Executive summary: Key legal and evidentiary issues

• Nabila Ismailzada sought judicial review of a CRA decision denying her eligibility for the Canada Recovery Benefit, rendered on August 7, 2024.

• The Attorney General of Canada (AGC) argued the Applicant's Notice of Application was filed out of time, having been served on December 15, 2025, well beyond the alleged August 19, 2024, deadline.

• AGC requested the Court exercise discretion under Rules 72 and 74 of the Federal Courts Rules to reject or remove the Notice of Application from the Court file.

• Rule 72 was found inapplicable because it is controlled exclusively by the Administrator at the time of filing, not invocable by a party seeking interlocutory relief.

• The Rule 74 process can only be engaged at the Court's own initiative and is not triggered by a unilateral letter from one of the parties.

• Associate Judge Molgat dismissed the AGC's request in its entirety, finding no basis to exercise discretion under either Rule 72 or Rule 74.

Background and facts of the case

Nabila Ismailzada applied for judicial review of a decision by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), dated August 7, 2024, which denied her eligibility for the Canada Recovery Benefit. According to Ms. Ismailzada's Notice of Application, she did not receive the CRA's decision letter until December 2, 2025. She subsequently filed her Notice of Application for judicial review thirteen days later, on December 15, 2025. The Registry accepted her filing without referring it to the Court under Rule 72(1)(b) of the Federal Courts Rules.

The AGC's request to the Court

On March 5, 2026, the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) sent a letter to the Federal Court requesting that the Court exercise its discretion under Rules 72 and 74 of the Federal Courts Rules. The AGC asked the Court to reject or remove the Applicant's Notice of Application, compel her to file a motion for a time extension, or issue any other order the Court deemed just. The AGC's primary contention was that the Applicant had until August 19, 2024, to serve a notice of application, and that her December 15, 2025 filing was out of time under subsection 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7. Notably, the AGC had already served and filed a Notice of Appearance on January 7, 2026, and transmitted the certified tribunal record in accordance with Rule 318 of the Rules on January 8, 2026, before making this request two months later.

The Court's analysis of Rules 72 and 74

Associate Judge Sylvie M. Molgat examined the AGC's reliance on Rules 72 and 74 in detail. With respect to Rule 72, the Court found it plainly inapplicable. Rule 72 applies only to the Chief Administrator appointed under section 5 of the Courts Administration Service Act, SC 2002, c 8, or a person acting on his or her behalf at the time a document is presented for filing. It concerns formal defects in a document or the failure to satisfy conditions precedent for the filing of a document. Since the Notice of Application had already been accepted for filing by the Registry on December 15, 2025, and was not referred to the Court by the Administrator pursuant to Rule 72(1)(b), Rule 72 was not engaged.

Regarding Rule 74, the Court drew on the recent decision of Associate Judge Trent Horne in Joorabdouz v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 152, which addressed the increasing number of requests from litigants, particularly respondents, to have documents removed from the Court file. The Court emphasized that the process leading to a decision under Rule 74 to remove a document from the Court file is engaged only at the Court's initiative. It is not a process that parties can initiate or that they control. Rule 74 is not engaged simply because a party writes a letter to the Court and asks that a document be removed. The Court further noted that except in extreme circumstances, which were not present here, the Court will not remove a document from the Court file based on a unilateral request from one of the parties. Both Rule 74 and principles of procedural fairness require that parties be given the opportunity to be heard before an order is made.

The distinction between Rule 74 and a motion to strike

The Court underscored that Rule 74 is not a substitute for a motion to strike. When the Court itself chooses to engage Rule 74, there will be a specific order or direction advising the party who filed the document as to the nature of the Court's concerns, and at least a timetable for exchange of submissions, if not an opportunity for an oral hearing. In contrast, when parties write to the Court requesting Rule 74 relief, it is not always apparent to the party who filed the document whether the Rule 74 process is engaged, whether submissions need to be filed, or when. An unregulated exchange of correspondence, the Court noted, is inefficient for all stakeholders. The Court cited the principle from Joorabdouz that a party cannot independently circumvent a motion to strike and reverse the onus by writing a short letter to the Court referring to Rule 74. Associate Judge Molgat characterized the AGC's request as one of the increasing number of improper requests the Court has been receiving to have documents immediately or unilaterally removed from the Court file under Rule 74.

Ruling and outcome

Associate Judge Molgat concluded that the AGC's reliance on Justice Stratas' decision in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Tennant, 2018 FCA 132, was misplaced, as the AGC's letter was neither a motion under Rules 359, 364, and 369 of the Rules nor did it comply with the Amended Consolidated General Practice Guidelines (June 20, 2025) governing informal motions for interlocutory relief. Finding that it was by no means evident that the pleading, on its face, suffered from a "fatal substantial defect," the Court declined to grant the relief sought in the AGC's letter. By order dated March 31, 2026, the AGC's request that the Court consider exercising its discretion pursuant to Rule 72 or 74 of the Federal Courts Rules was dismissed, with the result that the Applicant's Notice of Application remains on the Court file. No monetary award was at issue in this procedural decision, as the ruling pertained solely to whether the Notice of Application would be removed from the Court file.