Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Procedural use of Rule 2.1.01 to summarily dismiss a proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process
• Attempted collateral attack on prior mortgage-related court orders, including a default judgment and writ of possession
• Failure to use or pursue ordinary appeal mechanisms as the proper route to challenge earlier judicial decisions
• Reliance on international human rights instruments, jus cogens norms, and the Charter to reframe a private mortgage dispute and enforcement steps
• Characterization of the proceeding as a request for a writ of mandamus compelling the Attorney General to act in relation to existing court orders
• Court’s conclusion that systemic and international-law arguments cannot be used to circumvent final civil judgments and procedural safeguards

Background and mortgage proceedings

The dispute arises from a mortgage loan obtained by the applicant, Tennyson Park, in relation to her house. She fell into default on the mortgage, which led the lender, Manulife, to commence civil proceedings. Those mortgage proceedings resulted in a default judgment against Ms. Park and a writ of possession in favour of the lender, entitling the lender to possession of the property. The Divisional Court decision notes that there were opportunities within those original proceedings for Ms. Park to challenge the lender’s claim or seek to set aside the default judgment, but she did not do so. Instead, the mortgage enforcement process proceeded to judgment and to an order granting possession of the property to the lender.

Re-entry into the property and trespass action

After the default judgment and writ of possession had been granted, Ms. Park re-entered the property, changed the locks, and resumed possession of the house despite the existing court orders. In response, rather than directly attacking the default judgment itself through established procedures, she commenced a separate civil action against the lender, alleging trespass. That trespass action was struck out by the court as an abuse of process because it was considered a collateral attack on the earlier default judgment and possession order. The logic was that the trespass claim sought to undermine the effect of the judgment and writ without using the proper mechanisms for appeal or setting aside those orders. Ms. Park appealed and sought a stay in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal (in 2025 ONCA 815) refused to grant the stay pending appeal, reinforcing that the existing judgment and writ remained in force while the appellate process unfolded.

Application for judicial review and international-law framing

Against this backdrop, Ms. Park commenced a new proceeding in the Divisional Court, framed as a “Notice of application for judicial review and determination of legal validity.” She named the Attorney General of Ontario as the respondent. In that application, she attempted to challenge various court orders made by judges and associate judges in the ongoing mortgage-related litigation. Although those orders were not listed exhaustively, some decisions, including the Court of Appeal ruling, were provided with the intake materials. The application asserted that it was not a “regular” judicial review but, instead, a proceeding seeking an official judicial determination of legal validity and a recognition of alleged systemic violations of fundamental rights. Ms. Park invoked an extensive legal framework, including “peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens),” the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She argued that domestic institutions were operating in contradiction to binding international norms and that they had an erga omnes obligation to acknowledge and cease structural violations, to compel evidentiary disclosure as a matter of due process, and to provide remedies for non-derogable rights. As a remedy, she sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Attorney General to act so as to end what she characterized as ongoing violations of universal law, the rule of law, and fundamental justice in the enforcement of the mortgage judgment and related orders. In the Divisional Court materials, there is no discussion of specific insurance or other policy wording or contract clauses beyond the general existence of a mortgage loan and related enforcement orders. The focus is on the procedural history and the international and constitutional norms invoked, not on interpreting detailed policy terms.

The Rule 2.1 notice and the applicant’s response

Given the nature of the filing, the Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, signaling that it was considering staying or dismissing the proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The Court summarized that Ms. Park appeared to be using the judicial review process to indirectly challenge various court decisions in what was essentially an ongoing civil mortgage dispute. The Attorney General requested that the Rule 2.1 process be used to summarily dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. The Court directed the Registrar to send out a Rule 2.1 notice and, in accordance with the rule, did not permit the respondent to make submissions. Ms. Park then delivered lengthy written submissions in response, doubling down on her view that the proceeding was a form of systemic challenge rather than a conventional judicial review. She framed the matter as a struggle to restore “true lawful order,” asserting that domestic courts must recognize and remedy what she described as embedded structural violations of international and constitutional norms.

Divisional Court’s analysis under Rule 2.1

In its endorsement, the Divisional Court reviewed Rule 2.1.01(1), which authorizes the Court to dismiss a proceeding that is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. The Court emphasized that the rule is reserved for “the clearest of cases,” referencing prior appellate authority on the narrow scope of this summary dismissal power. The judge concluded that Ms. Park’s application fell into that exceptional category. The central reasoning was that the issues arising from the mortgage proceedings should have been addressed before the judges presiding over those cases or through direct appeals and related procedural avenues, not through a new judicial review framed against the Attorney General. The Court found that Ms. Park was attempting to challenge existing court decisions indirectly, even as she had appeal rights available—and, in some instances, was already exercising them. By re-packaging her grievances in the language of international law, jus cogens, and systemic violations, she was effectively mounting an impermissible collateral attack on those existing decisions. The Court held that this tactic constituted an abuse of the process of the court and fell squarely within the scope of Rule 2.1.

Outcome and implications for the parties

Having determined that the application was an improper collateral attack and an abuse of process, the Divisional Court dismissed the proceeding under Rule 2.1.01. The result is that Ms. Park’s attempt to obtain a writ of mandamus and a wide-ranging declaration of invalidity and systemic illegality was rejected at a preliminary, procedural stage without a full hearing on the merits. The decision reinforces that challenges to mortgage judgments and related enforcement orders must proceed through established mechanisms—motions to set aside, appeals, or other recognized procedures—rather than through collateral proceedings that target the Attorney General or attempt to recharacterize private civil disputes as broad international-law controversies. In this Divisional Court decision, the successful party is the Attorney General of Ontario, as the application was dismissed in its entirety. No monetary award, damages, or specific costs figure is stated in the endorsement; accordingly, the total amount ordered in favour of the successful party cannot be determined from this decision.