Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope and application of municipal by-law R.V.Q. 3021 on the obligation of building owners to maintain all constituent parts of a building in good condition, particularly in a heritage district.
• Use of aggravating factors under section 145.41.7 LAU to justify a substantial regulatory fine, including repeated non-compliance, patrimonial status, and visual nuisance to the neighbourhood.
• Evaluation of recidivism under section 236 C.p.p. and its impact on the permitted range of fines between $2,000 and $250,000 for repeat infractions.
• Whether the first-instance judge overstepped the evidentiary record by “creating” aggravating factors (nuisance, access to subsidies, intent) and thereby rendered the sentence unreasonable.
• Challenge to the proportionality of a $50,000 fine, including arguments based on alleged financial incapacity, personal circumstances, and the requirement for individualized sentencing even in regulatory matters.
• Allegation of a breach of the appearance of impartiality by the trial judge, rejected on the basis of the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.

Facts and procedural background

François Béland is the owner of a patrimonial building located on rue D’Auteuil, near rue Elgin, in the Vieux-Québec heritage sector. The property is listed in the City of Québec’s Répertoire du patrimoine bâti and is recognized as an immeuble patrimonial presenting an exceptional heritage interest. The owner acquired the property in 1996 and testified that he had invested substantial sums (estimated at around $700,000) in the building after purchase. Over time, however, the exterior condition of the building deteriorated significantly. Since at least 2013, municipal inspectors for the Ville de Québec have repeatedly documented problems with the building envelope, including deteriorated masonry, fissures, openings, temporary coverings such as tarps, and visible signs of decay. The City issued multiple notices of infraction and correction, and eventually an “avis de détérioration” was registered against the property on the land register in 2022, listing the specific corrective work required. Despite these interventions, the building’s state continued to worsen, and photographs taken in 2019, 2021, 2023, and 2024 illustrated progressive degradation.
This history led to a series of municipal prosecutions. In November 2019, Béland was convicted and fined $1,000 for a similar regulatory infraction, followed by a second conviction in April 2021 with a $2,000 fine, both concerning failure to keep the building properly maintained. In both instances, he entered guilty pleas on the trial dates. For the current file, an inspection on 8 February 2023 again revealed that the building’s constituent parts were not kept in good condition, in breach of the City’s building maintenance by-law. A fresh statement of offence was issued, and Béland eventually pleaded guilty on 20 March 2024, before the municipal court judge.

Regulatory framework and policy terms at issue

The offence arises under the City of Québec’s Règlement sur l’occupation et l’entretien des bâtiments (R.V.Q. 3021). Article 3 of this by-law imposes a general duty to maintain the constituent parts of a building “en bon état”, requiring they be kept in a state that preserves their integrity and allows them to fulfil their intended function. The regulation provides non-exhaustive examples of “parties constituantes en mauvais état d’entretien”, such as an exterior envelope that is not watertight and permits water infiltration or vermin; unprotected or degraded exterior surfaces; brick walls with void or cracked mortar joints; unstable or degraded stairs or balconies; and walls or ceilings with holes or cracks. These definitional elements framed the factual assessment of the state of the D’Auteuil building.
Article 24 of the same by-law sets the penalty regime. For a natural person, it prescribes a minimum fine of $1,000 and a maximum of $250,000 for a first offence, and in case of recidivism a minimum of $2,000, up to the same $250,000 maximum. For a corporation, the minimums are doubled. The by-law also specifies that, in imposing sentence, the judge must notably take into account the aggravating factors enumerated in section 145.41.7 of the Loi sur l’aménagement et l’urbanisme (LAU).
The LAU provisions underpinning the by-law are central to the case. Section 145.41.6 LAU authorizes municipalities to adopt building occupation and maintenance by-laws that provide for fines up to $250,000 and allow higher minimums in case of recidivism, especially where an “avis de détérioration” has been registered. Section 145.41.7 LAU lists statutory aggravating factors that a court “must notably take into account”, including: intentional conduct or negligence; the gravity or risk of harm to health or safety; intensity of nuisances suffered by neighbours; predictability of the infraction and failure to heed prior warnings or notices; heritage status of the building; whether the offender’s acts or omissions pushed the building to a point where demolition is the only useful remedy; and attempts to conceal the infraction or failure to mitigate its consequences.
In addition, section 236 of the Code de procédure pénale (C.p.p.) governs recidivism, allowing the higher “recidive” penalty bracket only when the new infraction occurs within two years of a prior conviction for the same provision. Here, the last conviction (28 April 2021) and the new offence date (8 February 2023) fell within the two-year window, opening the way to the recidivism fine range of $2,000 to $250,000.

Hearing on sentence and first-instance judgment

At the municipal court sentencing hearing, the City initially sought a fine of $100,000, later reduced to $84,000 after Béland entered a guilty plea. The prosecutor relied on his history of similar infractions, the heritage character of the building and sector, repeated failures to comply with notices and recommendations, and the registered notice of deterioration. Béland, for his part, proposed a fine of $15,000. He attributed delays in remedial work to difficulties with contractors, financial constraints, and serious health problems affecting his spouse between 2018 and 2020. He also alluded to damage caused by a third party during snow-clearing in 2017 and suggested that occasional fines were a lesser evil compared to the cost and complexity of major restoration work, though he denied acting cynically or intentionally.
Both sides agreed that the sentencing analysis should be anchored in the factors enumerated in section 145.41.7 LAU, and structured their argument around them. The municipal judge then examined each factor in light of the evidence. He found that Béland had acted with negligence and carelessness over a prolonged period, having known about the problematic condition of the building for more than ten years while taking no effective steps to remedy it. The judge accepted there was little or no direct evidence of serious risk to occupants’ health or safety, so he declined to retain that factor as aggravating. However, he concluded that the state of the façade and the use of unsightly, “temporary” protective measures (plastic sheeting, boarded windows, etc.) created a clear visual nuisance and “urban eyesore” for the neighbourhood.
The judge gave significant weight to the heritage status of the building and its location in the Vieux-Québec patrimonial site. He noted the progressive deterioration documented by years of photographs and the City’s repeated interventions, culminating in the notice of deterioration specifying the corrective work required. He found that various measures taken by Béland—partial or cosmetic repairs—were superficial and ineffective, amounting more to “maquillage” than to genuine attempts to fix the underlying problems. While the building’s condition had not yet reached a point where demolition was the only useful remedy, the court found that aggravating factors predominated overwhelmingly over attenuating ones.
On attenuating factors, the judge accepted that the spouse’s illness was a real hardship, but considered it insufficient to explain or justify nearly a decade of inaction from 2013 to 2023. He placed limited weight on Béland’s unsupported claims of financial incapacity because no documentary evidence—such as tax returns, financial statements, or income proofs—was produced. Conversely, the owner’s ability to obtain a $1,025,000 mortgage and the property’s municipal assessment of $1,545,000 for 2022–2024 suggested that he had access to significant equity and financing options, including sale of the property to a purchaser more able to carry out the necessary work.
The municipal judge emphasized that, in regulatory penalty context, deterrence—particularly general deterrence—is a primary objective. He cited legislative changes that deliberately raised maximum fines to combat “démolition par abandon” of heritage buildings and to ensure sanctions were no longer “risible” for negligent owners. In light of the recidivist status, the multiple aggravating factors, the heritage context, and the legislative intent to impose meaningfully dissuasive penalties, the court fixed the fine at $50,000, plus costs prescribed by regulation. He expressly acknowledged that the jump from the previous $2,000 fine to $50,000 was steep, but considered it justified by the law’s new framework and the owner’s conduct over time.

Grounds of appeal and arguments

Béland appealed the sentence to the Superior Court on three main questions: whether the trial judge had effectively “created” aggravating factors without evidentiary backing, thereby curing an alleged lack of proof from the City; whether the $50,000 fine was unreasonable or disproportionate; and whether the judge had breached the duty of impartiality or the appearance of impartiality, particularly in comments linked to finances, nuisance, and supposed recourse to subsidies or expropriation.
On evidentiary error, the appellant argued that no direct witness evidence from neighbours was adduced on the intensity of any nuisance, so this factor should not have been retained as aggravating. He objected to the references to a “nuisance visuelle” and “verrue urbaine” (urban eyesore) and to suggestions of possible squatters, stressing that the municipal judge himself had recognized that he could not, beyond reasonable doubt, conclude that units were abandoned and occupied by squatters. Béland further contended that the judge impermissibly relied on unproven assumptions concerning the availability of municipal or other subsidy programs and that he wrongly depicted the owner as hoping for expropriation, a position Béland maintained he had never adopted.
On the reasonableness of the sentence, the appellant submitted that the judge placed disproportionate emphasis on exemplary punishment and general deterrence, at the expense of individualized proportionality. He said that the judge ignored or minimized his personal circumstances, including financial hardship and his spouse’s health issues, and mischaracterized him as a bad-faith owner who preferred paying occasional fines rather than complying with the by-law. He contended that at least two aggravating factors—nuisance and the element of dissimulation or failure to mitigate—were unsupported by the record and should be struck, which would require a substantially lower fine.
Regarding impartiality, the appellant claimed that the municipal judge’s comments about a “prêteur spécialisé”, his supposed knowledge of municipal regulation due to owning multiple properties, and the availability of subsidies indicated bias or at least a lack of the necessary appearance of neutrality. He also argued that the judge’s assessment of his finances and intentions went beyond the evidence and evinced a prejudgment of his character. He invited the Superior Court to infer a breach of impartiality and to replace the sentence with the $15,000 fine proposed by the defence at first instance.

Response of the City of Québec

The City, as respondent, emphasized the narrow scope of appellate intervention in sentencing matters. It invoked the rule that an appeal court may interfere only where the sentence is demonstrably unfit (manifestly non-indicated), or where an error of law or principle—such as mischaracterizing or ignoring relevant factors—materially affects the outcome. The City maintained that the municipal judge applied the correct legal framework, carefully reviewed the statutory aggravating factors of section 145.41.7 LAU, and made factual findings solidly anchored in the evidentiary record.
On nuisance, the City argued that jurisprudence recognizes that “nuisance” in public law is broadly defined and includes visual degradation and aesthetic harm, not just physical danger or noise. It pointed out that photographs and the inspector’s testimony were sufficient to show a serious visual nuisance; testimony from neighbours was not a legal prerequisite where the nuisance is objectively apparent on the evidence. The City relied on prior appellate and trial decisions that defined nuisance to encompass prejudice, discomfort, or degradation of aesthetic, artistic, or cultural values, and that allowed photographic evidence alone to prove such nuisances.
Concerning the factor relating to concealment or failure to mitigate, the City distinguished between active concealment and the alternative branch of the statutory wording, which concerns a defendant’s failure to take meaningful steps to mitigate the consequences of an infraction. It reasoned that the judge’s reference to “maquillage” accurately captured the reality that the owner’s superficial, piecemeal interventions did not effectively reduce the harm caused by the building’s poor condition. In that sense, the judge was entitled to consider that the appellant had failed to mitigate, even if he had not tried to hide the infraction itself.
On the availability of grants and the discussion around expropriation, the City pointed out that the evidence, including the testimony of the building inspector and the appellant himself, indicated that subsidy programs existed for heritage building repairs, and that the possibility of expropriation had been raised by the defence during the hearing. The City therefore contended that the judge’s remarks were rooted in the record, not speculation.

Superior Court’s analysis of the legal issues

On the question of alleged evidentiary overreach, the Superior Court methodically reviewed the municipal judgment and the record. It confirmed that the municipal judge had expressly declined to treat risk to health and safety, or the idea that demolition was the only useful remedy, as aggravating factors, given the lack of proof on those points. For the remaining aggravating factors, however, the Superior Court found that the judge’s conclusions were supported by evidence and consistent with the statutory framework.
With respect to nuisance, the court adopted the broad, jurisprudential definition which includes visual nuisance and degradation of aesthetic values. It noted that dozens of photographs showed the building’s dilapidated condition, the presence of tarps and boarding, and generally unsightly temporary measures that had become de facto permanent. These images, combined with the heritage setting, justified treating the situation as a nuisance to the neighbourhood without needing neighbour testimony. The court held that the municipal judge did not “create” evidence but simply drew reasonable inferences from the photographic exhibits and inspection reports.
On the factor concerning concealment or failure to mitigate, the Superior Court accepted the City’s interpretation of section 145.41.7 LAU, which contemplates two distinct scenarios: (1) active attempts to hide the infraction, and (2) a failure to undertake real, effective measures to mitigate the consequences. While Béland had not tried to conceal the building’s condition, his minimal and largely cosmetic works, combined with a decade of non-compliance, supported the conclusion that he had not genuinely sought to limit the harm. The municipal judge was thus entitled to treat this as an aggravating factor on the “failure to mitigate” branch of the provision.
Regarding subsidy programs and expropriation, the Superior Court found that the trial record did contain references to existing grant mechanisms for patrimonial buildings and that the concept of expropriation had been put on the table by the defence during questioning. The municipal judge’s reference to expropriation served to illustrate the long-term risk of continued inaction rather than to punish Béland for exercising or not exercising a legal option. The court concluded that none of these comments amounted to an evidentiary fabrication or improper reliance on facts not in the record.

Assessment of proportionality and regulatory sentencing principles

Turning to the reasonableness of the $50,000 fine, the Superior Court reiterated that in regulatory matters—especially those concerning public protection, urban planning, and heritage conservation—deterrence, and most notably general deterrence, carries particular weight. Unlike criminal law, which primarily condemns intrinsically wrongful conduct, regulatory offences are aimed at enforcing standards necessary to protect the public interest, meaning that non-compliance must be sanctioned robustly enough to avoid creating an implicit “licence fee” to violate the rules.
The court observed that the applicable range for a recidivist individual offender was $2,000 to $250,000, and that the imposed fine of $50,000 remained well below the maximum. It highlighted the lengthy history of non-compliance, repeated convictions that failed to prompt corrective action, and the clear legislative intent—reflected in increased maximum penalties and parliamentary debates—to combat “démolition par abandon” of heritage structures. These elements justified placing the fine higher in the spectrum to send a strong dissuasive message to both the offender and other owners of patrimonial properties.
On the appellant’s financial situation, the Superior Court agreed with the municipal judge that Béland bore the burden of substantiating any attenuating effect based on inability to pay. Bare assertions of financial strain without supporting documents were insufficient. The evidence of a significant mortgage and a high property valuation undermined the claim that he was utterly unable to finance required repairs. Accordingly, the first-instance judge did not err in declining to treat alleged financial constraints as a meaningful mitigating factor. The court also endorsed the view that the spouse’s illness, while regrettable, could not justify a decade-long pattern of ignoring notices and failing to regularize the building’s condition.
The Superior Court concluded that the municipal judge had properly balanced the relevant objectives and principles of sentencing in regulatory law, including proportionality, deterrence, and consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. It found no error of principle, no misapprehension of the evidence on material points, and no basis to characterize the $50,000 fine as manifestly excessive or unfit in the circumstances.

Impartiality and appearance of impartiality

On the allegation of compromised impartiality, the Superior Court recalled the strong presumption that judges act impartially and the high threshold required to rebut it. It noted that a judge may ask questions, make comments, and even express strong views about the seriousness of conduct, provided these interventions remain grounded in the evidence and applicable law.
The court reviewed the contested comments and found that the municipal judge had not described the lender as “specialized” in any prejudicial way in his written reasons, nor made findings about the appellant’s sophisticated knowledge of municipal regulation beyond what flowed from his status as a multi-property owner. The judge’s remarks about potential expropriation were directly prompted by a question or point raised by the defence at the hearing, and framed as an observation about the consequences of continued neglect of a patrimonial building for the municipality.
Importantly, the Superior Court observed that the defence had not raised any concern about bias or appearance of bias at the time of the hearing, which, according to appellate jurisprudence, generally constitutes a waiver of the right to invoke that ground later unless the bias only became apparent after the fact. Here, nothing in the record indicated such a late-emerging concern. The court therefore held that no reasonable, informed observer, viewing the proceedings as a whole, would conclude that the municipal judge lacked impartiality or that the appearance of impartiality was compromised.

Final outcome and monetary consequences

After addressing each of the appellant’s grounds—evidentiary complaints about aggravating factors, alleged disproportionality of the fine, and claimed breach of impartiality—the Superior Court determined that the municipal judgment contained no reviewable error. The judge had applied the correct statutory framework (R.V.Q. 3021, LAU s. 145.41.6–145.41.7, C.p.p. s. 236), properly assessed the evidence of long-term neglect and heritage degradation, and imposed a penalty consistent with the heightened deterrent purpose of recent legislative reforms concerning heritage buildings.
The court therefore dismissed the appeal and confirmed in full the sentence imposed at first instance. As a result, the Ville de Québec remains the successful party, and the $50,000 fine against François Béland stands, along with the regulatory court costs prescribed by the applicable rules. The judgment does not specify a precise dollar figure for costs, so the only quantified monetary sanction clearly determined in favour of the successful party is the $50,000 fine, with the amount of additional costs not ascertainable from the decision.