Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope of the Tribunal des professions’ appellate powers under article 175 of the Code des professions, especially its ability to order a full de novo hearing before a new disciplinary panel.
• Proper standard of review (reasonableness vs correctness) when the Superior Court reviews the Tribunal des professions, and when issues of procedural fairness and impartiality are raised.
• Whether strongly worded and inappropriate comments by the disciplinary council’s presiding member created a real appearance of bias sufficient to vitiate a 443-page decision following 42 hearing days.
• Extent to which the institutional “syndic” (rather than a specific named syndic ad hoc) has standing and interest to appeal an acquittal decision to the Tribunal des professions.
• Impact of long delay, repeated proceedings and heavy procedural history on the choice of remedy, including whether fairness and efficient use of judicial resources justify reinstating an acquittal rather than sending the case back.
• Allocation of costs (including expert fees) across all levels of proceedings when a professional ultimately succeeds in having disciplinary acquittals restored after many years of litigation.

Background and procedural history
Éliane Lévy is a psychologist who became the subject of a disciplinary complaint after an investigation by the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec (SAAQ). The SAAQ’s inquiries suggested she appeared to have a “gift of ubiquity” and a tendency toward “généreuse et extensive” billing, raising suspicions of false or inflated invoicing for psychological services over several years. This prompted the syndic of the Ordre des psychologues du Québec to file a formal disciplinary complaint in 2015 alleging six counts of misconduct relating largely to alleged overbilling and services not rendered or not necessary. The alleged conduct covered a long period, roughly from 2004 to 2014.
The matter was heard before the Conseil de discipline de l’Ordre des psychologues du Québec. The hearing was exceptionally long and complex: it lasted 42 days over more than three years, from September 2016 to December 2019, and generated a massive evidentiary record of testimony, documents and expert reports. In October 2020, the disciplinary council issued a 443-page decision acquitting Lévy of all six counts. The majority (lawyer-chair Me Chantal Perreault and psychologist member Roger Picard) concluded that the syndic had not proved the alleged misconduct. A third member, psychologist André Deschambault, dissented on the merits but did not allege any bias or impropriety by his colleagues.

Controversial comments in the disciplinary decision
Despite the length and detail of the disciplinary council’s reasoning on the evidence, paragraphs [20] to [29] of its decision became the center of controversy. In those introductory passages, Me Perreault departed from the merits of the case to air personal grievances about her disputes with the chief president of the disciplinary council and to criticize the way some of her files, including this one, were administratively managed. The Superior Court later described these as “neuf petits paragraphes incendiaires” and compared them to language more commonly found in dramatic resignation letters or late-night emails than in judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. The comments also included sharp language about the SAAQ investigation and the syndic’s role, couched in vivid and sometimes flamboyant terms.
These paragraphs were undeniably inappropriate in tone and content and had nothing to do with the actual issues between the syndic and Lévy. They triggered concerns about whether the integrity and impartiality of the disciplinary process had been compromised, even though the remainder of the 443-page decision was meticulous, detailed and squarely focused on the evidence and legal analysis of the complaint.

Appeal before the Tribunal des professions
The syndic appealed the acquittal decision to the Tribunal des professions (TP). One preliminary question was whether the syndic who signed the appeal, Marc Lyrette, had the proper standing and interest, since the file had originally been entrusted to a syndic ad hoc, Jean Boudreau, by resolution of the order’s board. Lévy argued that only the specific syndic ad hoc with that mandate could appeal, and that the substitution of another syndic without a formal reprise d’instance was an invalid interference with the independence of the syndic’s office. The TP rejected this argument, treating the right of appeal as attached to the institutional function of “syndic” rather than to a particular individual.
On the merits of the appeal, the TP focused heavily on the contentious paragraphs of the disciplinary decision. It concluded that the process was tainted by partiality, or at least by an appearance of bias, arising from three main sources: the personal conflict between Me Perreault and the chief president of the council; the disparaging comments toward the SAAQ, whose investigation had led to the complaint; and the disrespectful tone toward the syndic’s office. Taking the view that such partiality undermined the integrity of the entire decision-making process, the TP allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal and ordered that the complaint be heard de novo by a new disciplinary panel. Importantly, the TP did not declare Lévy guilty on any count; it simply wiped the slate clean and sent the complaint back for a complete rehearing.

Issues on judicial review before the Superior Court
Lévy applied to the Québec Superior Court for judicial review of the TP’s 2023 decision. Four central issues were raised. First, whether the TP had reasonably concluded that the syndic had the quality and interest to appeal the disciplinary acquittal. Second, whether the TP was correct in finding that the disciplinary decision was vitiated by partiality or the appearance of partiality. Third, whether the TP had reasonably exercised its appellate powers by ordering a full de novo hearing before a new council. Fourth, whether the TP’s analysis of the “factors of attachment” in relation to the complaint and its legal basis was within the bounds of reasonableness.
The Superior Court carefully distinguished between questions that engage the TP’s expertise and those that concern procedural fairness. For issues within the TP’s core expertise—such as syndic standing and the interpretation of the disciplinary complaint—it applied a deferential reasonableness standard, asking only whether the TP’s reasoning showed any fundamental gaps. For the bias/partiality issue, however, the court applied the correctness standard, as questions of procedural fairness and natural justice are always reviewed for correctness under Canadian administrative law jurisprudence.

Findings on syndic standing and other technical issues
On the first and fourth questions (syndic standing and factors of attachment), the Superior Court concluded that the TP had not acted unreasonably. It upheld the TP’s approach that the right to appeal a disciplinary decision belongs institutionally to the syndic’s office, not to one specifically named syndic. This interpretation fit the structure of the Code des professions, which emphasizes the independence and functional continuity of the syndic in protecting the public.
Similarly, the court saw no fundamental flaw in the TP’s criticisms of how the disciplinary council had dealt with certain legal bases or factors of attachment in the complaint.While there might have been room for debate about those points, nothing in the TP’s reasoning on those matters rose to the level of an incoherent or indefensible analysis that would justify judicial intervention.

Assessment of bias and appearance of partiality
The turning point in the case was the TP’s conclusion that the disciplinary decision was tainted by partiality. The Superior Court accepted that the controversial paragraphs “frappent l’imaginaire” and were wholly inappropriate in a judgment. However, applying the established test for reasonable apprehension of bias—whether a reasonable, well-informed person would apprehend that the decision maker would not decide fairly—the court held that these passages did not, in context, justify setting aside the entire 443-page decision.
The court emphasized the strong presumption of impartiality enjoyed by judicial and quasi-judicial decision makers, which cannot be displaced by mere suspicions, conjecture or isolated inflammatory language. Here, the offending paragraphs were largely a personal and administrative dispute between Me Perreault and the chief president of the council, not directed at Lévy or her case. As for the harsh language toward the SAAQ and the syndic, the court viewed it as severe commentary grounded in the evidence regarding how the investigation and prosecution had been conducted, rather than as proof of an improper predisposition or favoritism toward one party.
Moreover, the decision was not solely that of Me Perreault: it was the majority decision of a three-member panel, with psychologist Roger Picard joining the reasons without expressing any concern about bias. The dissent of psychologist André Deschambault, while disagreeing on the merits, also said nothing to suggest that he regarded his colleagues as biased or the process as unfair. The court noted that any concerns about bias arising from the publicly known administrative conflict between Me Perreault and the chief president had been aired during the deliberation period, yet no party had sought her recusal at the time.

Choice of remedy and limits of the Tribunal des professions’ powers
Even if one accepted some discomfort with the tone of the disciplinary reasons, the Superior Court held that the TP’s chosen remedy—a complete de novo hearing before a fresh panel—was both legally and practically problematic. Legally, it did not fit within article 175 of the Code des professions. That provision allows the TP to confirm, modify or quash a disciplinary decision, and, where it overturns an acquittal and finds the professional guilty, either impose a sanction itself or return the matter to the council solely for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sanction. It does not authorize the TP, in a case like this where no conviction has been entered, to send the file back for a full retrial of the complaint from scratch.
The court found that invoking any supposed “inherent powers” of the TP to justify such a broad remedy would contradict the clear legislative framework. Inherent or accessory powers are supplementary and cannot be used to circumvent explicit statutory limits. By ordering a de novo hearing without grounding that remedy in article 175 or any other clear authority, and by providing very little reasoning for choosing such a drastic “nuclear” option, the TP’s decision suffered from a fundamental analytical gap and was unreasonable in the administrative law sense.

Impact of delay, prejudice and public confidence in justice
The Superior Court placed significant weight on the extraordinary delay and burden already borne by Lévy. The complaint dated from 2015 and involved conduct as far back as 2004. The disciplinary hearing consumed 42 days over three years and culminated in a detailed 2020 decision acquitting her. The TP’s intervention came only in 2023, and the judicial review judgment in 2025, making the Superior Court the seventh decision maker to touch the file.
The court stressed that Lévy had been unable to practise as a psychologist since 2015, losing the final years of her career as she approached retirement. For the syndic, by contrast, the case was one file among many, and the office was already on its third different syndic handling the matter. From a real-world perspective, and with reference to broader concerns about timely justice expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in decisions like R. v. Jordan, the court considered that sending the case back for yet another multi-year process would be deeply unfair and damaging to public confidence in the justice system.
In this context, the court applied Supreme Court guidance from Vavilov and subsequent cases allowing reviewing courts, in exceptional situations, to resolve a matter themselves instead of remitting it, particularly where delay, fairness, costs and the efficient use of public and judicial resources strongly militate against a further remand. It found this to be such an exceptional case: the complaint had already been exhaustively litigated, the disciplinary reasons—though imperfect—were not actually tainted by bias, and starting over would amount to an injustice rather than a remedy.

Outcome and implications
Ultimately, the Superior Court allowed Lévy’s application for judicial review. It quashed the Tribunal des professions’ 2023 decision, rejected the finding of bias and the order for a new hearing, and reinstated in full the disciplinary council’s 2020 acquittals on all counts. In doing so, the court expressly noted its discomfort with what it described as the syndic’s near-“acharnement” in pursuing the matter through more than a decade of litigation and emphasized the need for finality and proportionality in professional discipline.
In terms of financial consequences, the court ordered costs against the syndic, including expert fees, not only for the judicial review but also for the prior proceedings before the disciplinary council and before the Tribunal des professions. However, the judgment does not specify a dollar amount, so while it clearly allocates costs in favor of the successful party, the exact total monetary figure for costs and disbursements cannot be determined from the decision. As a result, the successful party is Éliane Lévy, who obtained full restoration of her acquittals and an award of costs at all levels, but the precise sum of those costs is not stated in the judgment.