Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Timeliness of the civil liability claim against the external investigator and her firm given Québec’s three-year extinctive prescription period
• Determination of the precise starting point of prescription: termination date based on the investigation versus later receipt of the written investigation report
• Assessment of whether the plaintiff’s alleged lack of access to the report created an “impossibility in fact to act” sufficient to suspend prescription
• Extent of the plaintiff’s knowledge, as of the dismissal, of the alleged investigative faults, resulting harm, and causal link between them
• Use of a preliminary motion under arts. 51 and following C.p.c. to qualify the action as manifestly ill-founded and abusive because it was prescribed
• Recovery of legal costs in favour of the successful defendants when a prescribed and doomed claim is struck at a preliminary stage

Background and facts of the dispute

Ryan Standup was a primary school teacher employed by the Kahnawà:ke Education Center (KEC), which operates a primary school in the Mohawk community of Kahnawà:ke. His employment came under scrutiny when an anonymous complaint of sexual assault was made against him in September 2021, alleging inappropriate sexual conduct toward a former student who had been a minor at the time of the alleged events. KEC retained Relais Expert-Conseil inc., an independent investigation firm, to conduct an external inquiry into the allegations. Me Janie L’Écuyer, a consultant with Relais, was one of the investigators and a signatory to the investigation report. As part of this process, she interviewed several witnesses, including the complainant and Mr. Standup. On 5 October 2021, she met with Standup so he could respond to the allegations and provide his version of events. Following the investigation, KEC sent Standup a letter dated 10 December 2021 informing him that the investigation had concluded and that, in light of its findings, KEC was terminating his employment. The termination was expressly grounded on the conclusions of the investigation report. On the same day, through his then-counsel, Standup requested a copy of the report. KEC refused on 15 December 2021, invoking confidentiality and litigation privilege, and it advised him of recourses available to challenge that refusal. Standup, who was legally represented throughout, did not pursue further steps at that time to obtain the report from the relevant access-to-information authorities.

Procedural history and claims advanced

On 17 July 2023, Standup commenced an action only against KEC, claiming more than $280,000 for unjust dismissal, including lost salary and moral damages. He alleged that the termination was wrongful and that the investigation had been unfair to him, particularly because he was not given a full opportunity to defend himself against all allegations. A few days later, on 20 July 2023, he finally obtained a copy of the investigation report, which summarized the evidence gathered and concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that the complainant’s version of events was more credible than his own. After reviewing the report, Standup amended his action on 4 February 2025 to add Relais Expert-Conseil inc. and Me L’Écuyer as co-defendants. He now claimed approximately $485,100, seeking to hold KEC, Relais and Me L’Écuyer solidarily liable for his alleged losses. In the amended pleading, he asserted that the investigation process and report were tainted by carelessness, negligence and unprofessional conduct, and that these faults resulted in his dismissal and reputational harm.

Alleged investigative faults and factual complaints

Even before suing Relais and Me L’Écuyer directly, Standup’s original claim against KEC already criticized the manner in which the external investigation was conducted. He alleged, among other things, that after his interview he was told that additional allegations had been raised but that he would not be allowed another opportunity to respond; that he had no chance to defend himself regarding some of the allegations relied upon to justify the termination; that the investigators appeared to have reached their conclusions in advance; and that the meeting lasted only about 15 minutes and was held by videoconference, which he considered indicative of a preconceived outcome. Once Relais and Me L’Écuyer were added as defendants and the pleadings were further refined, the plaintiff listed a long series of specific alleged errors in the investigation process and in the report’s analysis. These included failing to interview additional witnesses such as colleagues, other alleged victims, whistleblowers and his superior at the time; interviewing certain witnesses (the whistleblower, the alleged victim) in the presence of family members rather than alone; treating the modes of interview of different persons inconsistently; not properly probing or corroborating the whistleblower’s assertions about online complaints said to have been posted by the plaintiff’s spouse; not verifying the status and background of a person named Destiny and her alleged accusations; not sufficiently testing the complainant’s narrative or contradictions; and failing to fully review his employee file.

Critique of credibility analysis and burden of proof

Standup also attacked the way the investigator evaluated credibility. In his remodified pleading, he alleged that Me L’Écuyer used inappropriate factors to assess credibility, effectively reversed the burden of proof, and assumed the complainant’s version to be true because he claimed to have reported the assaults to police and undergone therapy. He argued that the report wrongly referenced a police report despite the complainant never confirming the name in any formal complaint, that the investigator did not genuinely seek to challenge the complainant’s account, and that she mischaracterized his own statements by suggesting he did not know the complainant at all, when he had only said he did not recall the individual as being in one of his classes. He further critiqued the use of criteria such as “interest to testify” and attitude in a way that penalized him for simply denying the allegations. By his account, the investigator treated his denials as a factor against his credibility, failed to consider the spontaneity of his statements as a credibility indicator in his favour, and ignored exculpatory elements such as statements by his son-in-law denying any assault. Collectively, these alleged faults were framed as professional negligence and carelessness by Relais and Me L’Écuyer, for which they should bear civil liability alongside the employer.

Civil procedure framework: abuse of procedure and prescription

Relais and Me L’Écuyer responded with a preliminary application seeking to have the action against them dismissed. Although they raised technical irrecevability and also invoked the general abuse of procedure provisions under articles 51 and following of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.p.c.), the court focused on the latter route because the defendants relied on evidence from Standup’s pre-trial examination. Under article 51 C.p.c., a court may, at any stage and even on its own initiative, characterize a proceeding as abusive where, irrespective of intent, it is manifestly ill-founded, frivolous, dilatory or otherwise constitutes an excessive or unreasonable use of procedure or a misuse of the judicial process. A claim that is clearly prescribed, with no real prospect of success, can fall within this concept, and courts may strike such actions early to conserve scarce judicial resources. Article 52 C.p.c. requires the party alleging abuse to show, on a summary basis, that the impugned proceeding is abusive, after which the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate prima facie that the proceeding is justified in fact and law and is not excessive or unreasonable. While the Court of Appeal has repeatedly cautioned that the threshold for finding abuse is relatively high and that judges must exercise prudence at preliminary stages, it has equally emphasized that this prudence does not oblige courts to “tolerate anything from anyone at any time.” Where the facts are clear, early dismissal is appropriate.

Prescription in Québec civil law and the starting point debate

On the merits of the preliminary application, the central legal question was prescription. The parties agreed that a three-year extinctive prescription period applied to the civil liability claim against Relais and Me L’Écuyer. The dispute concerned the date on which that period began. In Québec civil law, the prescription clock starts on the day the right of action arises—that is, the first moment when the creditor of the right could sue, having sufficient knowledge of fault, damage and the causal link between them, assessed through the lens of a reasonably prudent and informed person. Prescription does not run when a person is in a genuine factual impossibility to act, such as where the debtor’s conduct conceals the very facts that give rise to the right, provided the creditor acts with appropriate vigilance once those facts could reasonably be discovered. Courts also insist on a certain proactivity in uncovering the key facts and reject attempts to rely on mere suspicions to delay the start of prescription. The defendants argued that the clock began on 10 December 2021, when Standup received the termination letter expressly referencing the investigation and its conclusions. Standup, by contrast, contended that he did not have “sufficiently precise” knowledge of the alleged investigative faults until 20 July 2023, when he finally received the report; he said that before then he had only suspicions and conjecture, which he believed were insufficient to crystallize a cause of action. He also argued that KEC’s refusal to provide the report and its retention of the document placed him in an impossibility in fact to act, suspending prescription until he obtained the report.

Court’s assessment of knowledge, diligence and impossibility to act

The court rejected Standup’s position and accepted that prescription began on 10 December 2021. It emphasized that, by that date, he knew the key elements required to sue the investigator and her firm. He was aware that a complaint had been made, that an external investigation had been conducted, that his own interview had left him feeling he had not been given a full opportunity to defend himself, and that KEC had terminated his employment based on the investigation’s conclusions. He had already alleged, in his initial claim against KEC, that the investigator had not allowed him to respond to all allegations and had appeared to have her conclusions pre-decided. He also admitted, in examination, that he understood from the termination letter that his dismissal rested squarely on the investigation and its findings, and that he recognized at that time the serious impact on his reputation and employability. Those circumstances meant that, applying the standard of a reasonably prudent and informed person, he had sufficient factual basis by 10 December 2021 to consider that faults in the investigation may have caused him compensable harm and to bring an action against the investigator and her firm. The court further found that KEC’s refusal, in December 2021, to disclose the report did not amount to a factual impossibility to act. Standup, represented by counsel, was informed of his right to challenge the refusal before the appropriate information-access authority but chose not to do so. For roughly a year and a half thereafter, he took no further steps to compel disclosure, even though he knew the report existed and understood its significance. The court held that this passivity fell short of the diligence required to suspend prescription; his inaction was his own responsibility, not a legal barrier preventing him from suing.

Finding that the claim was prescribed and outcome of the motion

Against this backdrop, the court concluded that 10 December 2021 was “the first moment” when Standup could have instituted proceedings against Relais and Me L’Écuyer. He only brought them into the case on 4 February 2025—more than three years after that date—so the claim was out of time. Even accepting that he learned of additional, more detailed alleged errors in July 2023 when he read the report, the court noted that these were distinct particulars of fault that could have been added later to an already-timely action. Nothing legally prevented him from suing the investigators within three years of his dismissal and then amending his pleading after receiving the report to refine the allegations of negligence. The court also underlined that he received the report on 20 July 2023, which was still about a year and a half before the prescription period—calculated from December 2021—would have expired in December 2024. Thus, even on his own narrative, he still could have added the investigators as defendants in time once the report was in hand. Given the plaintiff’s admissions and the clear timeline, the court found that no additional evidence at trial would change the legal conclusion on prescription. Proceeding to a full hearing on this issue would waste judicial resources and impose unnecessary costs on the investigator and her firm.

Final ruling, successful parties and monetary consequences

In its conclusion, the Superior Court allowed the preliminary application by Relais Expert-Conseil inc. and Me Janie L’Écuyer, formally declaring the action against them manifestly ill-founded because it was prescribed, and dismissing the claim as an abuse of procedure in the sense that it had no reasonable prospect of success. The case against KEC as employer was not decided in this judgment, which is confined to the liability of the external investigators. The successful parties in this decision are therefore Relais Expert-Conseil inc. and Me Janie L’Écuyer. The court ordered that they recover their legal costs (“frais de justice”), but the judgment does not specify any exact dollar amount or quantify damages in their favour. Accordingly, while costs are awarded, no precise total monetary award for damages or costs can be determined from this decision.