

CITATION: Halton (Regional Municipality) v. Rewa et al, 2026 ONSC 908
COURT FILE NO.: 1665/17
DATE: 20260212

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
491 Steeles Avenue East, Milton, ON L9T 1Y7

RE: THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF HALTON,
Plaintiff/Responding Party
AND:

NICOLAS REWA, MARION REWA, REWA CONSULTANT LIMITED, and
1103882 ONTARIO LIMITED,
Respondents/Moving Parties

BEFORE: RSJ E. Ria Tzimas

COUNSEL: Ralph Cuervo-Lorens, Counsel for the Plaintiff
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Nicolas Rewa, Self-Represented Respondent/Moving Party
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HEARD: In Writing

COSTS ENDORSEMENT
RE: MOTION RETURNABLE JUNE 26, 2025

INTRODUCTION

- [1] On June 26, 2025, I was scheduled to hear three motions related to the adequacy of Halton's documentary productions in advance of discoveries. One of those motions was brought by Mr. Rewa.
- [2] For the reasons discussed in my endorsement of August 1, 2025, see: 2025 ONSC 4503 starting at para. 39, Mr. Rewa's motion was adjourned with costs on a substantial indemnity basis for costs thrown away.
- [3] The parties were provided with a timeline to exchange and file their costs submissions. Although Halton served its costs in accordance with the court-ordered timeline, I did not

receive Mr. Rewa's costs submissions until a few weeks ago. I understand that there may have been some technical administrative difficulties with the filing of those submissions, specifically in relation to the filing of an affidavit of service. In any event, I accepted Mr. Rewa's late submissions for the purposes of giving him the opportunity to advance his arguments.

- [4] For the reasons that follow, I fix costs against Mr. Rewa in the sum of \$15,000, payable within 30 days of today's endorsement.

ANALYSIS

- [5] The principles that govern the awarding of costs were outlined in my costs decision in relation to the Ohashi motion, which I released on January 12, 2026, see: *Halton (Regional Municipality) v. Ohashi et al*, 2026 ONSC 866. I rely specifically on paragraphs 6-9 of that decision.
- [6] Halton seeks costs thrown away in the sum of approximately \$24,590. Mr. Rewa disputes the claim and submits that the submission is highly disproportional. The costs thrown away ought not to exceed approximately \$1,100.
- [7] Mr. Rewa's submissions are far from compelling. Instead, they raise several serious concerns, which I address below.
- [8] First, Mr. Rewa continues to take liberties with the truth and shows absolutely no remorse or appreciation for the magnitude of his improper conduct and his deliberate attempt to mislead the court with non-existent legal authorities. He is wrong to suggest that his motion had to be adjourned because the court was unable to reach it. The motion was adjourned because Mr. Rewa purported to be unwell and said he would be unable to return on the following day. More significantly, the motion also had to be adjourned *because of* Mr. Rewa's improper conduct as that related to his factum and his anticipated legal submissions. The adjournment had *nothing* to do with the court's available time, which was set several weeks prior to the hearing dates. The court had set aside two days and but for the noted difficulties, Mr. Rewa's motions would have been heard.
- [9] Second, Mr. Rewa's treatment of the costs thrown away and the manner in which he tries to diminish Halton's submissions demonstrates his failure to gain any insight on the severity of his deliberate attempt to mislead the court. He could have used his costs submissions to recognize his errors, but he squandered that opportunity. His overall attitude is one suggesting that his conduct was no big deal.
- [10] Third, Mr. Rewa undermined his own credibility over his facility with legal research. At the time of the motion, he tried to justify his error by suggesting that as a self-represented litigant he had limited resources, and he did not appreciate the weaknesses and flaws of resorting to the use of generative AI. Yet in his costs submissions, in his attempt to criticize Halton for the time it required to discover and verify his misleading case citations and legal propositions, Mr. Rewa revealed his very substantive understanding of the Canadian Legal Information Institute CanLII as a primary online research tool. He recognized that CanLII is

free, updated daily and includes powerful keyword searching, citation tracking and links to statutes. Given that knowledge, one must wonder why he wouldn't double check the results of AI against CanLII, to verify the veracity of the proposed legal principles and citations. So much for Mr. Rewa's limited legal knowledge.

- [11] The reality is that if Mr. Rewa's health were the only reason for the adjournment, I would not have ordered any costs. People get sick, they may feel unwell, and a short adjournment in the circumstances would be the only appropriate and principled response.
- [12] My costs order was intended to respond to Mr. Rewa's deliberate attempt to mislead the court by relying on non-existent cases and legal principles. As I explained in my endorsement of August 1 at paragraphs 40-55. Mr. Rewa's conduct was deliberately misleading, and it was the second time he was advancing non-existent legal authorities. Lying to the court has consequences.
- [13] Fourth, I cannot ignore the fact that even when Halton alerted Mr. Rewa to the difficulties with his legal submissions, Mr. Rewa did not undertake any proactive steps to correct or mitigate his error. Mr. Rewa had the benefit of Halton's factum well in advance of the motion. Halton's analysis was thorough. Counsel worked through each improper citation to outline the precise difficulty with each cited case. Halton could have included a sentence or two in its response, but it took the proper step to outline its concerns in full detail. Were it true that Mr. Rewa did not initially appreciate the failings of generative AI, having been alerted to his errors, Mr. Rewa could have advised the court of his error and sought some additional time to revise his submissions. He did none of that. Against that reality, it is rather rich for Mr. Rewa to submit that the costs thrown away be limited to an equivalent of 2-3 hours of counsel time.
- [14] Finally, Mr. Rewa never renewed his motion, even though I gave him that opportunity. His costs submissions suggested his intention to do so, but the deadline of September 30, 2025, has long come and gone and no renewed motion was submitted. In result, Halton must be compensated for costs thrown away in its response to Mr. Rewa's motion, in its totality and not just in relation to the improper submissions.
- [15] Turning to Halton's costs submissions and a request for a cost order of \$24,590, with respect, I have reservations. My principal difficulty rests with the recognition that Halton's bill of costs is not limited to time spent specifically on responding to Mr. Rewa's motion. The tasks are not broken down in a way that would allow for a more granular analysis. Instead, the bill of costs includes references to the other motions and the "housekeeping" submissions that were to be addressed at the conclusion of the three motions. Moreover, Halton's responding submissions for all the three motions rested on one anchoring affidavit sworn by Mr. Nagel, thus resulting in some overlap of effort. That overlap necessarily attracts a discount to the costs claimed.
- [16] Insofar as the costs associated specifically with Halton's response to Mr. Rewa's misleading factum are concerned, I recognize that costs thrown away would not be limited to the costs associated with researching Mr. Rewa's cases. Contrary to Mr. Rewa's submissions, the task

would not have been as simple as running a CanLII search. Halton's counsel discovered the problem, they searched for the cases, they identified the precise flaws with each proposed citation, and then they offered to the court a thorough submission of the difficulties they discovered. Absent those efforts, the court may not have discovered the magnitude of the difficulties with Mr. Rewa's factum. In the result, it is reasonable to conclude that this task would have required in the range of 16-18 hours to complete. At an average rate of \$450 and on a substantial indemnity scale, that cost would come to approximately \$7,000.

- [17] In addition, since Mr. Rewa did not proceed to renew his motion, altogether, it stands to reason that costs thrown away ought to be expanded to account for Halton's costs for the totality of its responding efforts. Had Mr. Rewa proceeded with his motion on the strength of revised materials, Halton would have been able to use its original responding materials to defend the motion and accordingly those efforts would not have been "thrown away." Keeping in mind Halton's overlapping efforts relative to the other two motions, in my review of the time spent by counsel, I find it reasonable that senior counsel would have spent in the range of 15 hours, specifically on the response to Mr. Rewa's disclosure concerns. At an average hourly rate of \$630, on a substantial indemnity scale, that would come to approximately \$8,000. When added to the costs associated with Halton's response to the flawed factum, the total costs thrown away come to a figure of \$15,000.

CONCLUSION

- [18] In the result, I fix costs at \$15,000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes. I find that this sum is a reasonable assessment of the costs thrown away as a result of both Mr. Rewa's improper conduct *and* also on account of his abandonment of his motion. The said sum is also intended to convey the very stern message to Mr. Rewa that his improper behaviour will not be tolerated by the court.
- [19] Accordingly, costs of \$15,000 are ordered against Mr. Rewa and payable within 30 days from the date of this endorsement.

RSJ E. Ria Tzimas

Date: February 12, 2026