Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Procedural challenge by Manufacturers Life Insurance Company under Rule 2.1.01 to summarily stay or dismiss the plaintiff’s civil claim as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process
• Alleged duplication between the plaintiff’s civil action and a prior Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario application concerning disability-based discrimination in access to goods, services, and facilities
• Assessment of whether similarity of facts and overlapping parties between tribunal and court proceedings is enough to constitute an abuse of process
• Application of the test for vexatious proceedings, including whether it is “obvious that an action cannot succeed,” and whether any reasonable person could expect to obtain relief
• Consideration of Supreme Court of Canada guidance that multiple or parallel proceedings are not, by themselves, sufficient to amount to abuse of process, and may sometimes enhance the administration of justice
• Judicial conclusion that Rule 2.1 is not the appropriate mechanism on the record before the court, resulting in dismissal of the insurer’s summary motion and allowing the plaintiff’s claim to proceed

Background and parties

This case arises from a civil action commenced by the plaintiff, Anita Leong, against her former employer, Moore Canada Corp. (also known as Data Communications Management), and The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (Manulife/Manufacturers). The action was started on December 22, 2025. The plaintiff’s claim includes causes of action arising out of the end of her employment and associated benefits. Specifically, she seeks damages for wrongful dismissal, unpaid sick and vacation pay, general and punitive damages, severance, lost benefits, and additional relief related to long-term disability benefits allegedly connected to her insurance coverage through Manufacturers. Parallel to this civil action, the plaintiff had previously pursued a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) application against Manulife Financial. That tribunal proceeding was framed as a disability-based discrimination complaint about “goods, services and facilities” under Ontario’s Human Rights Code. The HRTO rendered a decision dated April 9, 2025, and a reconsideration decision dated June 5, 2025, though the full content of those decisions is not reproduced in this endorsement.

The insurer’s Rule 2.1 motion

Manufacturers brought a procedural request, styled as a Request for Stay or Dismissal under Rule 2.1 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure. The request, dated January 16, 2026, relied on Rule 2.1.01(1), which empowers the court to summarily stay or dismiss a proceeding that appears, on its face, to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The insurer’s core position was that the action against it is “duplicative” of the earlier HRTO matter. It attached as supporting material the HRTO Notice of Application, the Respondent’s Response, the Tribunal’s April 9, 2025 decision, and the June 5, 2025 reconsideration decision. Manufacturers argued that the plaintiff is relying on the same factual foundation in both the HRTO case and the civil action and that continuing the lawsuit in the Superior Court would be an improper repeat of issues already advanced before the tribunal. The insurer effectively invited the court, at this early stage, to dispose summarily of the claims against it on the pleadings alone, without a full evidentiary record or conventional motion for summary judgment or strike.

Allegations and overlap between proceedings

The endorsement notes that the HRTO application against Manulife Financial appears to involve alleged discrimination on the basis of disability in connection with the provision of goods, services, and facilities. The plaintiff’s present statement of claim in the Superior Court also invokes disability-related facts and long-term disability benefits as part of a broader employment and benefits dispute. The judge observes that the plaintiff seems to draw on the “same facts” in both the HRTO proceeding and the current civil action. However, the court also notes that the record does not clearly explain the corporate relationship, if any, between the different insurance entities named in the tribunal and court processes, although this lack of clarity is not treated as determinative. The real issue was not simply whether the proceedings shared factual overlap, but whether that overlap transformed the civil action into something vexatious or abusive, justifying its termination under Rule 2.1.

Legal framework: frivolous, vexatious, and abuse of process

Justice Ramsay frames Rule 2.1 as a narrow, exceptional summary procedure designed for plainly frivolous, vexatious, or abusive proceedings. The decision cites prior authority, including Joubarne v. Kellam, for the principle that the court may resort to Rule 2.1 only where it is apparent from the statement of claim itself that the proceeding may be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The court also refers to the classic criteria for vexatious proceedings discussed in Re Lang Michener et al. v. Fabian. One key distilled criterion is whether it is “obvious that an action cannot succeed,” or that it would “lead to no possible good,” or where no reasonable person could expect to obtain relief. Applying this standard, Justice Ramsay finds it is not obvious that Ms. Leong’s action cannot succeed. On its face, the statement of claim raises arguable issues about wrongful dismissal, unpaid entitlements, and disability benefits. Accordingly, the case does not fit within the narrow band of claims that can be struck out at the threshold as vexatious.

Multiplicity of proceedings and the doctrine of abuse of process

The insurer’s argument that the lawsuit is “duplicative” is examined through the lens of the modern doctrine of abuse of process. Justice Ramsay draws extensively on recent appellate and Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation–Saskatchewan, and Cashin Mortgages Inc. v. 2511311 Ontario Ltd. The decision reaffirms that while a multiplicity of proceedings engaging the same issues can, in some situations, constitute an abuse of process, the mere existence of multiple or parallel proceedings with similar parties or overlapping issues is not, by itself, sufficient. The abuse of process doctrine is fundamentally concerned with the integrity of the administration of justice and fairness to the parties, including considerations of judicial economy, consistency, and finality. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the analysis does not end once a court identifies overlapping or similar proceedings. Instead, the court must inquire whether allowing the later proceeding to continue would, in context, undermine judicial economy, lead to inconsistent results, or otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The endorsement notes that, in some circumstances, separate but related proceedings may be justified and can even enhance the administration of justice when different forums address distinct aspects or remedies that are not fully available in a single proceeding. Here, the tribunal process focused on Code-based discrimination in services, whereas the present action includes wider wrongful dismissal and contractual/benefits issues.

Why Rule 2.1 was found inappropriate

Justice Ramsay ultimately concludes that Rule 2.1 is not the proper vehicle to decide complex questions of abuse of process arising from potentially overlapping tribunal and court proceedings. Determining whether the civil action improperly duplicates the HRTO case and offends principles of finality and judicial economy would require a more developed record and a more robust procedural mechanism than the truncated Rule 2.1 process. The judge emphasizes that the context and remedies available in both forums must be weighed, and that such a multi-factorial assessment cannot fairly be made “in a summary fashion” at this stage. On the materials filed, the court is not persuaded that the action is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process within the strict confines of Rule 2.1. As a result, the motion by Manufacturers Life Insurance Company to stay or dismiss the action against it under Rule 2.1.01(1) is dismissed, and Ms. Leong’s claim is permitted to continue in the ordinary course.

Outcome, successful party, and monetary award

In the result, the court dismisses the defendant insurer’s Rule 2.1 motion and declines to summarily terminate the proceedings against it. The successful party in this particular decision is the plaintiff, Anita Leong, because her action against Manufacturers is allowed to proceed, and the insurer’s request for a stay or dismissal is rejected. The endorsement is confined to this procedural question and does not adjudicate the merits of Ms. Leong’s wrongful dismissal, unpaid pay, benefits, or disability claims, nor does it determine liability or quantum. No damages, compensation, or other monetary relief are awarded in this decision, and there is no express order for costs set out in the text of the endorsement. Accordingly, while the plaintiff is procedurally successful, the total amount ordered or awarded in her favour in this specific ruling is nil, and any future damages or costs will depend on subsequent steps or decisions in the litigation.