

Federal Court



Cour fédérale

Date: 20260423

Docket: T-4165-25

Citation: 2026 FC 545

Vancouver, British Columbia, April 23, 2026

PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon

BETWEEN:

JAMIE THOMAS LEIBEL

Applicant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The applicant, Jamie Thomas Leibel, is seeking judicial review of two second-review decisions dated April 25, 2025 [Decisions] whereby a Canada Emergency Benefits Validation Agent [Agent] of the Canada Revenue Agency [CRA] found him inadmissible, for specific time

periods, for two COVID-era economic measures, namely, the Canada Emergency Response Benefit [CERB] and the Canada Recovery Benefit [CRB].

[2] Mr. Leibel, who represents himself, challenges both the reasonableness of the Decisions and the procedural fairness of the process through which they were rendered. In its response, the Attorney General of Canada [AGC] concedes that the Decisions at issue are unreasonable and were reached in a procedurally unfair manner. The sole issue that remains in dispute between the parties is the appropriate remedy.

[3] For the reasons that follow, Mr. Leibel's application for judicial review will be granted in part. I am satisfied that the Decisions are unreasonable and were reached in a procedurally unfair manner. However, contrary to Mr. Leibel's submission, it is not the Court's role to determine his eligibility to the CERB and the CRB. The appropriate remedy is to remit the matter back to the CRA for new decisions regarding his eligibility to these benefits, in light of the flaws conceded by the AGC and identified by this Court in these reasons.

II. Background

A. *The eligibility requirements for the CERB and the CRB*

[4] As of March 2020, the federal government introduced a range of measures to mitigate the economic impacts caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the CERB and the CRB. These were targeted financial benefits intended to support workers who experienced a loss of income due to the pandemic and who were unable to benefit from the protection offered by the regular

employment insurance regime. The CRA is the federal body responsible for administering these income support programs. In this role, it acts on behalf of the Minister of Employment and Social Development.

[5] The CERB was available for seven four-week periods between March 15, 2020, and September 26, 2020, for eligible employees and self-employed workers who had suffered a loss of income due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRB followed the CERB and was available for any two-week period between September 27, 2020, and October 23, 2021, for eligible employees and self-employed workers who had suffered a loss of income due to the COVID-19 pandemic (*Aryan v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2022 FC 139 at para 2 [*Aryan*]).

[6] The eligibility criteria for the CERB are set out and detailed in the *Canada Emergency Response Benefit Act*, SC 2020, c 5, s 8 [CERB Act]. Among other things, the CERB Act requires employees or self-employed workers to have earned at least \$5,000 in employment income or self-employment income in 2019 or in the 12-month period preceding their application for the CERB (see the definition for “worker” at section 2 of the CERB Act). It also requires the worker to have ceased working for reasons related to COVID-19 for at least 14 consecutive days within the four-week period in respect of which the worker had applied for the CERB (paragraph 6(1)(a)).

[7] Turning to the CRB, its eligibility criteria are set out in the *Canada Recovery Benefits Act*, SC 2020, c 12, s 2 [CRB Act]. The CRB Act requires employees or self-employed workers applying for the CRB to (i) have earned at least \$5,000 in employment income or net self-employment income in 2019, 2020, 2021, or in the 12-month period preceding the day on

which they make their first application (paragraphs 3(1)(d) and (e) and subsection 3(2) of the CRB Act); (ii) have suffered a 50% drop in their average weekly income compared with the previous year for reasons related to COVID-19 (paragraph 3(1)(f) of the CRB Act); and (iii) have sought work, whether as an employee or in self-employment, during the two-week period in which benefits are received, in order to maintain eligibility for the CRB (paragraph 3(1)(i) of the CRB Act).

B. *Mr. Leibel's professional activities and benefit claims*

[8] Mr. Leibel works in the construction industry.

[9] He applied for and received the CERB for the seven four-week periods from March 15, 2020 to September 26, 2020. He also applied for and received the CRB for 26 two-week periods from September 27, 2020 to August 28, 2021, and then from September 26, 2021 to October 23, 2021.

[10] On July 24, 2024, the CRA sent a letter to Mr. Leibel advising him that the agency would conduct a verification review of his eligibility to the benefits [Verification Letter]. The Verification Letter requested that Mr. Leibel provide specific documents to support his claims.

[11] On February 13, 2025, the CRA informed Mr. Leibel that he was not eligible for the CERB and the CRB on the basis that the CRA did not receive a reply to the Verification Letter.

[12] On March 18, 2025, Mr. Leibel requested a second review and provided documentation to the CRA, including (i) the first refusal letter dated February 13, 2025, (ii) an undated handwritten explanation letter, and (iii) bank statements from the Royal Bank of Canada from August 27, 2019 to December 29, 2021.

[13] On April 4, 2025, Mr. Leibel spoke with the Agent by telephone. The Agent asked questions to Mr. Leibel about the impact of COVID-19 on his work and asked for additional documentation to verify Mr. Leibel's income during the CERB periods and the CRB periods, as the documents Mr. Leibel had filed to date were not sufficient. The Agent asked for pay stubs, records of employment, or letters from Mr. Leibel's employers.

[14] In response, on April 15, 16, and 17, 2025, Mr. Leibel provided the Agent with records of employment [ROE] from his former employers. Under the section titled "reason for issuing this ROE," the employers indicated "Quit," "Shortage of work / End of contract or season," or "Dismissal" with respect to his various jobs.

C. *The CRA's Decisions*

[15] In a letter dated April 25, 2025, the Agent informed Mr. Leibel that, after their second review, the CRA was still of the view that he was ineligible for the CERB and the CRB for specific periods of time. The CRA explains the Decisions as follows:

We have determined you are not eligible for the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB). You are not eligible for the following period(s):

June 7, 2020, to September 26, 2020, for the following reason(s):

- You earned more than \$1,000 of employment or self-employment income during the applicable payment period.
- You quit your job voluntarily.
- You did not stop working or have your hours reduced for reasons related to COVID-19.

We have determined you are not eligible for the Canada Recovery Benefit (CRB). You are not eligible for the following period(s):

October 25, 2020, to August 28, 2021, and September 26, 2021, to October 23, 2021, for the following reason(s):

- You quit your job voluntarily.
- You did not have a 50% reduction in your average weekly income compared to the previous year due to COVID-19.

[16] The reasonableness of these Decisions must be assessed in light not only of the Decisions themselves, but also of the Agent's notes dated April 23, 2025, which are recorded in the CRA's internal system. These notes reveal the Agent's rationale in support of the Decisions and, as such, form an integral part of them (*Aung v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2026 FC 523 at para 12 [*Aung*]; *Cormier c Canada (Procureur général)*, 2026 CF 241 at para 17 [*Cormier*]; *Deblois c Canada (Procureur général)*, 2026 CF 218 at para 16 [*Deblois*]; *Leclerc c Canada (Procureur général)*, 2025 CF 1787 at para 24 [*Leclerc*]; *Richard c Canada (Procureur général)*, 2025 CF 1464 at para 31; *Taileb c Canada (Procureur général)*, 2025 CF 1303 at para 21 [*Taileb*]; *Tcherkas v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2025 FC 1289 at para 38 [*Tcherkas*]; *Delage c Canada (Procureur général)*, 2025 CF 497 at para 16 [*Delage*]; *Lavigne v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2023 FC 1182 at para 26; *Aryan* at para 22).

[17] In this case, the Agent noted that Mr. Leibel indicated that prior to the pandemic, he worked as a full-time operator but lost his job once more experienced workers returned to work.

During the pandemic, Mr. Leibel started working for temporary agencies. He decided to apply for the CERB and the CRB as his contracts were short, resulting in a reduction in work. The Agent acknowledged the ROE submitted by Mr. Leibel confirming his income from his 2020 and 2021 employers. With respect to the CERB, the Agent confirmed that Mr. Leibel had an income under \$1 000 during CERB periods 1 to 3. Mr. Leibel started working in CERB period 4. Although the ROE confirmed that Mr. Leibel had no income during CERB periods 5 to 7, the Agent concluded that Mr. Leibel had voluntarily stopped working, making him ineligible to the CERB for those periods. With respect to the CRB, the Agent determined that Mr. Leibel's income was not reduced by 50% during CRB periods 3 to 4, 13, 15, 17 to 20, 23 to 24, and 27 to 28. While Mr. Leibel's income was determined to be reduced by 50% during CRB periods 1 to 2, 5 to 12, 14, 16, and 21 to 22, the Agent still found Mr. Leibel ineligible on the basis that he voluntarily quit his jobs.

III. Issues

[18] Mr. Leibel submits that the point in dispute is whether he is eligible for the claimed benefits, namely, whether he experienced a 50% reduction in wage, whether he voluntarily quit his jobs, and what was the impact of COVID-19 on his employment.

[19] However, as rightfully pointed by the AGC and as I explained at the hearing, it is not the Court's role, on judicial review, to determine an applicant's eligibility to the COVID-19 benefits implemented by the federal government (*Aung* at para 3; *Cormier* at para 58; *Deblois* at para 3; *Delage* au para 14). Thus, the sole issues before this Court are rather whether the CRA's

Decisions are reasonable and were reached in a procedurally fair manner, and the appropriate remedy.

IV. The standard of review

[20] The Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in *Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov*, 2019 SCC 65 [*Vavilov*] established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard in judicial reviews of the merits of administrative decisions (*Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2025 SCC 21 at para 35 [*Pepa*]; *Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [*Mason*]), unless the circumstances lend themselves to the application of one of the recognized exceptions to this presumption (*Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association*, 2022 SCC 30 at para 28 [*Society of Composers SCC*]; *Vavilov* at paras 33–64, 69–72).

[21] It is now well established that the standard of review applicable to the merits of the CRA's decisions regarding COVID-era benefits such as CERB and CRB payments is reasonableness (*Aung* at para 15; *Cormier* at para 25; *Deblois* at para 12; *Leclerc* at para 42; *Taileb* at para 32; *Mailloux v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2025 FC 583 at para 16; *Delage* at paras 12–13; *Ashurova v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2025 FC 428 at para 34 [*Ashurova FC*], aff'd by 2026 FCA 54 at para 11 [*Ashurova FCA*]; *Devi v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2024 FC 33 at para 14; *Flock v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2022 FC 305 at para 15; *He v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2022 FC 1503 at para 20 [*He*]; *Lajoie v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2022 FC 1088 at para 12; *Aryan* at paras 15–16).

[22] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (*Pepa* at para 46; *Mason* at para 64; *Vavilov* at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility” (*Vavilov* at para 99, citing notably *Dunsmuir v New Brunswick*, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74).

[23] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion (*Pepa* at paras 46–47; *Mason* at paras 58, 60; *Vavilov* at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” (*Vavilov* at para 13). Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. Before a decision can be set aside on the basis that it is unreasonable, the reviewing court must be satisfied that “there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” (*Vavilov* at para 100).

[24] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of

fact and the weighing of evidence (*Mason* at para 57; *Vavilov* at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker (*Vavilov* at paras 125–126, citing *Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; *Doyle v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2021 FCA 237 at para 3). The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable.

[25] Despite the presumption of reasonableness, the approach to be taken with respect to procedural fairness issues has not changed following *Vavilov* (*Vavilov* at para 23). It has typically been held that correctness is the applicable standard of review for determining whether a decision maker complies with the duty of procedural fairness and the principles of fundamental justice (*Mission Institution v Khela*, 2014 SCC 24 at para 79; *Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa*, 2009 SCC 12 at para 43 [*Khosa*]; *Canada (Attorney General) v McBain*, 2017 FCA 204).

[26] However, although the reviewing exercise is akin to correctness review, the Federal Court of Appeal has affirmed that questions of procedural fairness are not truly decided according to any particular standard of review. Rather, it is a legal question to be answered by the reviewing court, and the court must be satisfied that the procedure was fair having regard to all of the circumstances (*Algoma Steel Inc v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2023 FCA 164 at para 22 [*Algoma Steel*]; *Canadian Hardwood Plywood and Veneer Association v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2023 FCA 74 at para 57; *Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship)*, 2020 FCA 196 at para 35, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed, no 39522 (August 5, 2021); *Lipskaia v Canada (Attorney*

General), 2019 FCA 267 at para 14; *Canadian Airport Workers Union v International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers*, 2019 FCA 263 at paras 24–25; *Perez v Hull*, 2019 FCA 238 at para 18; *Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2018 FCA 69 at para 54 [*CPR*]).

[27] Consequently, the test is whether, given the particular context and circumstances of the case, the process followed by the administrative decision maker was fair and gave the parties concerned the right to be heard, as well as a full and fair opportunity to be informed of the evidence to be rebutted and to have their case heard (*Algoma Steel* at para 22; *CPR* at para 56; *Higgins v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2018 FCA 49 at para 17). No deference is owed to the decision maker on issues of procedural fairness (*Amer v Shaw Communications Canada Inc*, 2023 FCA 237 at para 51; *Maritime Employers Association v Syndicat des débardeurs (Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 375)*, 2023 FCA 93 at para 81).

V. Analysis

A. *Preliminary issue*

[28] Mr. Leibel’s Notice of Application named the Respondents as “His Majesty the King” and the “Canada Revenue Agency.” Counsel for the AGC submits that because the Decisions were made by the CRA on behalf of the Minister of Employment and Social Development, the proper responding party is the AGC, in accordance with section 303 of the *Federal Courts Rules*, SOR/98-106 [Rules].

[29] I agree. Accordingly, I will order that the style of cause be amended with immediate effect, replacing “His Majesty the King” and the “Canada Revenue Agency” with the AGC as the named respondent (*Aung* at paras 27–28; *Piscitelli v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2026 FC 277 at paras 17–18; *Kawasaki v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2025 FC 936 at para 15; *Aryan* at paras 13–14; *Hasselsjo v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2021 CanLII 89551 (FC) at para 2).

B. *The Decisions are unreasonable and were reached in a procedurally unfair manner*

[30] For the grounds raised by the AGC, I am satisfied that the Decisions are both unreasonable and procedurally unfair.

[31] With respect to procedural fairness, as conceded by the AGC, the Agent did not contact Mr. Leibel to make inquiries about the circumstances of his dismissals or why he left his various employments. However, paragraphs 3(1)(k) and 3(1)(l) of the CRB Act provide that an applicant must not have quit their employment or voluntarily ceased to work “unless it was reasonable to do so.” As such, and although Mr. Leibel knew that the CRA was trying to verify his income for the purposes of his eligibility to the benefits, the Agent did not provide Mr. Leibel the opportunity to make submissions on the circumstances in which his employments ended, which was directly relevant to the Agent’s assessment. While bearing in mind that, in the context of decisions made under the CRB Act and the CERB Act, the level of procedural fairness owed is at the low end of the spectrum (*Ashurova FC* at para 61), it is clear from the record that Mr. Leibel was not afforded a fair opportunity to respond to the Agent’s concerns in that regard.

[32] Turning to the reasonableness of the Decisions, the Agent did not address the reasons why Mr. Leibel decided to leave his employments, despite the provisions of the CRB Act making these reasons a relevant element in the assessment of the eligibility of an applicant to the benefits. Similarly, the reasons only discuss the Agent's conclusion that Mr. Leibel was ineligible for certain periods because he quit his job voluntarily. However, there is no accounting of the evidence on the record indicating that, in certain instances, Mr. Leibel was dismissed from his job or laid off due to a shortage of work, namely, due to circumstances beyond his control. This suffices to render the Decisions unreasonable.

C. *The appropriate remedy is remitting the matter back to the CRA*

[33] Being satisfied that the Decisions are unreasonable and were reached in a procedurally unfair manner, I must determine the appropriate remedy.

[34] As it appears from his Notice of application, Mr. Leibel seeks from this Court an order finding him eligible, "again," for the benefits claimed. For the reasons I conveyed to Mr. Leibel at the hearing, this is not a remedy that the Court can order in this case. I rather agree with the AGC that this matter should be remitted to a different CRA agent for redetermination as it does not fit within the limited circumstances where the Court could direct the CRA to allow Mr. Leibel's CERB and CRB claims.

[35] It is true that in *Vavilov*, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that a reviewing court has some discretion as to the appropriate remedy when it quashes an unreasonable decision, with the majority cautioning against the "endless merry-go-round of judicial reviews and subsequent

reconsiderations” (*Vavilov* at paras 140–142). Accordingly, it may sometimes be appropriate to decline to remit a matter to an administrative decision maker “where it becomes evident to the court, in the course of its review, that a particular outcome is inevitable and that remitting the case would therefore serve no useful purpose” (*Vavilov* at para 142; *Mobil Oil Canada Ltd v Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board*, 1994 CanLII 114 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 202 at pp 228–230; *Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada*, 2020 FCA 100 at paras 99–100 [*Society of Composers FCA*], aff’d in *Society of Composers SCC*). This may also be the case where correcting the error would not change the existing result and would have no practical consequences, and only one conclusion is in fact possible (*MiningWatch Canada v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans)*, 2010 SCC 2 at para 52; *Farrier v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2020 FCA 25 at para 31; *Robbins v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2017 FCA 24 at paras 16–22 [*Robbins*]). This discretion to grant or not grant remedies exists in the case of both procedural and substantive errors (*Society of Composers FCA* at para 99).

[36] However, the Supreme Court specified that this remedial discretion must be exercised with restraint, as the choice of remedy must “be guided by the rationale for applying that standard [reasonableness] to begin with, including the recognition by the reviewing court that the legislature has entrusted the matter to the administrative decision maker, and not to the court, to decide” (*Vavilov* at para 140). Therefore, where a decision reviewed under the reasonableness standard cannot be upheld, it will most often be appropriate to remit the matter to the decision maker to have it reconsider the decision with the benefit of the Court’s reasons, and determine whether it arrives at the same outcome or at a different one (*Vavilov* at para 141; *Society of Composers FCA* at para 99; *Robbins* at para 17). In short, the threshold for choosing not to remit

the matter to the administrative decision maker when their decision is considered unreasonable is high (*Canada (Attorney General) v Zalusky*, 2020 FCA 81 at para 104; *D’Errico v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2014 FCA 95 at paras 14–17).

[37] Insofar as the standard of the reasonableness is marked by deference and respect for the legitimacy and competence of administrative decision makers in their area of expertise, the discretion of the reviewing courts to refuse remitting an unreasonable or procedurally unfair decision to the administrative decision maker for reconsideration must therefore be exercised carefully, sparingly, and with prudence. It shall be limited to those rare cases where the context can only inevitably lead to one single result and where the outcome leaves no doubt. These situations will more likely be exceptions. The Supreme Court’s brief remarks in *Vavilov* on the exercise of discretion in remedies do not constitute an opening for reviewing courts to substitute themselves for the administrative decision maker and interfere with the merits of the decision to be rendered (*Pêcheries Lebreton & Fils Ltée c Canada (Emploi et Développement social)*, 2025 CF 2016 at paras 100–104; *Dugarte de Lopez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2020 FC 707 at paras 32–34; *Paulo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2020 FC 990 at para 50). It would be ironic, to say the least, if the discretionary remedy associated with the standard of reasonableness, a standard anchored in the recognition of and respect for the role of administrative decision makers, were to become the ground for transferring those decision makers’ powers to the courts of justice responsible for their supervision.

[38] In the case of Mr. Leibel, it is possible that, even if informed of the flaws affecting the Decisions, a new CRA agent could nevertheless reasonably arrive at the same decision. However, this new administrative decision maker could also reach a different conclusion, one

more favourable to Mr. Leibel, with respect to his eligibility to the benefits. It is for the Minister of Employment and Social Development, via the CRA, and not for the Court, to make such a determination. It would not be appropriate for the Court to venture into this area and thereby usurp the expertise and decision-making authority that the legislature has entrusted to the CRA on the issue of eligibility to the benefits. This is clearly not a situation where the record leans so heavily in favour of one single and inescapable outcome that sending the matter back to the CRA would serve no useful purpose (*Lemus v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)*, 2014 FCA 114 at para 38).

[39] Of course, in this new review of Mr. Leibel's eligibility now ordered by this Court, it goes without saying that the CRA shall give Mr. Leibel a full and fair opportunity to present his evidence (including new evidence, notably on the circumstances leading to the termination of his jobs) and his arguments to demonstrate that he meets the eligibility criteria to receive the CERB and CRB payments. Mr. Leibel shall also be properly informed of the evidence to be rebutted.

[40] Mr. Leibel should also note that it will be open for him to submit to the CRA the documents he submitted to this Court, as part of the new review of his eligibility. He bears the onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that he meets the eligibility criteria to receive the CERB and CRB payments.

VI. Conclusion

[41] For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Leibel's application for judicial review is allowed, in part. I am satisfied that the Decisions are unreasonable and were reached in a procedurally unfair manner given that Mr. Leibel did not know the case he had to meet. However, this is not one of those rare cases where the Court should direct the CRA's decisions. As such, the Decisions of the Agent with respect to Mr. Leibel's eligibility to the CERB and the CRB are quashed and the matter is remitted back to the CRA for redetermination by a different agent.

[42] In the exercise of my discretion, no costs will be awarded.

JUDGMENT in T-4165-25

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. This application for judicial review is granted in part.
2. The decisions dated April 25, 2025, in which the Canada Revenue Agency [CRA] found the Applicant ineligible for the Canada Emergency Response Benefit [CERB] and the Canada Recovery Benefit [CRB], are set aside.
3. The Applicant’s files with respect to his applications for the CERB and the CRB are returned to the CRA for redetermination by a new officer, in accordance with these reasons.
4. The style of cause is amended to name the Attorney General of Canada as the Respondent.
5. No costs are awarded.

“Denis Gascon”

Judge

FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET: T-4165-25

STYLE OF CAUSE: JAMIE THOMAS LEIBEL v ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA

PLACE OF HEARING: VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA

DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 23, 2026

JUDGMENT AND REASONS: GASCON J.

DATED: APRIL 23, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Jamie Thomas Leibel

FOR THE APPLICANT
(ON HIS OWN BEHALF)

Jennifer Rogers

FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Attorney General of Canada
Vancouver, British Columbia

FOR THE RESPONDENT