Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Characterization of the flight disruption as a “retard” (delay) versus an “annulation” (cancellation) and whether it falls under article 19 of the Montreal Convention.
• Determination that the Montreal Convention is an exclusive liability regime for international air carriage claims, displacing the ordinary three-year prescription in the Civil Code of Québec.
• Application of the strict two-year limitation period in article 35 of the Montreal Convention, running from the passenger’s arrival date at destination.
• Assessment of whether Air Canada’s provision of a replacement flight two days later meant the carrier remained ready and willing to perform the contract, keeping the case within the “delay” framework.
• Reliance on recent case law (Dussault and other Quebec decisions) holding that cancellations and refusals to transport can still constitute “delay in the transport of passengers” under article 19.
• Consequences of issuing the claim after the two-year period, resulting in the extinction of the right of action and dismissal at a preliminary stage without any monetary award or costs.

Facts of the case

In 2022, Liliane Uwambaye purchased airline tickets from Air Canada for herself and her family for international travel from Fort Lauderdale to Brussels, Belgium. The itinerary included a connecting flight in Montréal. The original departure date from Fort Lauderdale was scheduled for 30 April 2022. On that date, the Air Canada flight out of Fort Lauderdale was cancelled. Air Canada then offered Ms. Uwambaye replacement flights, still operated by Air Canada, departing Fort Lauderdale two days later, on 2 May 2022. Using this rebooked itinerary, Ms. Uwambaye ultimately arrived at her final destination in Brussels on 3 May 2022, two days later than originally planned. Nearly three years after the events, on 25 April 2025, Ms. Uwambaye filed a claim in the Small Claims Division of the Court of Québec. She sought CAD 9,500 in damages, alleging loss and inconvenience resulting from Air Canada’s cancellation of the original flight and the consequent delay in her arrival. Air Canada responded on 5 June 2025 with a defence and a motion to dismiss (Demande en rejet), arguing that the claim was out of time because it was governed by the Montreal Convention, which contains a strict two-year time bar for actions in liability arising from international carriage by air.

Legal framework and policy terms at issue

The central legal framework was the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, commonly known as the Montreal Convention. The court noted that the Convention applies to international carriage by air of persons, baggage, or cargo for reward (article 1) and has the objective of establishing a uniform and limited liability regime for international air carriers. Article 29 of the Convention embodies the principle of exclusivity. Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Thibodeau v. Air Canada, the judge reaffirmed that for damage arising from international air carriage of passengers, baggage, or cargo, the Montreal Convention supplies the only available basis for liability against the carrier, within the subject-matter it covers. National legal causes of action cannot bypass its conditions and limits where the Convention applies. In terms of the substantive liability hook, article 19 of the Montreal Convention was at the heart of the dispute. It states that the carrier is liable for damage caused by “delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo,” unless the carrier proves that it and its agents took all reasonable measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to do so. The Convention itself does not define “delay” or expressly differentiate delay from cancellation. However, the court looked to both doctrinal commentary and case law to interpret this notion broadly, so as not to unduly narrow the Convention’s scope. A second crucial clause was article 35 of the Montreal Convention. It provides that any action for damages must be brought, under pain of extinction of the right, within two years from the date of arrival at destination, the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or the date on which the carriage stopped. In parallel, Ms. Uwambaye attempted to invoke the general three-year prescription under article 2925 of the Civil Code of Québec, arguing that the Montreal Convention did not apply because she had experienced a cancellation, not a mere delay. If the Convention did not apply, the provincial civil prescription period would govern and her claim, filed in April 2025, would not be prescribed.

Characterization of the event: delay versus cancellation

The court first addressed whether the events—an initial cancellation followed by rebooking two days later—constituted a “retard” within the meaning of article 19. Drawing on doctrinal commentary (including Clay S. Hunter’s discussion of air carrier delay) and a series of Quebec and Canadian decisions, the judge emphasized that delay is to be understood in a functional and broad manner. According to the doctrinal approach cited, as long as the carrier remains ready, willing, and able to complete the contract of carriage, and the passenger presents themself ready to travel, any lateness in performing the carriage—regardless of its operational cause—falls under the Convention’s delay regime. Only when the carrier truly repudiates the contract of carriage in its entirety, and no longer intends to perform, would the claim not be characterized as delay under the Convention. The court noted that Air Canada, after cancelling the original 30 April 2022 flight, offered Ms. Uwambaye a replacement flight two days later on 2 May 2022. She accepted and traveled to Brussels, arriving on 3 May 2022. The carrier therefore continued to perform the transport contract, albeit belatedly. This was not a case where the carrier refused all carriage or definitively terminated the contract. In support of a broad understanding of “delay in the transport of passengers,” the court cited the Superior Court decision in Dussault v. Air Canada, which had considered a proposed class action involving both delayed and cancelled flights. In Dussault, the court concluded that article 19 applies irrespective of the cause of the delay and that an annulment of a flight can still produce a delay “in the transport” of passengers and thus fall squarely within article 19. The judge also referred to other Quebec cases in which courts treated cancellations, missed segments, and rebookings with the same or other carriers as falling under article 19’s delay regime, including Mohammad v. Air Canada, Labelle v. Société Air France, Zouheir v. Turkish Airlines, Sternstein v. Air Canada, Cloutier v. Qatar Airways, and Jeukeng Dongmo v. Air France. On the strength of this jurisprudence and commentary, the court held that article 19 must receive a broad and purposive interpretation to avoid unduly restricting the Convention’s reach. An annulment of a flight that results in the passenger ultimately arriving later than planned is “susceptible de causer un retard dans le transport aérien de voyageurs” and thus falls within article 19.

Application of the Montreal Convention and exclusion of the Civil Code

Given the characterization of the events as a delay within the meaning of article 19, the court found that Ms. Uwambaye’s action was one for damages governed by the Montreal Convention. That meant the Convention’s exclusive regime applied, including its limitation provisions, and that the general three-year prescription of the Civil Code of Québec was displaced in this context. The judge reiterated the holding from Thibodeau that, within the subject-matter it addresses, the Montreal Convention is exclusive and exhaustive with respect to carrier liability for what happens to passengers between embarkation and disembarkation. In this case, the harm alleged—financial loss and inconvenience due to late arrival at destination on an international itinerary—fell directly within that field. Consequently, the court rejected Ms. Uwambaye’s argument that the case should be treated as a standard civil or contractual claim governed by the Civil Code’s three-year limitation period. Instead, the two-year period in article 35 of the Montreal Convention applied, and any action filed outside that period would result in the extinction of the right to sue.

Limitation period analysis and outcome

Having concluded that the Montreal Convention governed the claim, the court turned to the limitation period under article 35. The provision requires that an action be brought within two years from the earlier of the passenger’s arrival at destination, the day the aircraft should have arrived, or the stoppage of carriage. For Ms. Uwambaye, the most favourable reference date was her actual arrival at Brussels: 3 May 2022. Counting two years from that date, she had until 3 May 2024 to file her claim. Any action instituted after that date would be time-barred, and her right of action would be extinguished. However, Ms. Uwambaye commenced her small claims action on 25 April 2025, almost one year after the two-year deadline had expired. She had assumed she had three years to sue, based on the Civil Code of Québec, but the court found that this assumption was incorrect because the Convention’s strict two-year period governed. As a result, the court held that by 25 April 2025, Ms. Uwambaye’s right of action against Air Canada under the Montreal Convention was already extinguished. The motion to dismiss had therefore to be allowed, as the claim was filed outside the mandatory limitation period.

Final ruling and monetary consequences

In its formal disposition, the Court of Québec allowed Air Canada’s motion to dismiss and rejected Ms. Uwambaye’s claim in its entirety. The judge held that the cancellation and rebooking amounted to a delay under article 19 of the Montreal Convention, that the Convention’s exclusive regime applied, and that the two-year limitation period in article 35 had expired before the claim was filed. Because the action was out of time, there was no adjudication on the merits of liability or quantum of damages, and Ms. Uwambaye’s demand for CAD 9,500 was dismissed. On the question of costs, the court took into account that the dismissal occurred at a preliminary stage and ordered that each party bear its own legal costs. In practical terms, Air Canada emerged as the successful party, but no monetary damages or costs were awarded in its favour; the total amount ordered to be paid to the successful party was therefore zero.