Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Procedural dismissal of the plaintiff’s automobile insurance action when she failed to attend trial under Rule 9-13(2)(a) of The King’s Bench Rules and the legal test for setting that dismissal aside.
• Scope and timing of appeals and leave requirements from interlocutory fiats and final judgments under The Automobile Accident Insurance Act, The Court of Appeal Act, 2000, and The King’s Bench Act.
• Alleged failures to accommodate a self-represented litigant’s documented medical disability and related procedural fairness, equality rights, and access to justice concerns.
• Challenges to trial management decisions such as refusals to adjust courtroom logistics, permit eating/drinking/vaping, and adjourn the trial shortly before the scheduled date.
• Costs consequences flowing from missed court-imposed deadlines and from the plaintiff’s conduct in “walking out” of a scheduled appeal hearing, including full-indemnity costs.
• Limits on separate appeals from costs-only and procedural rulings where those issues can be raised within appeals from the main merits judgments.

Background and facts of the dispute

This case arises from a statutory automobile insurance dispute between Alicia Yashcheshen and Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI), the provincial public auto insurer. The underlying action was brought under The Automobile Accident Insurance Act (AAIA), which governs benefits and entitlements following automobile accidents in Saskatchewan. The details of the accident and the precise benefits claimed are not set out in this Court of Appeal decision, but it is clear that the action concerned Ms. Yashcheshen’s claim to accident-related benefits or compensation from SGI under the AAIA. The litigation history is lengthy and procedurally complex. Before trial, the plaintiff sought a number of accommodations, citing disability-related needs and the fact that she was self-represented. She requested that the trial be held in a different courtroom location and that she be permitted to eat, drink, and vape in the courtroom, and she also sought particular scheduling of breaks. The trial judge refused these requests in an April 24, 2025 fiat (Fiat #1), explaining that some matters were beyond the judge’s authority and others did not appear necessary. That fiat also addressed case conference scheduling and other procedural questions. As the trial date approached (June 16, 2025), the plaintiff also sought an adjournment of the trial and filed an affidavit in support. In a June 11, 2025 fiat (Fiat #2), the judge partially allowed SGI’s objections to her affidavit, refused her application to adjourn the trial, and directed that the trial proceed as scheduled.

Trial dismissal and post-trial motions

When the trial was called, SGI appeared but Ms. Yashcheshen did not attend. Relying on Rule 9-13(2)(a) of The King’s Bench Rules, the trial judge dismissed the action in a June 19, 2025 judgment (Judgment #1). That rule states that if the defendant appears when a trial is called and the plaintiff does not, the defendant “is entitled to judgment dismissing the action.” After her action was dismissed, Ms. Yashcheshen applied promptly under Rule 9-13(3) to set aside the dismissal. That provision allows a party to ask, within 15 days, that a judgment obtained when one party does not appear at trial be set aside “on those terms that the Court considers just.” In Judgment #2, issued August 15, 2025, the trial judge dismissed her application to set aside the dismissal judgment. Thus, by late summer 2025, the plaintiff’s action against SGI had been definitively dismissed at the trial level: first by the initial dismissal under Rule 9-13(2)(a), and then by the refusal to set that dismissal aside under Rule 9-13(3).

Appeals, interlocutory orders, and leave requirements

Following these trial-level rulings, multiple appeals and related applications were launched in the Court of Appeal, resulting in five appeal files: CACV4551 (Fiat #1), CACV4566 (Fiat #2), CACV4571 (Judgment #1), CACV4616 (Judgment #2), and CACV4668 (Judgment #3, discussed below). SGI responded by applying under Rule 46.1 of The Court of Appeal Rules to quash several of the appeals, arguing that they were interlocutory, required leave, or were frivolous or abusive. The appeals were placed under case management because of their number, their interrelationship, and the many associated applications. A single judge of the Court of Appeal (Leurer C.J.S.) managed the procedural aspects, while a full panel is reserved for applications to quash and for determining the merits of the appeals themselves. A crucial legal issue was whether leave to appeal was required. SGI relied on section 194 of the AAIA, which allows an insurer or claimant to appeal decisions of the Court of King’s Bench or the Automobile Injury Appeal Commission to the Court of Appeal “on a question of law only,” and only “with leave” of a judge of the Court of Appeal, within a limited time. The plaintiff initially argued that this leave requirement applied only to merits determinations of benefits under the Act and not to a dismissal for non-attendance under Rule 9-13, but she ultimately conceded that leave was required for appeals from Judgment #1 and Judgment #2. For interlocutory decisions such as Fiat #1 and Fiat #2, the Court applied established tests for extensions of time and for leave to appeal. On extension of time, four usual factors were considered: the appellant’s bona fide intention to appeal within time; reasonable diligence or a reasonable explanation for delay; absence of prejudice beyond the ordinary appeal process; and the existence of an arguable case. On leave to appeal, the standard from Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v Saskatchewan requires that the proposed appeal be of sufficient merit and of sufficient importance to the case, to the field, or to the administration of justice to warrant the Court’s attention.

Accommodation, disability, and procedural fairness issues

At the heart of the proposed appeals from the dismissal judgment (Judgment #1) and the refusal to set it aside (Judgment #2) are questions about how the trial judge handled the plaintiff’s disability and self-represented status. In her draft notice of appeal (confirmed as the basis for her leave application), Ms. Yashcheshen framed four main questions of law. She alleged that the trial judge erred by dismissing her action under Rule 9-13(2) without exercising discretion to accommodate her documented medical disability and self-represented status and thereby breached procedural fairness, section 15 equality rights under the Charter, and principles articulated in key Supreme Court cases such as British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGSEU and Pintea v Johns. She also argued that the judge improperly treated her non-attendance as determinative without considering whether dismissal was proportionate or necessary, that the judge’s comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias by questioning the legitimacy of her medical condition and credibility, and that the judge rejected uncontroverted medical evidence without proper basis, contrary to evidentiary standards and natural justice. The Court of Appeal judge recognized that these questions raise issues of law about the interpretation of rules and legal tests, and more importantly, they engage procedural fairness regarding accommodation of disabled or self-represented litigants, reasonable apprehension of bias, and natural justice. Such questions are generally treated as questions of law suitable for appellate review. On that basis, he was satisfied that the plaintiff’s proposed appeal from Judgment #1 met the merits and importance components of the leave test.

Findings on the various leave applications

The Court of Appeal judge distinguished between different decisions when ruling on leave: For Fiat #1 (interlocutory accommodations and procedural directions), he granted an extension of time but refused leave to appeal. While he accepted that there was at least an arguable case and no prejudice from the timing, he found that a separate appeal from Fiat #1 was no longer important because that fiat was interlocutory and its rulings had been subsumed into the final dismissal judgment (Judgment #1). Any complaint about Fiat #1 could instead be raised within the main appeal from Judgment #1, making a standalone appeal unnecessary. For Judgment #1 (dismissal for non-attendance), he assumed (without definitively deciding) that leave was required and granted both an extension of time and leave to appeal. The extension was justified by Ms. Yashcheshen’s consistent efforts to challenge the dismissal and the lack of prejudice to SGI from her initial filing of a notice of appeal instead of a leave application. The importance element was satisfied because the judgment finally terminated her action and raised potentially broader legal issues. On the merits element, he found that the four articulated grounds raised bona fide legal questions about Rule 9-13 and procedural fairness. For Judgment #2 (refusal to set aside the dismissal), he again granted an extension of time and leave to appeal, largely for the same reasons as for Judgment #1. Although there could be an argument that such an order should not be the subject of a separate appeal from the underlying dismissal, the parties had not taken that position, and the judge accepted that the appeal from Judgment #2 had independent vitality. For Judgment #3 (the costs and recording decision), he refused leave to appeal. Judgment #3 addressed the plaintiff’s request for leave under section 6-14 of The King’s Bench Act to appeal the costs award associated with Judgment #2, and her request to be allowed to record a Chambers appearance. The trial judge found that section 6-14 only restricts appeals from “costs only” judgments and that the plaintiff, in any event, could challenge the costs award directly in her appeal from Judgment #2. The Court of Appeal judge concluded that the separate application to appeal Judgment #3 was ill-conceived and of doubtful merit and that the question about recording a Chambers appearance was now moot because the appearance had already taken place. As a result, leave to appeal Judgment #3 was denied.

Case management, appeal structure, and evidentiary organization

Because the issues raised in the appeals from Fiat #2, Judgment #1, and Judgment #2 are closely interrelated, the Court of Appeal judge issued detailed case management directions. He ordered that these three appeals (CACV4566, CACV4571, and CACV4616) be heard on the same day before the same panel. To avoid duplication and reduce burdens on the self-represented appellant, he directed that there be a single common appeal book for all three appeals, containing the key fiats (Fiat #1 and Fiat #2), the three judgments (Judgment #1, Judgment #2, and Judgment #3), the notices of appeal, SGI’s application to quash the Fiat #2 appeal, and the plaintiff’s application for leave nunc pro tunc in that file. Only three paper copies of this common appeal book are required, though an electronic copy must be filed in each appeal file. Similarly, he directed that each side file only one factum (or in Ms. Yashcheshen’s case, a written argument of up to 60 pages) dealing with all three appeals and the associated applications. Each factum must organize the arguments in a way that clearly distinguishes which issues relate to which appeal or application. These directions modify the usual requirements of Rule 28 of The Court of Appeal Rules to fit the unique complexity of this litigation.

Costs orders and the outcome of this Court of Appeal decision

A major feature of this decision is the allocation of costs against the plaintiff in connection with her procedural conduct and unsuccessful leave applications. First, the judge revisited costs reserved in an earlier October 28, 2025 procedural ruling, where he had extended deadlines despite the plaintiff’s failure to meet a September 26, 2025 filing date. He found that SGI had incurred additional expense, though less than it claimed, and fixed costs at $1,000 in SGI’s favour for that missed deadline. Second, he addressed an aborted hearing on January 12, 2026. On that date, multiple interconnected applications had been set down for hearing. The day before, the plaintiff sought separate days for each application and asked that everything be adjourned. At the hearing’s outset, the judge heard submissions on scheduling and indicated he would not break the applications apart. When he turned to the plaintiff’s adjournment request, she began making submissions but, before SGI responded and before any ruling on adjournment, she announced she would not proceed and then hung up, effectively ending her participation and preventing the Court from ruling. The judge treated this as “metaphorically walking out of the hearing,” noting that by doing so she had, in substance, obtained the adjournment she wanted while showing a lack of regard for the Court and for SGI. For this conduct, he held that SGI should receive full indemnity costs for its “additional actual out-of-pocket legal expenses” related to the January 12, 2026 hearing, limited to the expense of lead counsel’s attendance in court that day (because co-counsel’s presence was mainly for training). SGI is directed to file a detailed bill of costs within seven days, after which the plaintiff may object in writing, and a further hearing may be held to settle the amount. Because that assessment is still pending, the precise figure for these full-indemnity costs cannot be determined from this decision. Third, the judge fixed additional lump-sum costs expressly in this fiat. He ordered that, in addition to the full-indemnity costs tied to January 12, Ms. Yashcheshen must pay SGI a further $3,000 in fixed costs, broken down as: $1,000 pursuant to an earlier September 17, 2025 procedural ruling involving these appeals; $1,000 in connection with her ultimately unsuccessful application for leave to appeal from Fiat #1 (CACV4551); and $1,000 in connection with her unsuccessful application for leave to appeal Judgment #3 (CACV4668). When combined with the $1,000 ordered for the missed September 26 deadline as reserved in the October 28 ruling, the total fixed costs clearly quantified in this decision are $4,000 in SGI’s favour. Beyond these fixed sums, the full amount that SGI will ultimately receive cannot yet be known because the full-indemnity costs from the January 12 hearing require a bill of costs and, if contested, a further hearing. In practical terms, the immediate outcome of this Court of Appeal decision is that SGI succeeds on the costs and leave issues decided here, while the plaintiff obtains leave to pursue her appeals from Judgment #1 and Judgment #2 and to challenge, within those appeals, the accommodations and costs issues that arose earlier in the litigation.