful response by the defendants impossible and prejudices their ability to defend against his claim. Many of the allegations are simply incapable of being proved or disproved, which also prejudices the defendants' ability to defend themselves. It is impossible for the defendants to respond to claims that are not known at law. The allegations in the NOCC "do not allow the defendants to know the case to be met, or to provide any form of concise or reasonable response":

Hutcheson at para. 44.

[48] For the above reasons, I conclude that permitting Mr. Gill's claim to proceed as pleaded in the NOCC will "prejudice, embarrass, or delay" a fair trial.

Is the NOCC otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court? (Rule 9-5(1)(d))

[49] Finally, the defendants say that the NOCC is an abuse of process and should be struck pursuant to Rule 9-5(1)(d).

[50] Permitting a NOCC to proceed will be an abuse of process if doing so "would violate principles of judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice": *Sahyoun* at para. 60. Where it is "difficult or impossible for the defendant to understand the claims against it and the case to be made out", a NOCC fails to serve the purpose of pleadings and is an abuse of the court's process: *Hutcheson* at para. 24.

[51] I have already concluded that the defendants are prevented from meaningfully responding to Mr. Gill's claims as they are pleaded. In addition to making the NOCC embarrassing, as found above, it also constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court.

[52] Further, the repeated denials of the Court's jurisdiction throughout the NOCC and Mr. Gill's assertion that the Court must approve any order he seeks are pleadings that violate the integrity of the administration of justice. This also constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court.

Conclusion regarding strike applications

[53] The above reasons summarize the problems I have relied on in deciding the issues before me; however, these reasons should not be taken as a complete review of the problems that exist with the NOCC. As in *Sahyoun*, the NOCC in this case “is so overwhelmed with difficulty that it is simply not possible to fully identify all of the specific inadequacies that exist”: at para. 64.

[54] The NOCC discloses no reasonable claim and is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious. It makes a fair trial impossible. It contains allegations that are an abuse of court process. These problems are so overwhelming that there is no way to save any part of the NOCC. In my view, the whole of the NOCC must be struck.

Should I give Mr. Gill leave to file an amended pleading?

[55] With one exception, the overwhelming problems with the NOCC cannot be remedied by amendment, for two reasons.

[56] First, the principal focus of Mr. Gill’s claim against the defendants is the alleged human trafficking. As explained above, there is no basis in law for that claim.

[57] Second, except for his claim against Encorp, there is no prospect that Mr. Gill’s allegation of constructive dismissal against the defendants could succeed, even if the pleading was amended. This is because Mr. Gill does not claim to have ever been employed by Grand Lodge, Ms. Swift, or Ledcor, and because the Court has no jurisdiction over Mr. Gill’s claim against Hain. Amending the NOCC will not resolve these fundamental problems with his claim.

[58] I therefore do not give Mr. Gill leave to file an amended NOCC against Grand Lodge, Ms. Swift, Ledcor, or Hain. Mr. Gill’s claims against them are struck, without leave to amend.

[59] However, I have concluded that it cannot be said that Mr. Gill’s constructive dismissal claim against Encorp has no prospect of success. With amendments to address the other issues with the NOCC described in these reasons, there may be a legitimate constructive dismissal claim against Encorp.

[60] In normal circumstances, I would be inclined to simply give Mr. Gill leave to file an amended NOCC to plead only the constructive dismissal claim against Encorp. However, these are not normal circumstances.

[61] Mr. Gill states that his allegations of constructive dismissal are secondary to human trafficking claim. He says that “the associated reason for the constructive dismissal” is “primarily to aid in the Human Trafficking of the Plaintiff” (Gill written argument, p. 1). Given Mr. Gill’s position and the overarching theory of his claim against the defendants, I am concerned that if he has leave to file an amended NOCC against Encorp, he will file a pleading that restates allegations relating to trafficking and other criminal offenses. The result will be that Encorp “will be back in the same position they are at present and this entire exercise will have to be repeated”, a concern expressed by the Court in deciding a strike application in another proceeding involving Mr. Gill: *Gill v. Canada*, 2013 BCSC 1703 at para. 20.

[62] I therefore consider it appropriate to make an order like that made in *Gill*, requiring that Mr. Gill not file an amended NOCC without further leave of the Court. If Mr. Gill wishes to pursue a constructive dismissal claim against Encorp, he must file an application seeking leave of the Court to do so. I am seized of any such application, which must be filed within 30 days of this decision and must include a draft of the proposed amended NOCC.

[63] The only claim that may be pleaded in the amended NOCC is constructive dismissal as against Encorp. The amended NOCC must plead only those material facts necessary to support the constructive dismissal claim and must not plead allegations of fact or law that are not relevant to the claim for constructive dismissal. The amended NOCC must otherwise comply with the *Rules*, including Rule 3-1(2) (Contents of notice of civil claim) and Rule 3-7 (Pleadings Generally).

Conclusion

[64] In summary, I determine that the NOCC must be struck in its entirety against all defendants pursuant to Rule 9-5(1), because it does not disclose a reasonable claim, it is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious, it is an embarrassing pleading that will prejudice a fair trial, and it is otherwise an abuse of court process. The claims against the defendants Grand Lodge, Ledcor, Hain, and Taylor Swift are struck without leave to amend. All claims against Encorp other than the constructive dismissal claim are struck without leave to amend. Mr. Gill may seek leave to file an amended NOCC against Encorp in respect of his constructive dismissal claim only, on the terms described above.

[65] As the successful parties, I award the applicant defendants costs, with the exception of costs related to preparation of the application records and books of authorities, which should not be included in their respective bills of costs. This is because, while the applicants brought separate applications, they sought similar relief and there was significant overlap between their positions, something that would have been clear to them well in advance of the joint hearing date. Despite that, each filed separate application records and provided me with separate books of authorities. Disbursements associated with the unnecessary duplication of materials that resulted from this approach are not reasonable. It is also not reasonable for the Court to examine the materials to assess the extent which duplication caused unnecessary expense. I therefore exclude all disbursements related to the application records and books of authorities from the costs award.

[66] I make the following orders arising out of these reasons:

1. The plaintiff's claims against the defendants Hain Celestial Canada, Hain Celestial Group, Ledcor Industries Inc., Grand Lodge of BC and Yukon (Freemason), Encorp Pacific, and Taylor Swift as pleaded in the notice of civil claim filed September 24, 2024, are struck pursuant to Rule 9-5(1).
2. The plaintiff is granted leave to amend the notice of civil claim on the following terms:

- i. The amended notice of civil claim must remove Hain Celestial Canada, Hain Celestial Group, Ledcor Industries Inc., Grand Lodge of BC and Yukon (Freemason), and Taylor Swift as defendants, and must not plead any claims against them.
 - ii. The only claim that may be pleaded in the amended notice of civil claim is constructive dismissal as against Encorp;
 - iii. The amended notice of civil claim must plead only those material facts necessary to support the constructive dismissal claim against Encorp and must not plead allegations of fact or law that are not relevant to the claim for constructive dismissal against Encorp; and
 - iv. The amended notice of civil claim must comply with the *Rules*, including without limitation Rule 3-1(2) (Contents of notice of civil claim) and Rule 3-7 (Pleadings Generally).
3. The plaintiff must not file the amended notice of civil claim without further leave of the Court, to be sought by way of court application before Justice Ramsay. The application must be filed within 30 days of this decision and must include a draft proposed amended NOCC that complies with paragraph 2 of this order.
4. The defendants Hain Celestial Canada, Hain Celestial Group, Encorp Pacific, Ledcor Industries Inc., and Grand Lodge of BC and Yukon (Freemason) are awarded costs, but excluding disbursements related to the application records and books of authorities.
5. The plaintiff's signature on the form of order is dispensed with. The defendant that submits this order for entry shall advise the plaintiff when it has been submitted and shall provide an entered copy of the order to the plaintiff forthwith upon entry.

6. The defendant that submits this order for entry shall provide an entered copy of the order to counsel for Ms. Swift forthwith upon entry.

“Ramsay J.”