Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• A life insurer successfully sought annulment of a declaratory judgment of death after presenting evidence the insured had fled to Iran rather than died.

• Failure to serve the annulment proceeding on the person declared dead did not warrant dismissal, as no prejudice resulted from the procedural defect.

• The Supreme Court of Canada interpreted "return" under arts. 97 et seq. C.C.Q. broadly to include any manifestation that the person declared dead is currently alive, without requiring physical return to their domicile.

• No heightened or intermediary standard of proof applies in Quebec civil law; the balance of probabilities — requiring clear and convincing evidence — is the sole standard for proving an absentee's return.

• Iranian government records, including a national identity card, two passports, at least 16 international flights, and welfare registration, collectively satisfied the trial judge that the insured was still alive.

• The appeal was unanimously dismissed with costs, upholding the annulment of the declaratory judgment of death in favour of the insurer ivari.

The disappearance of Hooshang Imanpoorsaid

Hooshang Imanpoorsaid, originally from Iran, resided in Brossard, Quebec, with his spouse Deborah Carol Riddle and their three children. He worked as an insurance and mutual fund representative and frequently travelled for business. In 2006, he purchased a life insurance policy from ivari, formerly Transamerica Life Canada. On February 17, 2008, Mr. Imanpoorsaid told his family he had to go to Toronto for business. He left home driving his car, taking a few pieces of luggage, but never arrived in Toronto. A police investigation revealed that he had never gone to Toronto. The next day, he sent two of his children an email stating that "things got out of hand and to fix it, drastic measures are necessary to be taken." That was the last time his loved ones heard from him. He did not return to Montréal and was never seen by his family again.

Suspicious circumstances surrounding the disappearance

The background to Mr. Imanpoorsaid's disappearance was deeply troubling. He owed a great deal of money to several creditors. In the years preceding his disappearance, he forged his spouse's signature to obtain loans and fraudulently appropriated funds from her registered retirement savings plan account as well as from their joint account. He also embezzled several hundred thousand dollars from clients. In 2011, during his absence, he was found guilty of appropriation of funds and conflict of interest by the discipline committee of the Chambre de la sécurité financière, and he was permanently struck off the roll. Shortly before he disappeared, Mr. Imanpoorsaid sold his clientele to Ms. Riddle and changed the designation on his life insurance policy to make his spouse the sole primary beneficiary. His children did not report his disappearance to the authorities until several months later.

The declaratory judgment of death

In 2016, after eight years of absence, Ms. Riddle applied to the Quebec Superior Court for a declaratory judgment of death pursuant to article 92, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of Québec. Anticipating that it would have to pay the insured sum of $550,000 under the life insurance policy, ivari opposed the pronouncement of a declaratory judgment of death. It believed that the suspicious circumstances surrounding his disappearance suggested that he had instead tried to flee his creditors. Despite these objections, Poirier J. of the Superior Court allowed Ms. Riddle's application and declared that Mr. Imanpoorsaid had died on February 20, 2015, seven years after his disappearance. The judge found that the suspicious circumstances surrounding Mr. Imanpoorsaid's departure that could have precluded a declaration of death before the expiry of the seven-year period could no longer do so once that period had elapsed.

Ivari's application for annulment and the evidence from Iran

Ivari appealed the declaratory judgment and later filed a motion seeking authorization to present indispensable new evidence, claiming to have found Mr. Imanpoorsaid alive in Iran. On July 12, 2018, the Court of Appeal dismissed ivari's motion to file new evidence and invited it instead to apply to the Superior Court for annulment of the declaratory judgment of death pursuant to article 98 C.C.Q. The Court of Appeal stayed the proceeding. Ivari then filed an application with the Superior Court to have Poirier J.'s decision annulled, but that application was not served on Mr. Imanpoorsaid. The insurer presented several pieces of evidence from Iranian authorities: on November 7, 2015, more than eight months after the presumed date of death, Iran's State Census Organization had personally delivered a national identity card to Hooshang Imanpoorsaid, and that body had no record of his death; an Iranian passport and immigration police department had issued two passports to Mr. Imanpoorsaid personally since his disappearance, with the documents including three photographs of him; according to information supplied by that government agency, Mr. Imanpoorsaid had made about 15 trips out of the country between October 2008 and December 2017; and in December 2018, he had apparently registered with the Iranian welfare organization.

The trial judgment and the Court of Appeal decision

Trial judge Narang J. annulled the declaratory judgment of death, finding on a balance of probabilities, in light of the evidence filed by ivari, that Mr. Imanpoorsaid was still alive. She interpreted the concept of "return" in article 98 C.C.Q. as not requiring the physical return of the person declared dead to the place where they were last seen, but rather as any manifestation serving to establish that the person is alive. The judge also rejected Ms. Riddle's argument that ivari's application could not be heard in the absence of service on Mr. Imanpoorsaid, finding that this argument amounted to "proceduralism." The judge awarded legal costs against Ms. Riddle, including the fees of ivari's expert, Sadafi Charghooshi. The Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, aside from the award of expert fees. The court agreed that the procedural defect could be overlooked because Mr. Imanpoorsaid had not been prejudiced, and that "return" should be interpreted broadly. The Court of Appeal ordered that the parties each pay their own expert fees, and also declared the appeal from the declaratory judgment of death to be moot.

The life insurance policy at stake

Central to the dispute was Mr. Imanpoorsaid's life insurance policy with ivari, carrying an insured sum of $550,000. Ms. Riddle, as the designated sole primary beneficiary, stood to receive this amount upon a valid declaration of her husband's death. Ivari's motivation for seeking annulment of the declaratory judgment was to avoid paying out this sum, given its belief — supported by the evidence it obtained — that the insured was still alive. No specific policy terms or clauses were discussed in the decision beyond the fact of the policy's existence, its insured sum, and the beneficiary designation.

The Supreme Court of Canada's analysis on service

The Supreme Court acknowledged that ivari should have attempted to serve the proceeding on Mr. Imanpoorsaid, calling service "a cardinal rule of our procedural law" that embodies the audi alteram partem principle. The Court noted that the absence of service was surprising given that ivari had hired lawyers in Iran to find him and stated at trial that it had obtained his telephone number. However, the Court held that the Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for any specific sanction for failure to serve an originating application in accordance with article 140, and the determination of the applicable sanction must remain contextual. Because an application for annulment of a declaratory judgment of death is normally a non-contentious proceeding that does not require the person declared dead to make submissions or arguments, no ground raised by Mr. Imanpoorsaid could have changed the outcome of the application. The Court observed that, paradoxically, the absence of service was even advantageous to Ms. Riddle, because the presence of the person declared dead would have bolstered ivari's evidence that he was currently alive.

Interpretation of "return" and the standard of proof

The Court undertook an extensive analysis of the concept of "return" in articles 97 et seq. C.C.Q., concluding it must be interpreted broadly as referring to the reappearance of the person declared dead following the declaratory judgment, wherever they are in the world, or else the manifestation of the fact that they are currently alive. The term contains no geographical limit but does involve a temporal limit: evidence of the absentee's reappearance must, at least in part, be subsequent to the declaratory judgment of death. On the standard of proof, the Court firmly rejected Ms. Riddle's argument that certain and unquestionable proof was required. In civil matters, absent an exception provided for by law, there is only one standard of proof prescribed by Quebec law, namely the balance of probabilities, as codified in article 2804 C.C.Q. The Court stated there is no intermediary standard of proof in civil matters when the facts to be proved are serious or especially improbable, and Quebec's civil law of evidence does not allow the balance of probabilities standard to be adjusted according to the particular nature of the case. The evidence that a person declared dead has returned must be clear and convincing, but no specific threshold of certainty is required.

The ruling and outcome

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed Ms. Riddle's appeal with costs, in a decision rendered April 10, 2026 by Chief Justice Wagner with all eight other justices concurring. The annulment of the declaratory judgment of death was upheld, meaning ivari was successful in establishing that Mr. Imanpoorsaid was still alive. The practical effect of this ruling was that ivari was not required to pay out the $550,000 life insurance sum that would have been triggered by a valid declaration of death. No other specific monetary award was ordered in favour of either party beyond the costs of the appeal.