Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope of a university’s duty of reasonable accommodation toward a disabled veterinary student under a prior settlement (Mémoire de transaction) and human rights principles
• Whether interlocutory relief was necessary to preserve the student’s ability to continue in the program part-time without undermining the University’s rights under the 2018 settlement
• Medical evidence on the impact of physical displacement and exam scheduling on the student’s pain, fatigue, and concentration, and whether this proved serious or irreparable prejudice
• Credibility and weight of medical notes and testimony regarding the need for remote written exams and extended rest periods between evaluations
• Balancing of inconveniences between protecting the student’s fundamental rights (integrity, dignity, equal access to education) and the University’s academic integrity, anti-plagiarism concerns, and operational constraints
• Judicial reluctance to micro-manage exam scheduling and internal academic administration in the absence of clear, concrete prejudice to the student

Factual background

Geneviève Lessard is a student with a disability who was admitted in 2005 to the Université de Montréal’s first-cycle doctoral program in veterinary medicine. Over the years, she has completed about half of the program and has consistently required academic accommodations because of functional limitations from multiple motor vehicle accidents. These include chronic pain, urgent and sometimes incontinent urination, reduced tolerance for sitting or standing, and concentration difficulties linked to pain. An occupational therapist’s 2008 functional assessment concluded that while she could, in theory, perform all program requirements, she could not sustain them at a normal full-time pace due to limited endurance. The report strongly recommended that she study part-time and receive specific physical accommodations such as an ergonomic chair, the ability to move and stretch during classes and exams, and access to washrooms with a female proctor. Historically, the University recognized her status as a student with a handicap and provided several accommodations in examinations held on campus, including a separate room, extra time, the ability to move around and take breaks, supervised washroom access, and specialized seating. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, however, she wrote all exams in person at the veterinary faculty. During the pandemic, like all students in the program, she completed her exams remotely online. After in-person teaching resumed, a new physiatrist, Dr. Duranleau, recommended in 2021 that she continue to write exams from home to avoid pain associated with trips to campus. Another treating physician, Dr. Haziza, later issued a broad note confirming that she has “important difficulties” with displacement and needed to write her exams at home to minimize stress and pain. For a time, the University followed these recommendations: even after most students returned to in-person exams, its disability support unit endorsed continued remote written exams “according to medical recommendations.” In May 2023, the University changed its position and required that Ms. Lessard resume taking her written exams in person, with the same physical accommodations she had received before the pandemic. She wrote two written exams on campus in May and June 2023. In autumn 2023, she then interrupted her studies for reasons unrelated to her disability.

The 2018 settlement and agreed accommodations

A central document is the 2018 “Mémoire de transaction,” a settlement agreement between Ms. Lessard and the University. Under this agreement, the University accepted that she would complete between 5 and 8 credits per trimester (autumn and winter) “because of her current medical condition,” and she, in turn, committed to completing the entire program by 1 June 2029. The settlement also states that the University undertakes to “take into account the particular accommodations required by her medical condition,” including for exams, while reserving important qualifications. It allows annual adjustment of the maximum number of credits if her medical condition improves, and stipulates that any accommodations must remain compatible with the objectives of courses and pre-clinical and clinical placements. The settlement further provides that some stages may not permit application of the recommended measures and allows the University to require a medical examination at its own initiative to assess her general condition. These clauses became important in the interlocutory analysis, particularly on the part-time status issue and the risk that an interim order could effectively freeze arrangements the parties had intended to remain flexible in light of evolving health and academic requirements.

Commencement of the new proceedings

In autumn 2025, anticipating a return to her studies for the Winter 2026 term (for which she was already enrolled), Ms. Lessard instituted an action for a permanent injunction and damages against the University, attaching an interlocutory injunction application. She alleged violations of her fundamental rights, including bodily integrity and dignity, and claimed the University was not providing sufficient accommodation. By the time of the hearing in January 2026, she had registered, with the University’s agreement, for three courses in Winter 2026 (total of six credits) on a part-time basis. The interlocutory application sought three main types of interim relief: confirmation of part-time enrolment with a hard cap of eight credits per term, an order to allow her to write all written exams remotely (with supervision costs partially reimbursed), and a series of orders governing the timing of her exams so that she could rest adequately between evaluations.

First issue: part-time status and credit load

On the first relief, Ms. Lessard asked the Court to order the University to allow her to pursue the veterinary program part-time, with a maximum of eight credits per session. On the merits she also seeks a declaration that this regime must continue “until completion of the program,” which would effectively allow extension beyond the 1 June 2029 deadline in the 2018 settlement. At the interlocutory stage, the Court easily found a serious issue to be tried. The settlement explicitly acknowledges a 5- to 8-credit limit per term and sets a completion deadline, raising real questions about how these commitments should be interpreted and adjusted over time in light of her disability. However, the Court held that the necessity and balance-of-convenience criteria were not met. Circumstances had evolved since the proceedings were filed: by the hearing date, Ms. Lessard was actually registered part-time for six credits in Winter 2026, which aligned with her desired pace. She did not demonstrate any concrete, imminent prejudice beyond speculation if the requested order was not granted before a decision on the merits. The Court emphasized that refusing an interlocutory order would not render a future judgment ineffective: if she ultimately succeeds, the final decision could still address the duration and conditions of her part-time status. In contrast, granting the order could seriously impair the University’s ability to rely on the settlement’s qualifying terms, such as annual adjustment of the credit cap, compatibility with course and stage objectives, and the fixed 2029 completion date. An interim order might “crystallize” a right to study part-time with a maximum of eight credits per term regardless of improved health, academic constraints, or the agreed completion deadline. Given the absence of present, concrete harm to Ms. Lessard and the significant structural implications for the University, the Court declined to grant an interlocutory injunction on this first issue.

Second issue: remote written exams

The second requested measure concerned written exams. Ms. Lessard asked that the University be ordered to allow her to take her written exams online, with the exams administered at her home and subject to possible in-person supervision by a University proctor, the extra supervision costs to be reimbursed up to a defined cap per exam. The Court first recognized a serious issue to be tried. The settlement obliges the University to take account of accommodations necessitated by her medical condition, including for examinations, and the University itself had previously accepted remote written exams for her alone, even after the pandemic, expressly “according to medical recommendations.” The legal question was whether a continued right to remote exams would be a reasonable accommodation given her medical limitations and any legitimate institutional constraints. Turning to necessity and irreparable harm, the Court focused on the upcoming Winter 2026 session. Medical evidence, especially from Dr. Duranleau and Dr. Haziza, described how displacement—both by car and on foot—substantially increased her pain, fatigue and stress, which in turn jeopardized her concentration and academic performance. Some notes were broad and, in one case, co-authored in form by Ms. Lessard and the physician, but the Court held they could not be discounted at the interlocutory stage, particularly since the University had not exercised its contractual right to require an independent medical assessment. Ms. Lessard herself testified that even walking required supports (such as a cane or sacro-iliac belt) when her pain was high. The University argued that earlier in-person exams, including two in 2023, proved she could manage the travel. The Court rejected this as inadequate to displace the detailed medical and testimonial evidence, and noted that prior tolerance of a disadvantageous status quo is not decisive where fundamental rights are implicated. Applying the standard test for injunctions, the Court reasoned that if a judge later finds on the merits that Ms. Lessard did have a right to remote written exams, forcing her to sit Winter 2026 exams in person in the meantime would amount to an ongoing infringement of her fundamental rights to bodily integrity and dignity, which are inherently difficult to repair after the fact. On that footing, an interlocutory order was necessary to prevent serious or irreparable harm.

Balancing the inconveniences on remote exams

On the balance of inconveniences, the Court weighed Ms. Lessard’s threatened harm against the University’s academic integrity concerns. The University contended that remote exams, especially when the student leaves the camera’s field of vision to access a washroom, cannot be adequately monitored against plagiarism or cheating, thereby jeopardizing the credibility of both the degree and the institution. The Court accepted that exam integrity is a legitimate institutional concern but found the evidence too abstract at this stage. The University did not allege or prove any concrete suspicion that Ms. Lessard herself might commit plagiarism; its argument remained entirely theoretical. Moreover, the Court stressed that the University had already allowed her to take remote exams, on a disability-only basis, for several terms post-pandemic without pointing to any changed circumstances. That reduced the weight of its sudden shift in policy. The Court also noted that Ms. Lessard was open to an in-person proctor being physically present at her residence during remote exams, although the University highlighted practical difficulties with that proposal. The judge chose to record her openness in the dispositive portion of the judgment but deliberately refrained from ruling on whether live invigilation at home would be a reasonable or required arrangement.

Limiting the scope of the remote-exam order

Although the Court chose to grant interlocutory relief on remote exams, it carefully confined the order. The injunction applies only to written exams in the Winter 2026 session for the three courses in which she is enrolled (DMV 3221 Santé publique, zoonoses; DMV 3237 Animaux exotiques de compagnie; and DMV 3416 Communication et professionnalisme vétérinaire). It specifies that she may take the intra-term and final written exams for these courses “at a distance,” but the Court refused to mandate that they be held specifically at her family home. The evidence showed she has a second residence within a five-minute walk of the faculty that she has historically used for in-person activities, and the essence of the accommodation relates to avoiding travel between a residence and the campus—not to privileging one residence over the other. The judge also refused to pronounce any forward-looking order that would govern remote exams for the many remaining courses in her program. Evaluation methods in the program are varied, and some forms of assessment may not be amenable to remote administration. Adopting the parties’ own earlier suggestion, the Court emphasized that exam modalities should be adapted on a case-by-case basis, by reference to confirmed courses and their specific evaluation formats, rather than through a broad, abstract injunction.

Third issue: exam dates and spacing between evaluations

The third cluster of relief concerned exam timing. Initially, when she had not yet re-enrolled, Ms. Lessard sought a general order that all formative and summative evaluations be taken “in deferred mode,” including in later trimesters or summers, and that she receive a minimum of two weeks’ rest between each evaluation and after the winter session. Later, once the Winter 2026 course schedule was known, she amended her application to add a specific calendar of exam dates of her own choosing. The University responded by proposing an alternative exam schedule for Winter 2026, offering approximately two weeks’ rest between exams. At the hearing, it agreed on the record to abide by that timetable if the Court so ordered. As with remote exams, the Court found a serious issue to be tried. The settlement again obliges the University to consider her medically required accommodations for exams, and over time her professional team’s recommendations evolved from one week to two weeks of rest between evaluations. However, the analysis of necessity and harm focused on comparison between two concrete calendars: Ms. Lessard’s preferred dates and the University’s alternative schedule with similar rest gaps. Both schedules afforded her roughly two weeks’ rest between exams, in line with the most recent medical notes. The main difference was structural: she wanted to defer her intra-term exam until after the session, thereby pushing all other exams later into June and July, while the University proposed to hold the intra exam during the designated Spring break (2–6 March 2026) and then to space the finals in May and early June. The Court found that Ms. Lessard had not shown precise, concrete facts demonstrating that it would cause her serious or irreparable prejudice to take the intra exam during the session, particularly during a week in which she would have had about two weeks of rest since the last class. The medical recommendations referred to rest “between exams,” not between an exam and subsequent classes. General physician comments about having exams in the summer or four weeks after classes ended were issued before anyone knew exactly which courses she would be taking in Winter 2026, what kind of exams they would involve, or whether an intra exam would be scheduled. That generic context reduced their persuasive value for the specific calendar now under review. As a result, the Court concluded that an interlocutory order forcing the University to adopt Ms. Lessard’s preferred dates was not necessary to prevent serious or irreparable harm or to preserve the usefulness of a final judgment.

Balancing the inconveniences on exam scheduling

On the balance of inconveniences, the Court accepted the University’s evidence that letting a student unilaterally dictate exam dates would pose significant operational difficulties. It highlighted multiple constraints, including the forms of evaluation chosen by professors, the need for faculty members or external lecturers to draft and mark alternative exams, the need for proctors even in remote formats, and institutional deadlines for submitting final grades. One example was particularly compelling: the intra exam in the public health course is prepared by several visiting lecturers rather than a single faculty member, and the University has no direct control over their availability to create and mark off-cycle exams on the dates proposed by Ms. Lessard. Given these logistical and academic constraints, and the absence of demonstrated irreparable harm if the University’s calendar were adopted, the Court concluded that judicial restraint was appropriate. Courts should avoid unnecessary interference in the internal functioning of educational institutions, particularly in academic scheduling, unless clear rights violations and concrete prejudice are shown. The judge therefore refused to order the University to adopt Ms. Lessard’s specific calendar for Winter 2026 or to grant the broad, program-wide timing order she initially sought. Still, because the University committed itself in open court to a particular alternative schedule incorporating about two weeks’ rest between each exam, the Court recorded that undertaking and ordered the University to comply with it for Winter 2026.

Final observations and disposition

Ms. Lessard also asked for an order compelling the University to formally notify the judgment to a list of managers and employees and commanding them to comply, under pain of sanctions. The Court rejected this, finding no evidence that the University would refuse to implement the judgment or needed special coercive measures directed at individuals. In the formal conclusions, the Court partly granted the modified interlocutory application dated 6 January 2026. It ordered the University to allow Ms. Lessard to sit, at a distance, the intra and final exams in DMV 3221, the final exam in DMV 3237, and the final exam in DMV 3416 during Winter 2026. It recorded her agreement to take certain team assignments and interactive workshops on the same dates and terms as other students. It also took note of the University’s undertaking to schedule her Winter 2026 written exams within specified date ranges (during Spring break, and then in May and June) and ordered it to comply with that schedule. The judgment reserved costs (“frais à suivre”), meaning no monetary award—no damages, no quantified costs—was made at this interlocutory stage. Overall, the decision is best characterized as a partial success for Ms. Lessard: she obtained temporary protection of her right to remote written exams for Winter 2026 and a medically informed exam calendar proposed by the University, but she did not secure an interim order locking in long-term part-time status, exam scheduling across future terms, or any financial award. Since the Court did not fix any amount for damages or costs, the total monetary recovery in favour of any party cannot be determined from this judgment.