Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Interaction between general civil procedure rules (arts. 173, 177 C.p.c.) and simplified rules for recovery of certain claims (art. 535.13 C.p.c.) when seeking a default judgment.
• Characterisation of the six-month time limit for inscription for instruction and judgment under the simplified procedure as non-rigorous, making the presumption of discontinuance inapplicable.
• Scope and use of a motion for revision under art. 74 C.p.c., including the power to correct a determinative legal error made by a special clerk.
• Criteria for extending the 10-day delay to seek revision (art. 84 C.p.c.), focusing on diligence once the judgment is notified and absence of negligence by the creditor bank.
• Effect of a debtor’s failure to respond to an assignment on the procedural track, triggering application of arts. 175 and 180 C.p.c. and permitting inscription for default judgment.
• Sufficiency of documentary proof and sworn declaration to establish non-payment, the balance owing, and contractual interest on a credit card account in support of a default judgment.

Factual background

The dispute arises out of a consumer credit relationship between Banque Canadian Tire and the defendant, Éric Plourde. The bank issued to Mr. Plourde a Mastercard Triangle World Elite credit card, granting him a revolving line of credit under standard cardholder terms. Over time, Mr. Plourde used the card but failed to meet his repayment obligations as they fell due under the contract. As at 10 December 2024, the bank’s records showed that he owed a total of $15,476.72 on the account, with an agreed annual interest rate of 21.99% per year applied to the outstanding balance. In response to the persistent default, the bank exercised its contractual remedies. On 20 January 2025, it served on Mr. Plourde an “avis de déchéance du bénéfice du terme” (notice of loss of the benefit of the term), demanding that he cure his default by paying $3,226.22 within 30 days and warning that, failing payment, the entire balance of $15,476.72 would become immediately due and payable. When he did not remedy the default within that period, the bank turned to the courts to recover the full outstanding balance, together with contractual interest and costs.

Procedural history and decision under review

Banque Canadian Tire instituted proceedings in the Cour du Québec, Civil Chamber, District of Abitibi, by introductory application served on 31 March 2025. The claim, brought under the simplified procedure applicable to the recovery of certain debts, sought payment of $15,476.72, plus interest at 21.99% per year from 10 December 2024, and costs. Mr. Plourde did not file any answer to the assignment within the time prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, nor did he otherwise appear or contest the claim. In light of this default, the bank later requested that the file be inscribed for instruction and judgment by default. On 30 January 2026, the special clerk (greffière spéciale), Me Danièle Baril, refused that request and dismissed the bank’s introductory application. Relying on the general provisions of arts. 173, 176 and 177 C.p.c., the special clerk found that more than six months had elapsed since service of the introductory application and that no application to extend the inscription delay had been granted or even filed. On that basis, she concluded that the six-month time limit was one “de rigueur” (of strict application) and that the claimant was therefore presumed to have discontinued the proceeding, leading to rejection of the action. The bank then sought judicial review of the special clerk’s decision by way of a motion for revision.

The revision mechanism and extension of the revision delay

The Court first addressed the admissibility and timing of the revision motion. Under art. 74 C.p.c., decisions of the special clerk, other than certain specified default judgments, may be revised by a judge on request, provided the motion for revision is notified and filed within 10 days of the impugned decision. The decision here was dated 30 January 2026, but the bank received the judgment only on 4 February 2026 via a notice of judgment from the court office. It prepared and filed its revision motion on 12 February 2026 and served the defendant on 16 February 2026. These dates fell outside the bare 10-day window from the date of the decision, so the bank asked the Court to extend the time under art. 84 C.p.c. The judge noted that the jurisprudence recognises that the 10-day delay for revision is not of strict application and may be extended where necessary. In this case, there was no evidence of negligence by the bank: it acted promptly upon actually receiving the judgment, filed its revision request within days, and ensured quick service on the defendant. Given the short delay, the good-faith conduct of the applicant and the absence of prejudice to an absent and non-contesting defendant, the Court extended the 10-day period and declared itself properly seized of the revision motion.

Interaction of general and simplified civil procedure rules

The core legal issue concerned the relationship between the general rules in Book II of the Code of Civil Procedure and the simplified rules in Book VI, specifically in the context of inscription for instruction and judgment under the simplified procedure. Article 173 C.p.c., a general rule, imposes a six-month strict deadline for a plaintiff to complete the preparation of the case and file a request for inscription for instruction and judgment, failing which art. 177 C.p.c. presumes discontinuance. However, the case at bar fell within the scope of the simplified procedure for recovery of certain claims, added in 2023 in Book VI. Under these special rules, art. 535.13 C.p.c. creates a distinct regime: inscription for instruction and judgment is to be made by the clerk, on the order of the court (for example at or after management conferences), and at the latest within six months of service of the notice of assignment. Jurisprudence cited by the judge confirms three key points. First, under the simplified regime, the six-month delay in art. 535.13 C.p.c. is not a delay “de rigueur”; it is a guideline to organise case flow, not a strict cut-off. Second, the responsibility for inscription shifts from the plaintiff to the court office acting on the Court’s order, so a claimant is no longer obliged to file a request for inscription within that period. Third, because the simplified rules do not specify a sanction for missing that six-month mark, the severe presumption of discontinuance in art. 177 C.p.c. does not apply. The judge also acknowledged that some Book II provisions remain relevant even under the simplified procedure, particularly where the simplified process is interrupted. In prior cases, the Court had held that, when a defendant fails to respond or file a summary of defence, the usual progression under the simplified rules (management conferences, settlement conferences) halts, and the provisions dealing with default judgments (arts. 175, 180 and following C.p.c.) step in to govern the next steps. That jurisprudence framed the Court’s approach to the bank’s request for default judgment in this matter.

Court’s analysis on delay and default judgment

Against that background, the judge examined whether the special clerk correctly applied the law when she dismissed the bank’s proceeding as presumed discontinued. He concluded that she had not. Once the defendant failed to respond to the assignment, the ordinary path of the simplified procedure no longer advanced: no management conference was scheduled, no preparatory or settlement conferences took place, and there was no further judicial oversight under Book VI. That default effectively suspended the simplified framework and triggered the application of the default-judgment provisions in Book II, notably art. 175 C.p.c. As amended in 2023, art. 175 C.p.c. provides that inscription for judgment is to be made by the clerk when the defendant fails to transmit an answer to the assignment within the delay set by the Code and the plaintiff so requests, upon deposit of the supporting evidence and a sworn declaration. In this case, Banque Canadian Tire did precisely that: after waiting for the process to move forward and seeing no action from the court office, it requested inscription for judgment by default under art. 175 C.p.c., filed its exhibits and lodged a sworn declaration by its representative, Lise Clark. The special clerk, however, treated the matter as if the general “six months of strict delay” rule in art. 173 C.p.c. still applied, and as if the plaintiff bore responsibility for inscription under that article. The judge found this to be a determinative error of law. Under the simplified Book VI scheme, arts. 173 and 177 C.p.c. are inapplicable for the type of claim before the court; there is no strict six-month deadline for the plaintiff to seek inscription, no obligation to seek an extension of that delay, and therefore no basis to presume discontinuance based on the passage of six months. The plaintiff’s request for default judgment, even if made more than six months after service, did not place it in default and did not warrant dismissal of the action. Given this misapplication of the Code, the Court held that intervention by way of revision under art. 74 C.p.c. was required to correct the special clerk’s ruling.

Outcome and monetary consequences

Having found the revision motion admissible and the special clerk’s decision legally flawed, the Court turned to the merits of the bank’s claim on the existing record. No new evidence was offered: the judge relied on the exhibits already filed, including the credit card agreement, account statements and the sworn declaration of the bank’s representative. On that basis, the Court was satisfied that the defendant had indeed obtained and used the Mastercard Triangle World Elite card issued by Banque Canadian Tire, that he had failed to honour his repayment obligations as they came due, that a valid notice of loss of the benefit of the term had been personally served on him on 20 January 2025, and that he had not cured his default within the 30-day grace period. The evidence also supported the bank’s calculation of the balance owing as $15,476.72 as at 10 December 2024, together with the agreed annual interest rate of 21.99% on that amount from that date. As a result, the Court allowed the motion for revision, set aside the special clerk’s decision, and allowed the introductory application. It entered default judgment against Éric Plourde, condemning him to pay Banque Canadian Tire the principal amount of $15,476.72 with interest at 21.99% per year from 10 December 2024 until full payment, plus court costs against the defendant. While the judgment clearly awards the principal and specifies the applicable interest rate, it does not quantify the precise total in dollars for interest and costs, as these will depend on the date of payment and the court’s tariff of costs.