Search by
Factual background
The case arises from a truck accident on 29 March 2021 on a ramp connecting Route 132 to Autoroute 15 North near the new Champlain Bridge. A semi-trailer truck overturned on this access ramp, blocking both lanes of the ramp and causing significant physical damage to the end portion of the safety guardrail. The plaintiff, Groupe Signature sur le Saint-Laurent S.E.N.C., is the consortium responsible for the design, construction, financing and maintenance of the new bridge over the Saint-Lawrence River under a long-term contract with the federal government. It claimed to have suffered material losses as a result of the accident, including costs associated with damage to bridge infrastructure and related works. The truck involved in the incident was owned by the corporate defendant 7173041 Canada Inc. (“Canada inc.”) and driven by the individual defendant, Omar Chehaita. Canada inc. admitted ownership of the vehicle, and Mr Chehaita testified at trial but did not actively contest the merits of the claim. Two additional individuals, Paul Singh and Charnjit Singh, were also named as defendants, but their precise role in relation to the truck, the accident, or the plaintiff was not established on the evidence, which later proved decisive for their position in the case.
Procedural posture and positions of the parties
The matter was heard in the Small Claims Division of the Court of Québec. Groupe Signature sur le Saint-Laurent sued the defendants in civil liability, relying on a “Detail of costs” schedule as the basis for its alleged damages. Canada inc., in its written defence, pleaded prescription (limitation) and challenged the quantum of damages as exaggerated, although it was not represented at the hearing. Mr Chehaita appeared and testified but did not formally contest the claim. The two Singh defendants did not succeed in being linked by evidence to the accident or to any contractual or legal relationship with the plaintiff. The court therefore had to determine whether it had jurisdiction, what substantive legal framework applied to the accident, whether liability was established under that framework, and, crucially, whether the plaintiff had proven any recoverable loss.
Legal framework governing liability
The court first confirmed that the accident fell under Québec’s Loi sur l’assurance automobile (LAA). The LAA defines an “accident” as any event in which damage is caused by an automobile, and “automobile” broadly covers any motor-driven vehicle adapted for use on public roads. Because the accident involved a truck (an automobile under the LAA) on a public road and resulted in damage to other property (bridge structure and safety devices), the material damage provisions of the LAA were engaged. Under article 84.1 LAA, any damage to an automobile or other property caused in an accident constitutes material prejudice, and any person suffering such material prejudice is treated as a “victim” for the purposes of the statute. Articles 108 and 109 LAA establish powerful presumptions of liability: the owner of the automobile is responsible for material damage caused by that automobile, and the driver is jointly liable with the owner unless they can prove that the accident was caused by the fault of the victim, a third party, or by force majeure unrelated to the condition or functioning of the vehicle, the driver’s health, or a passenger’s act. These provisions create a strict liability type regime in which the owner and driver carry the burden of establishing recognised grounds of exoneration. They must positively prove such grounds; simply showing absence of fault is not enough to displace the statutory presumption.
Inapplicability of the direct compensation convention
The court then considered whether the “Convention d’indemnisation directe pour le règlement des sinistres automobiles” (the Direct Compensation Agreement) applied. This contractual regime, referred to in articles 115 and 116 LAA, is designed primarily for collisions involving at least two automobiles and channels the owner’s recourse through their own automobile insurer under a predetermined allocation mechanism. The judge concluded that the Convention did not apply in this situation because the material damage did not result from a collision between two automobiles; instead, a single truck damaged external property – the bridge and its infrastructure. As a result, the special direct-compensation regime was not triggered, and the plaintiff was entitled to proceed under the ordinary rules of civil law, supplemented by the LAA’s presumptions of liability.
Use of case law and doctrinal authorities
To interpret and apply articles 84.1, 108, 109 and 115 LAA, the court relied on both doctrinal commentary and a series of Québec decisions. Scholarly commentary emphasises that the responsibility of the owner and driver is strict in nature, that the exceptions to liability are narrowly framed, and that the burden of proving any exonerating circumstances rests squarely on those parties. The judge also surveyed prior cases where automobiles caused damage to non-automobile property: for example, collisions with horse-drawn vehicles, farm equipment such as hay bale elevators, residential structures, and electricity masts and aerial power lines. In those authorities, courts have consistently treated such incidents as accidents under the LAA, applied the presumptions of liability against owners and drivers, and required clear proof of fault by the victim, a third party, or force majeure for any exoneration. One reference case did illustrate exoneration where the evidence showed that low-hanging power lines, rather than any fault in the truck’s operation, were the true cause of the accident, demonstrating that the presumption can be rebutted on compelling proof of third-party fault.
Application of the LAA to the accident
On the facts, the judge held that the accident on the ramp was plainly an “accident” under the LAA because the damage to the bridge structure and safety barriers flowed from the impact of the truck, an automobile in the statutory sense. This made Groupe Signature sur le Saint-Laurent a “victim” of material prejudice within the meaning of article 84.1. Article 115 LAA therefore allowed the plaintiff to bring a civil claim before the Court of Québec while benefiting from the liability presumptions in articles 108 and 109. As owner and driver respectively, Canada inc. and Mr Chehaita were presumed liable for the material loss caused, unless they could prove fault by the victim or a third party, or force majeure. There was no evidence supporting any of these exonerating grounds. Accordingly, the court accepted that fault and legal responsibility rested, in principle, with Canada inc. and Mr Chehaita.
Evidentiary gaps and failure to prove damages
The case ultimately turned not on liability but on proof of damages. Although the plaintiff established that an accident occurred and that the truck caused physical harm to the bridge infrastructure, it still bore the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, both the existence and the quantum of its financial loss. Two witnesses for the plaintiff, Derek Bitar and Martin Chamberland, explained aspects of the contractual and operational context. They confirmed that Groupe Signature sur le Saint-Laurent is remunerated by the federal government under a 30-year contract for the design, construction, financing and maintenance of the bridge. This long-term arrangement suggests that routine maintenance, repair obligations and associated costs are largely embedded in a broader contractual and financial framework, rather than being billed incident by incident. The evidence also showed that traffic management at the time of the accident was handled by the Sûreté du Québec, not by the plaintiff. This undermined any claim that the plaintiff itself incurred specific traffic control expenses for which it could seek indemnity from the defendants. Most critically, in relation to the damaged safety barriers (the guardrails), the plaintiff did not produce documentary evidence such as invoices, purchase orders, or accounting records showing the cost of acquiring replacement guardrails, nor did it provide expert or other evidence of their depreciated value at the time of the accident. Without that proof, the court was unable to determine either the replacement cost or the appropriate deduction for depreciation. The bare “Detail of costs” document, unbacked by underlying records or objective valuation evidence, was insufficient to meet the evidentiary standard imposed by the Civil Code of Québec on a balance of probabilities.
Outcome, successful parties and monetary result
In light of these evidentiary deficiencies, the court held that, even though the presumed fault of Canada inc. and Mr Chehaita had been established under the LAA, the plaintiff failed to prove the alleged material damages. As for Paul Singh and Charnjit Singh, the court found that there was no legal link between them and the plaintiff – no demonstrated ownership, control, contractual tie or other juridical basis for liability – so no claim could stand against them. The judge therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in its entirety, expressly “without court costs,” meaning there was no order requiring the plaintiff to pay legal costs to the defendants. The successful parties in the litigation were thus the defendants, including Canada inc., Mr Chehaita, and the two Singh defendants, because the claim against all of them was rejected. No damages or costs were awarded in their favour, and the total monetary award ordered in the case was effectively zero, with the court noting that the plaintiff had not proven any compensable loss and that no recoverable costs were granted.
Download documents
Plaintiff
Defendant
Court
Court of QuebecCase Number
500-32-165452-246Practice Area
Civil litigationAmount
Not specified/UnspecifiedWinner
DefendantTrial Start Date