Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Self-represented plaintiff Marie Pia Fazio appealed an Associate Judge's order that removed her Statement of Claim from the Federal Court file under Rule 74 for presenting no viable matter within the Court's jurisdiction.

• Employment disputes with private entities fall outside Federal Court jurisdiction, rendering the wrongful termination, harassment, and workplace misconduct allegations non-actionable in this forum.

• Intellectual property claims contained fundamental material defects due to the plaintiff's failure to identify specific works, inventions, or trademarks, and subsection 13(3) of the Copyright Act presumes employer ownership of work created during employment.

• Charter arguments failed because the defendants are private entities not acting on behalf of government nor pursuant to a government statute, and no specific Charter right was identified as breached.

• References to the Canada Labour Code and Canadian Human Rights Act were inapplicable since nothing indicated the defendants fall within the category of federally regulated entities governed by those statutes, and no proper complaints were filed with the relevant tribunals.

• International law instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ILO Conventions, do not form part of Canadian domestic law and cannot be relied on to assert substantive rights alone.

Background and the plaintiff's allegations

Marie Pia Fazio, a self-represented litigant, brought a Statement of Claim in the Federal Court of Canada against her former employers — Altus Business Consultants Limited, Sparkrock Incorporated, Sparkrock Limited, Sparkrock Edsembli Incorporated, Sparkrock Canada Incorporated, Sparkrock U.S. Incorporated (formerly known as Altus Business Consultants America Inc.), Ember Investments Incorporated, and Ionic Partners Limited Liability Company. Ms. Fazio asserted that she experienced reprisals and harassment from the defendants and others because she is a whistleblower who has exposed an international modern slavery network operating in Norway, Sweden and Canada. Her claims included having experienced intimate partner violence and eviction by her former partner, as well as unemployment, kidnapping and torture; being targeted and abused by the defendants as well as the Canada Revenue Agency, Toronto-Dominion Bank, and all other Sparkrock companies; being conspired against and abused by Federal Court Registry staff and Justices of the Court; and being prejudiced by the defendants for their alleged non-compliance with the Rules, such as late filing.

The initial order under Rule 74

Associate Judge Trent Horne reviewed Ms. Fazio's Claim and, on March 16, 2026, ordered its removal from the Court file pursuant to Rule 74 of the Federal Courts Rules. A.J. Horne concluded that the Claim presented no viable matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. He described the following core allegations made by Ms. Fazio: wrongful termination and reprisal; harassment and workplace misconduct; payroll irregularities and corporate identity shifts; misappropriation of intellectual property; and systemic misconduct related to payroll, banking and federal reporting systems. Ms. Fazio subsequently appealed this order, and the appeal was heard by the Honourable Justice Battista on April 7, 2026, by way of Zoom videoconference.

Standard of review and the plaintiff's arguments on appeal

The applicable standard of review for the appeal of a decision by an Associate Judge is that such decisions should only be interfered with when they are incorrect in law or are based on a palpable and overriding error in regard to the facts. Ms. Fazio asserted that the threshold for Rule 74 decisions is high, rarely used, and that A.J. Horne erred by failing to consider proportionality. The Court found that A.J. Horne correctly identified that while Rule 74 may be infrequently used, it is an important tool that allows the Court to ensure that scarce judicial resources are not devoted to claims that have no prospect of success or are abusive proceedings. As for proportionality, A.J. Horne was alive to the consequences of the claim's removal from the Court file and conducted a comprehensive review of the applicable law.

The jurisdictional hurdle over employment matters

Ms. Fazio alleged that because material facts were in dispute, it was improper for her Claim to have been "prematurely" removed. However, Justice Battista noted that this argument ignores the fundamental hurdle that employment matters with private entities are not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. Ms. Fazio further alleged that the defendants are federally incorporated, multinational and complex as an organization, and accordingly the matter must fall under federal jurisdiction. The Court clarified that a defendant's status as federally incorporated, multinational or complex does not, on its own, grant the Court jurisdiction where none is granted by federal legislation. Provincial courts are vested with significant exclusive jurisdiction and competence in many matters outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and provincial human rights, labour and employment legislation are robust.

Deficiencies in the intellectual property claims

Ms. Fazio claimed that various governing federal statutes and matters of federal concern were at issue, including the Copyright Act, the Competition Act, the Patent Act, and the Trademarks Act. However, she generally referred to these legal instruments but did not describe specific breaches of any specific provisions within them. A.J. Horne acknowledged that Ms. Fazio advanced an intellectual property dispute, but the Court found that there continued to be fundamental material defects in the intellectual property claim that rendered it non-actionable. Ms. Fazio had not provided any list of works that are in issue, or any material facts, as required by pleadings for copyright infringement. She had also failed to identify any specific invention or trademark, rendering any specific claim under patent or trademark law non-actionable. Ms. Fazio also provided no arguments disputing A.J. Horne's determination that subsection 13(3) of the Copyright Act is fatal to any claim of copyright infringement, because the defendants are presumed to be copyright owners of Ms. Fazio's work during her employment. As for the competition law allegations, the only basis for Ms. Fazio's assertions under the Competition Act was the fact that the defendants engage in competition and cross-border corporate conduct; however, this mere assertion did not disclose any actionable cause of action or breach of the Competition Act.

Charter, human rights, and international law arguments

Ms. Fazio also asserted breaches of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canada Labour Code, the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and broadly the Conventions of the International Labour Organization. The Court found each of these arguments unavailing. Regarding the Charter, Ms. Fazio did not identify any specific Charter right that was breached, and A.J. Horne correctly noted that the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction over all Charter claims. Charter protection concerns government conduct offending the Charter, and the defendants are private entities not acting on the behalf of government, nor acting pursuant to a government statute. The Charter does not govern the conduct of private actors, including corporations, acting independently of government. As for the Canada Labour Code, Ms. Fazio failed to mention it in her submissions before A.J. Horne and in her Claim. The Code applies to specific federal works, undertakings and businesses, or other entities engaging in matters exclusively within statutory jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Government as specified in the Code, and nothing indicated that the defendants fall within this category. Similarly, the Canadian Human Rights Act applies to private sector corporations but only employers and service providers that are federally regulated such as airlines and banks, and the defendants are not private entities engaging in a federally regulated industry. Even assuming there was subject matter jurisdiction, Ms. Fazio had not made a proper complaint in the relevant tribunals established under the Canada Labour Code and the Canadian Human Rights Act. Her failure to do so was essentially a request for the Court to bypass the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal and the Canada Industrial Relations Board. A.J. Horne appropriately recognized that alleged breaches of a statute are not torts and do not create any actionable tortious claims. Finally, the Universal Declaration does not form part of Canadian domestic law and cannot be relied on to assert substantive rights alone. The same principle applies to the broadly asserted Conventions of the ILO, which were not argued before A.J. Horne nor in the Claim.

The ruling and outcome

Justice Battista found that A.J. Horne made no error in law, nor any palpable and overriding errors in his factual assessment of Ms. Fazio's claim. There was no basis to overturn his decision to remove Ms. Fazio's Claim from the Court file. The motion appealing A.J. Horne's Order was dismissed in favour of the defendants. The Court made no order regarding costs, and no specific monetary amount was awarded to either party.