

In the Court of Appeal of Alberta

Citation: ATB Financial v 1719091 Alberta Ltd, 2025 ABCA 291

Date: 20250826
Docket: 2503-0135AC
Registry: Edmonton

Between:

ATB Financial

Respondent

- and -

**1719091 Alberta Ltd, Clearwater Radiator Inc, Edgewood Products Inc,
and Michael David Coe**

Applicants

**Reasons for Decision
of the Honourable Justice Kevin Feth**

Applications to Extend Time for Permission to Appeal
Applications for Permission to Appeal
Applications for Stays

**Reasons for Decision
of the Honourable Justice Kevin Feth**

Overview

[1] The applicants, Michael David Coe, 1719091 Alberta Ltd, Clearwater Radiator Inc, and Edgewood Products Inc, seek extensions of time to appeal two orders: an order restricting the applicants from initiating steps in the lower court action and an order granting a receivership over 1719091 Alberta Ltd. If the applications to extend the time to appeal are granted, the applicants also seek permission to appeal the orders (if permission is required) and a stay of the orders pending appeal.

[2] For the reasons to follow, both applications to extend the time to appeal are dismissed. Accordingly, the applications for permission to appeal and for stays of the orders pending appeal need not be determined.

Background

[3] Mr Coe is the owner of 1719091 Alberta Ltd, Clearwater Radiator Inc, and Edgewood Products Inc. 1719091 Alberta Ltd borrowed money from ATB Financial. The debt was secured against industrial real property (“Industrial Property”) and was guaranteed by Clearwater Radiator Inc, Edgewood Products Inc, and Mr Coe personally.

[4] 1719091 Alberta Ltd fell into arrears on the debt repayment. On August 9, 2022, ATB Financial commenced the action below against the applicants seeking to collect on the debt. The applicants were noted in default on November 8, 2022.

[5] On December 16, 2022, the court below granted ATB Financial a consent judgment against the applicants in the amount of \$1,464,241.94 plus interest. The consent judgment was not appealed.

[6] ATB Financial then took steps to foreclose on and sell the Industrial Property. On January 9, 2023, ATB Financial filed an application for a redemption order, an affidavit of value, an affidavit of default, and a certificate of title (“Application Materials”). The application was returnable on January 23, 2023.

[7] On January 13, 2023, ATB Financial served the applicants with the Application Materials by email.

[8] On January 18, 2023, the court below granted an order that deemed service of the Application Materials good and sufficient, and that allowed ATB Financial to substitutionally

serve the applicants by email with all subsequent notices, orders, and other documents for the action (“Substitutional Service Order”). The Substitutional Service Order was not appealed.

[9] On January 23, 2023, the court below granted a redemption order setting a deadline to repay the debt, failing which the property would be offered for sale.

[10] Mr Coe sought to pay off the debt by sending ATB Financial two documents. The first was styled as a “money order” that purported to transfer \$1,732,986 to ATB Financial. The document listed the Canada Revenue Agency as the source of the funds, Mr Coe’s social insurance number as the “issuer”, and Mr Coe’s birth documentation number as the “acceptor”. The second document claimed to transfer \$1,949,609 to ATB Financial as “payment” with much the same information as the first. Neither document was a method of payment acceptable to ATB Financial.

[11] In rejecting both forms of purported payment, ATB Financial asserted that Mr Coe was engaging in Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) strategies, which are contrivances to avoid payment. Some OPCA strategies allege that governments operate secret bank accounts linked to birth documentation that can be accessed to pay debts through special documents and declarations: see *Meads v Meads*, 2012 ABQB 571 [*Meads*].

[12] On March 24, 2023, Mr Coe purported to make another payment by sending to ATB Financial a “promissory note” from Vanessa Amy Landry. She promised to pay the debt at a rate of \$200 per month. Ms Landry is known to the court as someone who previously collaborated with a Freeman-on-the-Land OPCA promoter in a mortgage elimination money-for-nothing scheme in which she claimed to pay very large mortgage debts with one ounce of silver: *Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry*, 2018 ABQB 856. ATB Financial also rejected this purported payment as another OPCA strategy.

[13] In May 2023, Mr Coe applied to unwind the foreclosure process and cancel the debt, relying on arguments characterized by ATB Financial as OPCA litigant behaviour. The application was adjourned to special chambers and later dismissed.

[14] On June 13, 2023, the court below granted an order listing the Industrial Property for sale. The applicants were uncooperative in the sale process.

[15] Two applications followed, resulting in the orders the applicants seek to appeal.

[16] First, ATB Financial applied to have the applicants declared vexatious litigants and to impose court access restrictions pursuant to ss 23-23.1 of the *Judicature Act*, RSA 2000, c J-2 because the applicants’ litigation conduct demonstrated an abuse of process. The application proceeded on a documents-only basis. The court below sent the applicants a letter on May 21,

2024, informing them of the application, explaining the procedural requirements, and providing an opportunity to file materials and respond to the materials submitted by ATB Financial. The applicants did not engage with that process.

[17] On July 30, 2024, Associate Chief Justice K. Nielsen concluded that the applicants are not “vexatious litigants” as contemplated by ss 23-23.1 of the *Judicature Act*, but had engaged in litigation misconduct in the action. He found that Mr Coe is “a participant in a broader OPCA-based enterprise or endeavor with a financial basis and objective: to use pseudolaw non-law to get money, eliminate debt, and/or frustrate debt collection”: *ATB Financial v 1719091 Alberta Ltd*, 2024 ABKB 461 at para 27 (*Restricted Access Reasons*). Utilizing the court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own proceedings, the Associate Chief Justice granted an order prohibiting the applicants from commencing any applications, appeals, or other processes in the action unless leave was given by him or his designate. If the applicants applied for leave, they were required to post \$10,000 with the Clerk of the Court as cash security [“Restricted Access Order”].

[18] Second, ATB Financial applied to appoint a receiver/manager over all the current and future assets of 1719091 Alberta Ltd pursuant to s 243(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 [“Act”]. On October 17, 2024, Justice R. Armstrong granted an order appointing BDO Canada Limited as the receiver and manager for 1719091 Alberta Ltd and deeming service of the notice of application on the applicants as good and sufficient [“Receivership Order”].

[19] On October 21, 2024, Mr Coe applied in the court below for an emergency injunction staying the Receivership Order and prohibiting its enforcement. The court declared the application a nullity because Mr Coe did not follow the prerequisites to filing outlined in the Restricted Access Order.

[20] On April 22, 2025, Mr Coe filed a further application in the court below for leave to “appeal” the Receivership Order. This application was also struck for failure to comply with the prerequisites in the Restricted Access Order.

[21] On July 14, 2025, the applicants filed the present applications in this Court.

Preliminary issue

[22] Mr Coe brings these applications in his personal capacity and on behalf of 1719091 Alberta Ltd, Clearwater Radiator Inc, and Edgewood Products Inc. He is not a lawyer and therefore cannot represent a corporation in any action or proceeding before a court or judge, even if he is an owner of the corporation: s 106 of the *Legal Profession Act*, RSA 2000, c L-8. However, Rule 2.23(4) of the *Alberta Rules of Court*, Alta Reg 124/2010 [Rules] gives the court a discretion to grant a right

of audience to any agent, who is not a lawyer, to speak on behalf of a corporation: ***Vuong Van Tai Holding v Alberta (Minister of Justice and Solicitor General)***, 2020 ABCA 169 at para 15.

[23] ATB Financial did not object to Mr Coe speaking on behalf of the corporate applicants. Similarly, BDO Canada Limited, as the receiver and manager for 1719091 Alberta Ltd, did not object to Mr Coe appearing as agent for that company. I therefore granted Mr Coe a limited right of audience for these applications to speak on behalf of the corporate applicants.

Application for an extension of time to appeal

[24] A notice of appeal must be filed within one month after the date of the decision being appealed, unless an enactment provides otherwise or the nature of the appeal first requires permission to appeal: Rule 14.8(2)(a). Where permission to appeal is required, the application for permission to appeal must be filed and served within the time periods mentioned in subrule (2)(a): Rule 14.8(3). Deadlines to initiate an appeal are short due to the importance of finality in litigation: ***Li v Morgan***, 2020 ABCA 186 at para 4.

[25] Rule 14.37(2)(c) allows a single appeal judge to extend the time to appeal. The test to extend the time was described in ***Sohal v Brar***, 1998 ABCA 375 at para 1, referring to the factors set out in ***Cairns v Cairns***, [1931] 4 DLR 819 at 826, 26 Alta LR 69 (SC (AD)) [***Cairns***]. The applicants must:

- (a) show a *bona fide* intention to appeal while the right to appeal existed, and that the failure to appeal was by reason of some special circumstance which serves to excuse or justify the failure;
- (b) account for the delay and show that the respondent has not been so seriously prejudiced as to make it unjust to disturb the judgment, having regard for the positions of both parties;
- (c) show that they have not taken the benefits of the judgment from which the appeal is sought; and
- (d) show that the appeal would have a reasonable chance of success if allowed to proceed.

[26] The decision to extend the time to appeal is discretionary; not all the ***Cairns*** factors must be met to grant the extension: ***Attila Dogan Construction and Installation Co Inc v AMEC Americas Limited***, 2015 ABCA 206 at para 5. This test is “premised on the importance of the finality of judgments”: ***R v Canto***, 2015 ABCA 306 at para 21, [2015] 11 WWR 354. The overriding question is whether the interests of justice are served by granting an extension: ***Wandler v Crandall***, 2017 ABCA 115 at para 14.

[27] For an order or decision granted under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, section 31 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules*, CRC, c 368 requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 10 days after the date of the order or decision being appealed. Section 187(11) of the *Act* provides that the court may extend time limits as it sees fit. The *Cairns* test applies to an application for an extension of time under the *Act*: *Alberta Treasury Branches v Conserve Oil 1st Corporation*, 2016 ABCA 87 at paras 21-22, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37025 (13 October 2016).

Analysis

The Restricted Access Order

[28] As the Restricted Access Order was granted on July 30, 2024, the applicants were required to file a notice of appeal by August 30, 2024. However, the application to extend the time to appeal was filed on July 14, 2025, more than ten months after the deadline.

[29] The applicants provide no evidence that they, or Mr Coe in particular, had a *bona fide* intention to appeal the Restricted Access Order within one month of it being decided. Prior to this application, the applicants took no steps at either level of court to dispute that Order.

[30] The applicants have not shown special circumstances excusing or justifying the delay. Mr Coe deposes that he believed permission to take a step and posting \$10,000 as security were necessary to initiate an appeal to this Court. However, the Restricted Access Order clearly states that the applicants are prohibited from initiating steps in the Court of King's Bench action, absent leave of that court; nothing in the Order bars access to this Court. The applicants do not explain how the Order was confusing, and offer no evidence of reasonable diligence, for example, by seeking timely legal advice from a lawyer or clarification from the court below about the meaning of the Order. Mr Coe deposes that he eventually obtained legal advice and then immediately prepared and submitted this application, but no reason is given for the long delay before obtaining that advice.

[31] Moreover, Mr Coe's stated belief that he thought permission to take a step was required is contradicted by his own actions. Months before filing these applications, he attempted to take steps in the underlying action to stay and then "appeal" the Receivership Order. He did not interpret the Restricted Access Order as impeding his efforts to file those applications (although he did not comply with the prerequisites to advancing new applications).

[32] Mr Coe also claims that his status as a self-represented litigant caused the delay. The applicants were provided with measured guidance from the Associate Chief Justice to "consult with a lawyer ... prior to seeking leave to take steps" in the action: *Restricted Access Reasons* at

para 40; see also *Goldstick Estates (Re)*, 2019 ABCA 508 at para 55. The applicants had the benefit of legal counsel early in the action. They do not assert an inability to access legal advice about pursuing an appeal. Moreover, deadlines under the *Rules* apply equally to self-represented and represented litigants: Rules 1.1(2) and 1.2; *Municipal District of Foothills No 31 v Alston*, 2023 ABCA 46 at para 3 [*Alston*].

[33] ATB Financial concedes that an appeal of the Restricted Access Order will not unduly burden the action or prejudice it, so long as the operation of the Order is not stayed. However, I accept that finality will be compromised, and that an appeal risks the continuation of an abuse of process by the applicants through meritless OPCA arguments raised in the proposed appeal.

[34] The applicants have not taken any benefit from the Restricted Access Order.

[35] The remaining consideration is whether the proposed appeal has a reasonable chance of success. This is a low standard. The applicants must demonstrate their position is arguable, “not certainty [of success] or even likely victory”, and that the appeal has some merit; it is not frivolous or hopeless: *Balisky v Balisky*, 2019 ABCA 404 at para 26; *Andres v Andres*, 2023 ABCA 42 at para 28.

[36] The burden is more difficult to meet where the proposed ground of appeal is subject to a deferential standard of appellate review: *Berro v Berro*, 2001 ABCA 157 at para 17; *Carbone v McMahan*, 2015 ABCA 263 at para 7. Deference is afforded to case management orders, such as the Restricted Access Order in this case, unless the exercise of discretion was unreasonable: *Lymer v Jonsson*, 2018 ABCA 36 at para 19; *Jonsson v Lymer*, 2020 ABCA 167 at para 18 [*Jonsson*].

[37] The applicants’ proposed grounds of appeal have no arguable merit. First, the applicants claim that the Restricted Access Order is invalid because it lacks certain “authentication symbols”, including an “Alberta Signature”, a visible Alberta Coat of Arms, “cryptographic signature, digital watermark, electronic seal, or QR verification”, and “secure metadata confirming the identity or authority of the issuing party”. Further, the applicants claim the Order has no “visible chain of lawful custody”. However, these “symbols” are not requirements of court orders in the Court of King’s Bench and no “visible chain of lawful custody” is required. Similar arguments have been properly rejected as OPCA strategies: *Meads* at para 349.

[38] Second, the applicants assert that the Restricted Access Order was granted without notice or reasons. However, the court below sent a letter to the applicants at their address for service informing them of the application, the procedural requirements, and inviting submissions. Mr Coe has not deposed that he did not receive this letter. The applicants did not respond. As for reasons, the Associate Chief Justice provided a detailed explanation in the *Restricted Access Reasons*.

[39] Third, Mr Coe contends that the Restricted Access Order violates his rights under ss 7 and 15(1) of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. The Restricted Access Order was granted under the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its process, rather than the vexatious litigation provisions of the *Judicature Act*: see *Restricted Access Reasons* at para 5. The *Charter* applies to government actions, not court orders: *RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd*, 1986 CanLII 5 (SCC) at para 36, [1986] 2 SCR 573. No arguable *Charter* violation arises.

[40] Fourth, Mr Coe alleges contraventions of his rights under several sections of the *Alberta Bill of Rights*, RSA 2000, c A-14. However, section 0.2 of the *Alberta Bill of Rights* states the "Act applies to the Legislature and government of Alberta in respect of all matters within the authority of the Legislature of Alberta". The *Alberta Bill of Rights* does not apply to superior court orders exercising the court's inherent jurisdiction.

[41] Finally, and for clarity, the applicants have not raised an allegation that the \$10,000 security requirement imposed by the Restricted Access Order creates an insurmountable financial barrier to court access. As this Court cautioned in *Jonsson* at para 67, prerequisites to commencing or continuing proceedings must be sensitive to the circumstances of the affected parties so as not to create insurmountable preconditions to accessing the courts. Here, Mr Coe has not provided material information about his personal financial circumstances nor asserted an inability to pay. Further, the action is in an advanced stage and the applicants have not identified any potential applications that might be barred by the Restricted Access Order. No arguable prejudice arises.

[42] In summary, the applicants have not shown that their proposed appeal has a reasonable chance of success.

[43] Having considered the *Cairns* factors, I conclude that the interests of justice are not served by granting the applicants an extension of time to appeal the Restricted Access Order.

The Receivership Order

[44] As the Receivership Order was granted on October 17, 2024, section 31 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules* required that the appeal of the Receivership Order be initiated by October 27, 2024. However, the application to extend the time to appeal was filed on July 14, 2025, almost nine months after the deadline.

[45] Turning to the *Cairns* factors, Mr Coe applied in the court below for an emergency injunction on October 21, 2024 to stay the Receivership Order. That application established the applicants' *bona fide* intention to appeal the Receivership Order while the right existed, even though the wrong process was engaged. However, that application was declared a nullity on October 24, 2024 because the applicants did not comply with the Restricted Access Order.

[46] Six months later, on April 22, 2025, Mr Coe filed a purported “appeal” of the Receivership Order in the court below. That application was struck on April 29, 2025 for not complying with the Restricted Access Order. The applicants delayed a further 2 ½ months before filing the application to extend time to appeal in this Court.

[47] The applicants have not provided an adequate explanation for the long delay. No special circumstances have been demonstrated excusing or justifying the failure to file the application in this Court within the 10 day time limit outlined in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules*. The plain wording of the Restricted Access Order did not bar access to this Court. The applicants were responsible for pursuing an appeal within the time limits. As explained earlier, Mr Coe’s status as a self-represented litigant and any lack of familiarity with the appeal process are not sufficient excuses. The applicants eventually obtained legal advice about filing an appeal in this Court but offer no explanation for the delay in obtaining that advice.

[48] ATB Financial asserts significant prejudice if the application to extend time to appeal the Receivership Order is granted. Section 195 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* provides for an automatic stay of proceedings upon the filing of a notice of appeal. The receiver/manager has liquidated the business of 1719091 Alberta Ltd, which involved the production and sale of cannabis, and has arranged for the destruction of the cannabis as a controlled substance. The receiver/manager has taken control of the Industrial Property and has listed the property for sale to substantially satisfy the debt owed to ATB Financial. A stay of the receivership would interfere with the timely and economical liquidation of the property. ATB Financial asserts that the forced sale will probably not recover all the outstanding debt, so any delay, added expense or loss of property value will prejudice ATB Financial’s recovery. The property appraisals and estimated receiver fees in evidence satisfy me that the forced sale will probably result in sale proceeds that are insufficient to fully extinguish the debt. I find that delay will likely cause additional expense and prejudice ATB Financial’s recovery.

[49] The parties disagree about the applicants taking any benefit from the Receivership Order. Maximizing the return on the liquidation of the Industrial Property ultimately benefits the applicants by enhancing the payment against the debt. However, the applicants consider the liquidation of the property as prejudicial to their long-term commercial interests. This factor cannot be resolved on the material before me. However, in balancing the *Cairns* factors, I find that it is not determinative of the outcome of this application.

[50] The remaining factor is whether the proposed appeal has a reasonable chance of success. The appointment of a receiver is a discretionary remedy: *Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v Lemare Lake Logging Ltd*, 2015 SCC 53 at para 47; [2015] 3 S.C.R. 419. The decision is afforded significant deference on appeal absent “an error of law, or the granting of the remedy is wholly unreasonable in the circumstances”: *BG International Limited v Canadian Superior Energy Inc*,

2009 ABCA 127 at para 6; *7451190 Manitoba Ltd v CWB Maxium Financial Inc et al*, 2019 MBCA 95 at para 28.

[51] The proposed grounds of appeal have no arguable merit sufficient to overcome this stringent standard. First, the applicants argue that the Receivership Order was granted without notice or reasons. However, prior to granting the Receivership Order, Justice Armstrong confirmed that the applicants were served in accordance with the Substitutional Service Order. They did not appear. As for reasons, Justice Armstrong acknowledged the direction from this Court that receivership orders “should not be lightly granted, and that a judge needs to explore whether there are other remedies short of receivership that could serve to protect the interests of, in this case, the... creditors.” He was satisfied that “ATB has already taken steps to engage other remedies that would be short out (sic) of receivership, and that specifically was the application for a sale... of the premises to realize on security” but “through no fault of ATB’s, [the attempted sale] was an abject failure, due primarily to the non-cooperation of the [applicants] and their unwillingness to obey orders of this court.” He concluded that “other remedies short of receivership have been explored ... and are simply not going to work in the circumstances of this case, given the conduct of the... debtors.” He expressly balanced the rights and conduct of the parties and concluded that the applicants were “engaged in active attempts to thwart the legitimate attempts of ATB to recover on the security”, “actively flouting the authority of this court” and taking steps that “jeopardize the realization of the security by the creditor.”

[52] Second, Mr Coe contends the Receivership Order violated his fundamental rights under the *Alberta Bill of Rights* and section 1(a) of the *Canadian Bill of Rights*, SC 1960, c 44. The Receivership Order was granted pursuant to a federal statute, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, so the *Alberta Bill of Rights* does not apply. Section 1(a) of the *Canadian Bill of Rights* provides individuals in Canada with protections over their right to the enjoyment of property. However, as s 1(a) states, this right is not unconditional and can be deprived by due process of law. Mr Coe has not established an arguable basis for his bald claim that the *Canadian Bill of Rights* was violated.

[53] Third, the applicants contend ATB Financial “securitized” the loan and that the court below dismissed evidence of this securitization when granting the Receivership Order. This is a recognized OPCA argument: *Bonville v President’s Choice Financial*, 2024 ABKB 483 at para 24. Such arguments have been repeatedly rejected by the Canadian courts: *Royal Bank of Canada v Courtoreille*, 2024 ABKB 302 at para 7. The lower court was not required to respond to this claim: *The Toronto Dominion Bank v Manah*, 2025 ABCA 201 at para 20.

[54] Fourth, the applicants argue the Receivership Order was granted after 1719091 Alberta Ltd was dissolved, so the Order should be of no force and effect. However, ATB Financial commenced the action prior to the dissolution of the corporation. The Receivership Order was granted within that action. Section 227(2)(a) of the *Business Corporations Act*, RSA 2000, c B-9, provides that a

civil action commenced by or against a corporation before its dissolution may be continued as if it had not been dissolved.

[55] Finally, the applicants submit the Receivership Order proceedings were filed in the wrong judicial centre because they were filed in Calgary rather than Edmonton, with the latter being the closest judicial centre. No objection to the venue was raised before Justice Armstrong. In addition, the applicants have not provided evidence that the venue for the proceedings prejudiced their ability to participate. In any event, the choice of venue did not deprive the court below of jurisdiction: Rule 3.6(2).

[56] In conclusion, having considered the *Cairns* factors, I find the applicants have not shown special circumstances excusing or justifying the significant delay. The delay is likely prejudicial to finality and ATB Financial's recovery of the debt. The applicants have no reasonable chance of success on appeal. Accordingly, I conclude that the interests of justice are not served by granting the applicants an extension of time to appeal the Receivership Order.

Conclusion

[57] The applications to extend time to appeal the Restricted Access Order and the Receivership Order are dismissed. As an extension for time to appeal has not been granted, there is no need to consider the applications for permission to appeal and a stay of the orders.

Costs

[58] Unless otherwise ordered, the successful party in an application before this Court is entitled to a costs award against the unsuccessful party: Rule 14.88(1).

[59] ATB Financial seeks full indemnity costs, pursuant to the terms of the security instrument and guarantees that the applicants entered into with ATB Financial. The security instrument confirms that the borrower, 1719091 Alberta Ltd, shall indemnify the lender for legal expenses on a solicitor and own client, full indemnity basis. The other applicants guaranteed that scale of indemnification.

[60] During submissions on costs, Mr Coe maintained his position that the security instrument is not valid and enforceable. However, I have found no merit in that assertion. He also requested that I exercise my discretion to award no costs in the event that the applications were unsuccessful, based on his status as a self-represented litigant.

[61] All litigants are required to pursue their claims in a timely and cost-effective way that promotes fair and just resolutions. Parties to litigation must refrain from filing applications or

taking proceedings that do not advance that purpose. Moreover, publicly funded court resources must be used effectively. These foundational principles apply whether a litigant is self-represented or represented by a lawyer: Rules 1.1(2) and 1.2; *Alston* at para 3.

[62] No principled reason is presented to deny ATB Financial the measure of costs specified in the terms of the security instrument. The record suggests that ATB Financial has been efficient in responding to these applications. The applicants shall pay costs on a solicitor and own client (full indemnity) basis, subject to and payable after assessment.

[63] The Court will prepare the Order. Rule 9.4(2)(c) is invoked.

Application heard on July 30, 2025

Memorandum filed at Edmonton, Alberta
this 26 day of August, 2025

Feth J.A.

Appearances:

T.L.F. Gusa
K.P. Letwin
for the Respondent

Applicant M.D. Coe

Applicants 1719091 Alberta Ltd, Edgewood Products Inc
and Clearwater Radiator Inc (limited audience)

D. LeGeyt
for the Receiver, BDO Canada Limited