

CITATION: Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 6046

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00100858-0000

DATE: 20251028

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: CHRISTIAN CHUKWUEDOZIE CHIJINDU, Applicant

- and -

LAW SOCIETY OF ONTARIO, Respondent

BEFORE: Associate Justice Kamal

HEARD: By Requisition, in writing

RULE 2.1.01 ENDORSEMENT

1. Rule 2.1.01 assists this Court in its gatekeeping functions to ensure that our system is not clogged by proceedings that are frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. This includes duplicative proceedings. What would our justice system look like if we allowed litigants to continue to repeatedly pursue litigation about the same underlying issues, even after they have been dismissed by all levels of courts in this country on multiple occasions?
2. The Court received a requisition, filed by the Respondent Law Society of Ontario (LSO), for an order to dismiss this application under Rule 2.1.01 of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. The LSO is the only Respondent in this Application.
3. Rule 2.1.01 allows the court to dismiss a proceeding if it appears, on its face, to be frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
4. On September 11, 2025, the Court provided notice under that rule that it was considering making an order staying or dismissing the application because it appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Submissions were received by both parties.
5. For the reasons that follow, I find that the Application is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. The Application is, therefore, dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.01.

Background

6. This Application arises out of the Law Society Tribunal's decision to revoke Mr. Chijindu's licence to practise law in 2020.

7. In this application, the Applicant, Mr. Chijindu, seeks two declarations:
 1. A declaration that the Law Society of Ontario denied Christian Chukwuedozie Chijindu his right to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction as guaranteed under section 24(1) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, thus, discriminated against him on the basis of his race as a black person, in violation of section 15(1) of the Charter, and
 2. A declaration that the revocation of the Class L 1 licence belonging to Christian Chukwuedozie Chijindu is null and void and of no force or effect, the Law Society of Ontario having denied him his rights guaranteed under sections 24(1) and 15(1) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.
8. There have been other proceedings related to the LSO's decision to revoke Mr. Chijindu's licence to practise law in 2020. There was an action with court file number CV-25-00737217-0000 at the SCJ in Toronto, which was dismissed by Justice Parghi (which then was unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal). There was also an Application with court file number CV-22-00686449-0000 in the SCJ in Toronto, which was dismissed by Justice Akazaki (which was also unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal and leave was denied at the Supreme Court of Canada).
9. Mr. Chijindu also unsuccessfully appealed to the Divisional Court from the judgment and orders of the Hearing Division and Appeal Division of the Law Society Tribunal dated November 25, 2019, February 12, 2020, and December 18, 2020. Mr. Chijindu also unsuccessfully appealed that order to the Court of Appeal, and leave was denied at the Supreme Court of Canada.

Analysis

Positions of the Parties

10. The LSO submits that this Application is a duplicative proceeding and constitutes a collateral attack on the revocation decision, as Mr. Chijindu seeks declaratory relief under the *Charter* to overturn that decision. The LSO further argues that the Application is frivolous and vexatious on its face, amounting to an abuse of process, noting that it is the eighth proceeding initiated by Mr. Chijindu following the revocation and the third in which *Charter* remedies have been sought in relation to the LSO's alleged conduct. The LSO maintains that this Application is a direct and improper challenge to the decisions of the Superior Court of Justice, the Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal regarding the revocation of Mr. Chijindu's licence and related proceedings, and therefore should be dismissed.
11. Mr. Chijindu submits that this Application is not a duplicative proceeding because although the previous proceedings engaged the same facts as this Application, they did not engage the same cause of action or seek the same remedy.

Principles applicable to Rule 2.1.01

12. [Rule 2.1.01\(1\) of the Rules of Civil Procedure](#) provides for a summary procedure that allows the court to dismiss a proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the process of the court.
13. Rule 2.1 must be “interpreted and applied robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise their gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process”. See: [Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733](#), at [para. 8](#).
14. It is not for close calls; it may only be used in “the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process”. See [Mohammad v. McMaster University, 2023 ONCA 598](#), at [para. 6](#), citing [Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733](#), at [para. 8](#); [Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320](#), at [para. 6](#).
15. The statement of claim (or in this case the Notice of Application) must be read generously, and I must assume that the assertions of fact are true unless they are obviously implausible or ridiculous. See: [Sumner v. Ottawa \(Police Services\), 2023 ONCA 140](#) at [para. 9](#).
16. In [Macmull v. Ontario \(Ministry of Health\), 2023 ONSC 2380](#), the Court considered dismissing an application under r. 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process because the application appeared to be duplicative of the applicant’s previous application for judicial review. The two applications sought review of different decisions of the HPARB but were based on the same factual circumstances. The application was found to be frivolous, vexatious, and without any basis in law. The frivolous and abusive nature of the application was apparent on the face of the notice of application.

Consideration of Previous Proceedings

17. While no evidence is submitted on a Rule 2.1 motion, the Court may review reasons and pleadings from other proceedings to determine whether the case is abusive. See [Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320](#) at [para. 9](#); [Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690](#) at [para. 8](#); [Mukwa v. Farm Credit of Canada, 2022 ONCA 320](#) at [para. 13](#).
18. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider the prior decisions involving these parties as part of this determination.
19. As part of this Rule 2.1 requisition, the LSO submitted the pleadings and decisions with respect to the previous proceedings. A list of documents provided with respect to the previous proceedings are outlined in Appendix A to this Endorsement.

20. On May 11, 2020, the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division revoked Mr. Chijindu's licence to practise law after having concluded in an earlier decision that he had engaged in professional misconduct. The Hearing Division found that Mr. Chijindu had engaged in "serious professional misconduct that brought discredit upon the legal profession" and that he "acted without integrity and without respect for the administration of justice" by: (i) charging fees to his client that were excessive and unreasonable; (ii) failing to encourage respect for the administration of justice by failing to comply with the two court orders requiring him to reimburse his client for excessive fees; (iii) failing to act honourably and with integrity by charging grossly excessive fees, failing to honour a court order to reimburse his client and rendering an even larger supplementary account to his client that was duplicative and false in an attempt to skirt the court's order; and (iv) transferring funds from his trust account to his general account without first having rendered an account.
21. Thereafter, the Appeal Division and the Divisional Court upheld the Hearing Division's findings of professional misconduct and the revocation of Mr. Chijindu's license. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada then rejected Mr. Chijindu's requests for leave to appeal.
22. Next, Mr. Chijindu filed an application in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Toronto, requesting an order compelling the LSO to reinstate his license, declarations that his rights under sections 7 and 15 of the *Charter* had been violated, and declarations alleging various improprieties on the part of the LSO in its previous proceedings against him.
23. On July 22, 2024, Justice Akazaki dismissed the Application, characterizing it as a "flank attack" on the conduct proceedings. Justice Akazaki's decision is found at [Chijindu v Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONSC 4037](#).
24. On February 7, 2025, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Chijindu's appeal of the Motion Judge's decision, holding that the proceeding constituted a collateral attack on the LSO's proceedings. The Court of Appeal's decision is found at [Chijindu v Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 91](#).
25. On July 31, 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada denied Mr. Chijindu leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
26. On February 18, 2025, eleven days after the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, Mr. Chijindu brought an action against the LSO and two LSO Discipline Counsel, seeking damages for malfeasance in public office and exemplary damages for successfully striking the Application.

27. On May 1, 2025, in accordance with Rule 2.1.01, Justice Parghi dismissed the action, finding that it exhibited the characteristics of vexatious litigation and that it was unlikely to succeed on its face. Justice Parghi’s decision is found at [Chijindu v Law Society of Ontario, et al., 2025 ONSC 2656](#).
28. On September 16, 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Chijindu’s appeal of Justice Parghi’s dismissal of the action. The Court of Appeal specifically found that the frivolous nature of both the Appellant’s action and of his appeal from the dismissal of his action under r. 2.1 is plain and obvious. In their view, this was not a close call and resorting to the procedure of r. 2.1 was fully justified.

Abuse of Process: Re-litigation and Collateral Attack

29. A proceeding is an abuse of process when it is inconsistent with the objectives of public policy. See [Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, 2003 CanLII 7815](#), at paras. 16, relying on [Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles \(2000\), 2000 CanLII 8514 \(ON CA\)](#).

i. Relitigation and Multiple Proceedings

30. The Supreme Court of Canada recently discussed the doctrine of abuse of process, relitigation, and multiple proceedings in [Saskatchewan \(Environment\) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4](#) at paras. 33 to 44.
31. The doctrine of abuse of process is concerned with the administration of justice and fairness. The doctrine engages the power of the court to prevent misuse of its proceedings in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party or would in some way bring the administration of justice into disrepute. See [Toronto \(City\) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63](#) at para. 37; [Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26](#), at para. 39; [Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29](#), at para. 33.
32. One way in which an abuse of process can arise is by relitigation, that is, “where the litigation before the court is found to be in essence an attempt to relitigate a claim which the court has already determined”. Relitigation will be an abuse of process if it violates “such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice”. See [Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26](#), at para. 40 and 41, quoting [Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles \(2000\), 2000 CanLII 8514 \(ON CA\)](#), at para. 56, [Toronto \(City\) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63](#) at para. 37; and [Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29](#), at para. 34.
33. Where warranted, the doctrine of abuse of process can be relied on to strike pleadings so as to prevent relitigation of an issue. See [Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26](#); [Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles \(2000\), 2000 CanLII 8514 \(ON CA\)](#).
34. Furthermore, a multiplicity of proceedings that engage the same issues can amount to an abuse of process. However, the abuse of process analysis does not end when multiple or

similar proceedings exist. Rather, the analysis needs to focus on whether allowing the litigation to proceed would violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice. Where, for example, having duplicative proceedings would waste the resources of the parties, courts, and witnesses, or risk inconsistent results and therefore undermine the credibility of the judicial process, this can amount to an abuse of process. See [Saskatchewan \(Environment\) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4](#).

35. In the case before me, Mr. Chijindu submits that this Application is not a relitigation of the previous proceedings because the proceedings decided by Akazaki J. and by Parghi J. were not the same causes of action as in this litigation, nor were they seeking the same remedies.
36. Mr. Chijindu relies on [Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, 2003 CanLII 7815](#), at [para. 17](#) to state that the “cause” must have already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Mr. Chijindu submits that Justice Akazaki dismissed the Application only on a jurisdictional ground. He did not decide the merits of the s.15(1) *Charter* challenge, which is a cause of action that remains unadjudicated to date.
37. I do not agree with Mr. Chijindu. In my view, this Application essentially seeks to revive the previous application by seeking declaratory relief that the LSO denied him the opportunity to collaterally attack the revocation decision. This is the third proceeding directed at the LSO’s revocation decision, plus there have been three attempts to appeal those decisions. Mr. Chijindu reuses arguments that have been heard and decided in an effort to revisit a final decision he clearly does not agree with.
38. Mr. Chijindu also submits that this court may not exercise its discretion under rule 2.1 to dismiss this Application unless it is to prevent the misuse of s. 24(1) remedial procedure in a way that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Relying on the Supreme Court in [Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 1994 CanLII 39 \(SCC\)](#), Mr. Chijindu pointed out that discretion must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*; exceeding these boundaries results in a reversible error of law. I agree with this proposition. However, I do not agree that one of the principles of the *Charter* is the guaranteed right of access to a court to hear the merits of a *Charter* challenge.
39. I have read the Application in the broadest and least-critical manner, with generous allowances for drafting deficiencies. After such a reading, I conclude that this Application is, on its face, an abuse of process and a clear attempt to relitigate issues that have been decided. It is not sufficient to relitigate the issues because Mr. Chijindu does not agree with the decisions.
40. In my view, allowing this Application to proceed would violate principles of judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice. Allowing this Application to proceed would amount to an abuse of process because there have been decisions clearly aimed at providing finality to this dispute between the parties.

Mr. Chijindu's attempts to relitigate these issues undermine the integrity of the administration of justice.

ii. Collateral Attack

41. A collateral attack is an attack on an order "made in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation, or nullification of the order". See [Toronto \(City\) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63](#) at [para. 33](#), quoting [Wilson v. The Queen, \[1983\] 2 SCR 594](#). To put it another way, a court order may only be challenged through the standard appellate process or comparable procedures. If not, a court's order must be followed. See [R. v. Bird, 2019 SCC 7](#). This is known as the collateral attack rule.
42. Collateral attacks and relitigation are not appropriate methods of redress since they inordinately tax the adjudicative process while doing nothing to ensure a more trustworthy result. See [Toronto \(City\) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63](#) at para 54.
43. The collateral attack rule applies not only to court orders but also to orders issued by administrative bodies.
44. The three courts (Akazaki J., the Court of Appeal, and Parghi J.) all concluded that seeking an Order requiring the LSO to reinstate Mr. Chijindu's licence was a collateral attack on the Order revoking his licence.
45. However, Mr. Chijindu pursues this application saying that the LSO acted to preclude him from ever seeking a remedy under section 24(1) of the *Charter*, and the LSO mounted a challenge (at the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal) to ensure that he was "permanently denied access to a court of competent jurisdiction."
46. In this request, Mr. Chijindu submits that the legal conclusions of Justice Akazaki, Justice Parghi, and the Court of Appeal about collateral attack directly contradict and ignore the Supreme Court in [R. v. Bird, 2019 SCC 7](#). Mr. Chijindu submits that the Supreme Court held that the common law rule against collateral attack cannot be invoked to preclude a person from challenging a court order when the order is alleged to violate constitutional rights.
47. In my view, Mr. Chijindu's interpretation of *R v Bird* is erroneous. The Supreme Court held that a collateral attack will only be permitted where there is no mechanism or forum for challenging the validity of an administrative decision, which can provide an effective remedy to vindicate *Charter* rights. See [R. v. Bird, 2019 SCC 7](#) at [paras. 29-30](#). In the present case, it was already found that Mr. Chijindu could raise his s. 15 *Charter* arguments before the very forum dealing with his licence.

48. Therefore, in my view, this Application is a collateral attack on both the revocation decisions, as well as the decisions of Justice Akazaki, Justice Parghi, and the Court of Appeal. I find that this collateral attack is an abuse of process.

Vexatious

49. A “vexatious” action is a proceeding that was brought for an improper purpose, including through duplicative proceedings. See [Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, 2003 CanLII 7815](#), at para. 11.

50. In [Gao v. Ontario \(Workplace Safety and Insurance Board\), 2014 ONSC 6497](#), Justice Myers identified several common attributes of a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43,15 that warrant the use of Rule 2.1 to stop proceedings. These attributes include:

- (a) bringing multiple proceedings to try to re-determine an issue that has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction;
- (b) rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings to repeat and supplement them in later proceedings including bringing proceedings against counsel who have acted for or against them in earlier proceedings;
- (c) persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals; and
- (d) bringing proceedings where no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought

51. For the reasons that follow, I am of the view that all of the attributes of a vexatious litigant are present in this Application.

52. First, it is clear based on the Application before me that Mr. Chijindu has brought multiple proceedings to try to re-determine an issue that has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. In addition to considering the multiple proceedings as an abuse of process, the multiple proceedings are also a hallmark of a vexatious litigant. This is clearly present in this Application, and it is the third proceeding in the Superior Court. At their core, all of the proceedings are largely concerned with the same substance. While Mr. Chijindu has attempted to frame the legal in a different light in this Application, it is still an attempt to attack the LSO’s revocation of his licence and the LSO’s proceedings against him.

53. Second, the present Application is rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings to repeat and supplement them in this proceeding. In my view, Mr. Chijindu is “rolling forward” the positions addressed previously, but under the auspices of a *Charter* rather than a civil remedy. This is a clear example of a case where Mr. Chijindu is supplementing his previous arguments to roll them over into this proceeding. This is the exact type of approach that the court has warned to be indicative of vexatious conduct.

54. Third, the persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals is another hallmark of a vexatious litigant. There is no dispute in the materials before me that Mr. Chijindu has unsuccessfully attempted to appeal numerous orders, including multiple appeals to the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada. All of the appeals have been unsuccessful. This hallmark is particularly worth consideration in this Application because the basis of this Application is that “the Law Society acted to preclude Mr. Chijindu from ever seeking a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter based on those allegations” and “the Law Society knew that there was no other court with competent jurisdiction available to hear the Charter allegations other than the superior court, yet it mounted a challenge, (at the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal), to ensure that he was permanently denied access to a court of competent jurisdiction.” These are essentially attempts to appeal and collaterally attack previous matters before this Court.
55. Finally, another characteristic of a vexatious litigant is bringing proceedings where no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought. Mr. Chijindu takes the position that his s. 15 *Charter* arguments have never been adjudicated on the merits. However, Mr. Chijindu conflates the right to apply to a court under s. 24(1) of the *Charter* with the right to have a *Charter* claim heard on its merits. There is no inherent right to have *Charter* claims proceed through to a hearing, especially where the proceeding itself is a collateral attack. This argument was dismissed by Justice Parghi and, subsequently, by the Court of Appeal.
56. The Court of Appeal wrote in its February 2025 decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal:
- We do not accept the appellant’s argument that s. 24(1) of the *Charter* gives him the right, having already exhausted his statutory remedies, to seek afresh a hearing in the SCJ. The motion judge was correct in his determination that while the SCJ has concurrent jurisdiction, this does not permit intrusion into decision-making powers specifically allocated.
57. This was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in their September 16, 2025 endorsement.
58. It is a fundamental tenet of our civil justice system that frivolous and vexatious proceedings may be dismissed without a full hearing. In Ontario, a party can commence a proceeding but is not entitled to have it heard on its merits. There is no automatic right to have a hearing. Mr. Chijindu’s assertion that he has a right to have a *Charter* claim heard on its merits would mean that Rule 2.1.01 would never apply to *Charter* claims. This is simply not supported in law and, in my view, not in line with the intention of Rule 2.1.
59. Accordingly, in my view, no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought by Mr. Chijindu in this Application.

60. The vexatious nature of the Application is apparent from the lengthy history of Mr. Chijindu’s proceedings arising out of the revocation decision, and the Notice of Application as drafted.

Frivolous

61. A “frivolous” action is a proceeding that lacks a legal basis or legal merit: [Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, 2003 CanLII 7815](#) (Ont. C.A.), at [para. 14](#).

62. Mr. Chijindu alleges a right to have the substance of his s. 15(1) *Charter* claims decided notwithstanding any absence of merit or jurisdiction. On that basis, Mr. Chijindu seeks the two declarations mentioned above.

63. This Court does not have the jurisdiction to declare the LSO’s revocation decision “null and void and of no force or effect.” See: [S.A. v Metro Vancouver Housing Corp., 2019 SCC 4](#) at [para. 60](#); [Chijindu v Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONSC 4037](#) at paras. [3](#) and [31](#); [Chijindu v Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 91](#) at [para. 4](#). This issue was already determined by Justice Akazaki and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, specifically with respect to the revocation of Mr. Chijindu’s licence.

64. I cannot see how Mr. Chijindu would be successful in his allegation that the LSO discriminated against him based on his race, in violation of section 15(1) of the *Charter*, because this court and the Court of Appeal both accepted the position of the Defendants in the previous application.

65. There is no automatic right to have a hearing. Mr. Chijindu’s assertion that he has a right to have a *Charter* claim heard on its merits is simply not supported in law.

66. Accordingly, I also find that this Application is frivolous and cannot succeed on its face.

Disposition

67. For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Application is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

68. I am permitted to dismiss the Application if any of the three considerations (frivolous, vexatious, or abuse of process) are established. If I am wrong in finding any of the three grounds individually, I am still permitted to dismiss the Application on the other grounds.

69. The Application is, therefore, dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.01.

DATE: October 28, 2025

Associate Justice Kamal

**APPENDIX A:
LIST OF DOCUMENTS PROVIDED WITH RESPECT TO PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS**

COURT FILE NUMBER: CV-25-00737217-0000 (SCJ - Toronto)

1. Statement of Claim issued February 18, 2025
2. Notice of Appeal dated May 30, 2025
3. Notice of Appeal dated June 1, 2025
4. Endorsement of Parghi J., dated May 1, 2025 [*Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario, et al.*, 2025 ONSC 2656]

COURT FILE NUMBER: 017/21 (Divisional Court – Toronto)

1. Notice of Appeal dated January 11, 2021
2. Reasons for Decision of Newton J., dated April 27, 2021 [*Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario*, 2021 ONSC 4872]

COURT FILE NUMBER: M52681 (Court of Appeal for Ontario)

1. Notice of Motion dated July 19, 2021
2. Order of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dated October 20, 2021

COURT FILE NUMBER: 40000 (Supreme Court of Canada)

1. Application Record, including:
 - a. Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal dated December 15, 2021
 - b. Reasons for Decision at Law Society Tribunal (“LST”) – Hearing Division dated November 25, 2019 (Tribunal File No.: 18H-107)
 - c. Order re Conduct Application dated February 20, 2020 (Tribunal File No.: 18H-107)
 - d. Reasons for Decision on Penalty and Costs dated May 11, 2020 (Tribunal File No.: 18H-107)
 - e. Reasons for Decision at LST – Appeal Division dated December 18, 2020 (Tribunal File No.: 20A-001)
 - f. Reasons on Appeal (Div. Court File No.: 017/21) dated July 19, 2021
 - g. Order (Div. Court File No.: 017/21) dated July 9, 2021
 - h. Order of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dated October 20, 2021 (Court of Appeal Court File No.: M52681)
2. Judgment dated May 12, 2022

COURT FILE NUMBER: CV-00686449-0000 (SCJ – Toronto)

1. Notice of Motion dated February 6, 2024
2. Reasons for Decision of Akazaki J., dated July 22, 2024 [*Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario*, 2024 ONSC 4037]

COURT FILE NUMBER: COA-24-CV-0820 (Court of Appeal for Ontario)

1. Notice of Appeal dated August 9, 2024
2. Reasons for Decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dated February 7, 2025

COURT FILE NUMBER: 41751 (Supreme Court of Canada)

1. Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal dated April 4, 2025
2. Judgment dated July 31, 2025