Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Characterization of TFSA and RRIF beneficiary designations as testamentary dispositions rather than gratuitous inter vivos transfers, rendering the Pecore presumption of resulting trust inapplicable
• Determination of whether Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act requires courts to treat registered accounts with beneficiary designations as passing outside the estate directly to the named beneficiary
• Evaluation of the deceased’s actual intention regarding the TFSA and RRIF, given the change in beneficiary from his stepchildren to his later partner and the absence of any reference to these accounts in his will
• Assessment of whether the respondent unduly influenced the deceased in changing the beneficiary designations, including scrutiny of pre-death gifts, relationship dynamics, and third-party opinion evidence
• Consideration of competing case law (Pecore, Calmusky, Mak Estate, Fitzgerald, Amherst Crane, Alger, Seguin and others) on resulting trust, testamentary dispositions and beneficiary designations for registered plans
• Allocation of costs from an estate litigation perspective where the legal issue is unsettled, including whether the estate trustee should personally bear costs or whether they should be paid out of the estate

Background and relationships

The case arises out of a dispute over who should receive the proceeds of two registered accounts held by the late Siegfried Ernest “Ernie” Kunka: a Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA) and a Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF), both at the Windsor Family Credit Union (WFCU). Ernie had been in a long-term common-law relationship of over thirty years with Rose Marie “Marie” Olar, who had two children from a prior relationship, Ann-Marie Mills and Michael Olar. Ernie was effectively their stepfather and, prior to the events in question, their financial and testamentary arrangements had been aligned as a family unit. Marie and Ernie executed spousal wills in October 2021, leaving their respective estates to each other, with a gift over to Mills and Olar if the survivor also died. When Marie passed away in November 2021, Ernie received her life insurance, TFSA, and RRIF as surviving joint owner and designated beneficiary. Those funds then became his alone to manage and dispose of, including through future estate planning. Following Marie’s death, Ernie struggled emotionally, but he remained socially connected: he spent time with friends, neighbours, support groups, church contacts and family. Among those with whom he reconnected was the respondent, Angele Giasson, a friend from decades earlier. Their relationship developed into a close companionship that included frequent overnights together, partial co-mingling of daily life, and, later, steps that brought Giasson into Ernie’s financial and insurance arrangements.

Estate planning changes and financial arrangements

In January 2022, Ernie revised his will to substitute Mills and Olar as his sole beneficiaries and estate trustees in place of Marie, and he named a friend, Robert Stach, as an alternate estate trustee and contingent beneficiary. He later amended the will in March 2022 to gift his car to Stach, but he ultimately fell out with Stach sometime thereafter. In September 2022, Ernie transferred $21,300 to Giasson to help her with credit card debt. Around the same period, he shifted some of his financial and personal benefits to include her more directly: he changed his insurance coverage from single to family to add her, she moved some belongings into his home, and she used his address for some of her mail, although they kept separate residences. In January 2023, Ernie listed Giasson as his spouse on the TFSA, and in March 2023 he did the same for the RRIF. Crucially, he changed the beneficiary designation on both the TFSA and the RRIF from Mills and Olar to Giasson. She made no contributions to these accounts, which remained fully funded by Ernie’s own assets and prior inheritances. Sometime in 2023, they also opened a joint bank account and a joint safety deposit box at WFCU, with evidence suggesting the box was used for mutual savings toward a holiday and the account had a zero balance. On April 26, 2023, with the assistance of a lawyer, Ernie again updated his will. He removed Stach and added Giasson as a contingent beneficiary but left the main structure intact: Mills remained estate trustee, and Mills and Olar remained equal residuary beneficiaries of his estate. The will, however, did not mention the TFSA or the RRIF, a detail later treated by the court as significant in understanding his intentions.

Events leading to the dispute and the litigation

In early August 2023, Ernie travelled with Giasson to Toronto to visit his sister. Shortly after their return, he was hospitalized and died on August 6, 2023. His final will naming Mills and Olar as beneficiaries was not challenged by anyone. The conflict instead emerged over the registered accounts: Mills, as estate trustee, argued that the TFSA and RRIF should fall back into the estate rather than pass to Giasson as designated beneficiary. Pending resolution, Mills and Giasson jointly directed WFCU to hold the funds in the TFSA and RRIF. Mills brought an application seeking directions and orders that the accounts belonged in the estate. She advanced two main arguments: first, that the presumption of resulting trust from Pecore v. Pecore should be extended to registered accounts with beneficiary designations, meaning the TFSA and RRIF “reverted” to the estate unless Giasson proved a gift was intended; and second, that even if no such presumption applied, the designations were procured by undue influence exerted by Giasson on a vulnerable, grieving and allegedly cognitively impaired Ernie. Giasson resisted the application, maintaining that Ontario legislation and binding appellate authority treat such registered accounts as passing directly to the named beneficiary outside the estate, and that there was no credible evidence that she pressured or coerced Ernie in any way.

Legal framework on beneficiary designations and resulting trust

The court began by addressing whether the Pecore presumption of resulting trust applies at all to registered plans with beneficiary designations, such as TFSAs and RRIFs. Pecore dealt with inter vivos transfers—specifically, a father adding his adult child as a joint holder on a bank account, giving that child present access to funds during the father’s lifetime. That structure differs markedly from a registered plan with a death-only payout: a TFSA or RRIF beneficiary has no right to access the funds during the account holder’s life, has no present ownership interest, and the account holder remains in full control of the asset, including the power to change the beneficiary designation at any time before death. The judge considered the trial decision in Calmusky v. Calmusky, which had extended Pecore and the presumption of resulting trust to a RIF beneficiary designation, effectively treating such designations as suspect and shifting the onus to the beneficiary to prove donative intent. That approach had already been criticized and rejected in later decisions such as Mak (Estate) v. Mak and Fitzgerald Estate v. Fitzgerald, which emphasized that beneficiary designations are governed by statute and operate as testamentary dispositions, not as inter vivos gifts. Relying heavily on Mak Estate and Fitzgerald, the court highlighted core distinctions: registered plans with designations are not joint accounts, the transferee gains no inter vivos control, the transfer only occurs on death, and the financial institution is contractually bound by legislation to pay the plan proceeds to the named beneficiary upon the plan holder’s death.

Statutory and appellate guidance on registered plans

The court then examined Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA), particularly Part III. Section 51(1) allows a person to designate a beneficiary of a “plan” (defined in s. 50 and related regulations to include RRSPs, RRIFs and TFSAs) by signed instrument or by will, and section 53 obliges the institution administering the plan to pay the proceeds in accordance with that designation on the participant’s death. Earlier Court of Appeal authority in Amherst Crane Rentals Ltd. v. Perring had already held that proceeds of an RRSP with a valid beneficiary designation do not fall into the estate but vest directly in the designated beneficiary on death, bypassing both the will and the estate’s creditors, except where specific statutory provisions (like s. 72 for dependants’ relief) apply. More recently, in Alger v. Crumb, the Court of Appeal treated beneficiary designations as testamentary dispositions that require express revocation under Part III of the SLRA, rather than being caught by a general revocation clause in a will. This reinforced the conceptual distinction between instruments establishing plan designations and traditional testamentary documents, and confirmed that plan proceeds are presumptively not part of the estate. Against this backdrop, the court concluded that Amherst Crane and Alger remain binding authority in Ontario on how registered accounts are to be treated: the proceeds of a TFSA or RRIF with a valid designation pass directly to the named beneficiary, and the doctrine of resulting trust from Pecore—developed for inter vivos transfers—does not apply. Calmusky was therefore not followed.

Determining Ernie’s intention regarding the TFSA and RRIF

Once the court held that no presumption of resulting trust applied, the burden shifted to Mills, as the party challenging the designations, to prove on a balance of probabilities that Ernie actually intended the TFSA and RRIF to benefit the estate rather than Giasson, or that the designations were the product of undue influence. Mills tried to anchor her argument in family history, asserting that the registered accounts originated from funds that had been part of Marie’s estate and that morally and practically they were meant ultimately for her children, Mills and Olar. The court rejected this framing. When Marie died, Ernie lawfully inherited her property; those assets became his own, and he was free to use or dispose of them as he chose. The correct focus was Ernie’s actual intention as to the TFSA and RRIF at the time he altered the designations, not what Mills or Olar felt was fair or consistent with Marie’s wishes. On the evidence, the court found no indication that Ernie intended these accounts to fall into the estate. He had affirmatively changed the designated beneficiaries from his stepchildren to Giasson and then, three months later, updated his will with a lawyer yet made no reference to bringing those accounts back into the estate. This sequence suggested that he deliberately kept the TFSA and RRIF outside the will regime, intending them to pass directly to Giasson upon his death while still leaving his home and residue to Mills and Olar under the will.

Allegations of undue influence and standards of proof

The court next turned to the claim that Giasson had exerted undue influence over Ernie. In estate and beneficiary-designation disputes, the party alleging undue influence bears the onus to prove it on a balance of probabilities, and the threshold is high. Authorities such as Seguin v. Pearson and Gironda v. Gironda describe the standard as requiring “outright and overpowering coercion” such that the testator’s will is effectively overborne and the decision is no longer truly their own. To assess this, courts consider a range of contextual factors: dependence on the beneficiary, social isolation, recent bereavement, conflicts, unexplained or radical testamentary changes, simultaneous legal document changes, large pre-death transfers, the respondent’s involvement in legal or financial meetings, any threats or expressions of fear, and other signs of manipulation. Some of these background concerns were arguably present—Ernie had recently lost his long-time partner and made significant pre-death gifts—but the evidence still had to show that Giasson actually overpowered his volition. In this case, the court accepted that Ernie was grieving and lonely, but found no reliable evidence of cognitive impairment, severe vulnerability, or inability to make independent decisions about his finances or estate.

Assessment of the evidence on influence and capacity

On the facts, the only meaningful Gironda-type factor clearly present was substantial pre-death transfers: Ernie’s $21,300 payment to help with Giasson’s credit card debt, their joint savings in the safety deposit box for a future vacation, and his attempted purchase of a washer and dryer for her shortly before death. However, there was no evidence that Giasson requested these gifts or applied pressure to obtain them. She declined to accompany Ernie to his lawyer when he revised his will, undermining the narrative that she orchestrated his estate planning. Nor was there any evidence from WFCU staff or documentation suggesting suspicious circumstances when he changed the beneficiary designations on the TFSA and RRIF. The affidavits from a neighbour and a friend—both aligned with Mills—were treated as speculative opinion evidence: each deponent had only seen the couple together once and offered generalized views that Giasson was “manipulative” without concrete examples. Mills and Olar likewise alleged abuse and manipulation, but they had minimal direct observation of the couple together and largely relied on Ernie’s emails expressing his hopes for a deeper romantic relationship and disappointment that Giasson would not move as quickly as he wished. The judge read these communications as showing that Ernie wanted Giasson to be more involved in his life, not that she controlled him. Notably, Giasson rejected his repeated marriage proposals, despite the obvious financial advantages marriage could have given her, further undermining any inference that she was scheming for legal and financial control.

Findings on undue influence and capacity

Mills also suggested that Ernie suffered from memory issues, possible early-onset dementia, alcohol misuse and suicidal ideation, and that these made him vulnerable to manipulation. The court emphasized that there was no medical or expert evidence to substantiate these claims, nor any documentation of the alleged mini-stroke beyond a bare reference in an affidavit. Importantly, Mills did not challenge Ernie’s capacity to execute his final will leaving his principal asset—his home—to her and Olar; instead, she attacked only the TFSA and RRIF designations. The absence of any capacity challenge to the will, which was made with a lawyer, undercut the suggestion that he was so impaired as to be easily overborne in closely related financial decisions. The judge also noted that Ernie had earlier recognized and acted on feeling taken advantage of by another friend, Stach, by removing him from his will. That behaviour, far from showing general vulnerability, suggested that Ernie could identify and respond to perceived financial exploitation when he believed it existed. In the result, the court found that Mills’ case on undue influence rested on speculation, suspicion and disappointment rather than concrete, persuasive evidence. There was no demonstration of the sort of overpowering coercion required to invalidate testamentary choices or beneficiary designations.

Outcome and costs

The court held that beneficiary designations under registered plans such as TFSAs and RRIFs are testamentary dispositions governed by the SLRA and related case law and that the Pecore presumption of resulting trust does not apply to them. It further found that the evidence established Ernie’s intention to have the TFSA and RRIF pass directly to Giasson on his death, and that Mills had not proven undue influence. Accordingly, the application was dismissed, and the court ordered that WFCU pay the TFSA and RRIF proceeds to Giasson, or as she directs. On costs, the judge recognized that the legal question about applying a resulting trust to such designations was arguable and unsettled, especially given conflicting lower-court authorities and the parties’ failure to initially bring the key Court of Appeal decisions to the court’s attention. The litigation was therefore seen as reasonably necessary to the proper administration of the estate. The court ruled that Giasson is entitled to her costs of the application, but that they should be paid out of the estate rather than personally by Mills in her capacity as estate trustee. The exact dollar amount of Giasson’s costs, and the precise monetary value of the TFSA and RRIF, are not specified in the judgment and would either be agreed by the parties or determined later through written costs submissions if necessary, so the total monetary amount ultimately awarded in her favour cannot be determined from this decision alone.