Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Procedural limits on using consent orders to bypass the two-stage process for summary judgment under General Application Practice Directive #9 (GAPD9).
• Tension between parties’ desire to quickly schedule a summary judgment hearing and the court’s insistence that all materials and preliminary steps be completed first.
• Role of affidavits, questioning on affidavits, and briefs of law in determining whether a summary judgment application is “ready for hearing.”
• Judicial discretion in managing litigation timelines where a pending summary judgment application does not suspend ordinary discovery or preparatory steps.
• Criteria for assessing suitability of a case for summary judgment, including the extent of factual disputes and potential credibility issues.
• Practical application of Hryniak v Mauldin and Rule 7-5 in promoting proportionate, efficient procedures while avoiding wasted hearings on unready applications.

Background and facts of the dispute
Farm Credit Canada (FCC), the plaintiff, commenced an action against the defendant, Rylan Chance Jasper, in the King’s Bench for Saskatchewan. The Statement of Claim, issued on October 11, 2024, alleged default under a loan and sought judgment for $302,863.33 together with interest at the contract rate of 19.5618% per year from September 9, 2024 to the date of judgment. The underlying dispute is therefore a debt recovery claim arising from an alleged failure to repay a loan.
The litigation proceeded through early case management steps. Mandatory mediation was completed on January 21, 2025. On January 29, 2025, the defendant filed a Statement of Defence. In that pleading, Mr. Jasper denied the debt and raised a limitation defence, asserting that the claim was statute-barred. At this stage, the court’s reasons do not resolve the factual or legal merits of either the debt or the limitation defence, and the judgment remains focused on procedure rather than substantive liability.

Commencement of the summary judgment application
On March 18, 2026, FCC filed a Notice of Application for summary judgment supported by an affidavit. The application invoked Rules 7-2 to 7-5 of The King’s Bench Rules governing summary judgment. In line with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hryniak v Mauldin and the Saskatchewan approach in A.M. v Hagen, Rule 7-5 allows the court to grant summary judgment where there is “no genuine issue requiring a trial” and authorizes the chambers judge to weigh evidence, assess credibility, and draw reasonable inferences when doing so. The summary judgment motion, if successful, would permit FCC to obtain a final determination of its loan claim without a full trial, presumably including a money judgment for the outstanding principal and interest.
Before that application could be heard, however, the parties turned to the scheduling mechanics. The hearing on the summary judgment application was initially set for April 16, 2026. On April 14, 2026, FCC’s counsel filed a proposed Consent Order, apparently agreed between the parties, that would direct the Local Registrar to schedule a hearing date for the summary judgment application and set backdated deadlines for affidavits, briefs of law, and cross-examinations on affidavits, all tied to that future hearing date.

General Application Practice Directive #9 and the two-stage process
The key legal framework for the court’s decision is General Application Practice Directive #9: Scheduling of Summary Judgment, Set Aside and Judicial Review Applications (GAPD9). GAPD9 creates a two-stage process for summary judgment applications: an initial readiness and management stage before a chambers judge, followed by a second stage—hearing on the merits—if the matter is certified as ready.
The first stage is designed to ensure that summary judgment is used efficiently and only when appropriate. It allows the court to review whether the application is suitable for summary determination and whether the necessary materials and procedural steps have been completed. The Directive arose from experience with failed or premature summary judgment hearings that were not ready or not suitable, wasting both court and counsel resources and undermining the goals of expediency and proportionality that summary judgment is intended to serve.
The Court of Appeal in Loraas v Loraas Disposal North Ltd. confirmed that the Court of King’s Bench is “master of its own processes and procedures” and may adopt such practice directions. The appellate court also clarified that filing a summary judgment application does not automatically displace or suspend the normal processes of discovery; whether discoveries and related steps proceed during a pending summary judgment application is a matter of judicial discretion within the GAPD9 framework.

Requirements for readiness and material filing under GAPD9
Over time, Saskatchewan case law has interpreted GAPD9 to require that all materials for a summary judgment application, including briefs of law, be filed at the first-stage readiness hearing rather than only at the final merits hearing. Decisions such as Karmazyn v Gall, Soldan v Law Society of Saskatchewan, Alliance Crane Inc. v Sapergia, and several others have reiterated that the first-stage chambers judge must be able to review the complete record that will be placed before the second-stage hearing judge. This includes affidavits from both parties, any reply affidavits, and full written argument.
The court in Atrium Mortgage Investment Corporation v Koh and Churko v Merchant previously emphasized that an application should not be set down for a summary judgment hearing until necessary steps—such as exchange of affidavits of documents, document production, and any other deemed-necessary steps—have been completed. In Churko, for example, the plaintiff’s summary judgment application was adjourned sine die because those foundational steps were incomplete, and the court insisted that any management issues be brought back to chambers once the parties were ready.

The court’s response to the proposed consent order
In the present case, the proposed Consent Order would effectively have reversed this sequence. Instead of first ensuring that affidavits, questioning on affidavits, and briefs of law were completed and filed, the order asked the court to schedule the second-stage summary judgment hearing in advance and then work backwards with deadlines. In the court’s view, this would cause the summary judgment application to leapfrog the first-stage readiness review mandated by GAPD9.
Justice Robertson declined to authorize the Consent Order. The reasons emphasize that while the court has discretion to approve or reject such consensual procedural arrangements, this discretion must be exercised consistently with the purpose and requirements of GAPD9. Allowing the proposed order would defeat the Directive by committing scarce hearing time to a matter that was plainly not ready, as the parties had not yet filed all their affidavits and still contemplated questioning on those affidavits.
The judge also underscored best practices that support readiness. These include the parties agreeing, where possible, on relevant facts and records, and the applicant filing a properly organized binder containing all materials from both sides—indexed and tabbed—for use at both stages. This organization assists the first-stage judge in determining readiness and supports efficient, focused argument at the second-stage hearing.

Criteria for suitability and the ongoing management of the application
Beyond readiness, the reasons summarize the types of considerations relevant when deciding whether a case is suitable for summary judgment at the second stage. Those considerations include whether both parties accept that the dispute is capable of summary determination, whether there is an agreed statement of facts and documents, whether additional affidavits have been filed, the volume and complexity of the material, the identification of any genuinely disputed facts, and whether such disputes turn on credibility assessments better left to a full trial. These factors reflect the framework in Hryniak and Rule 7-5, which aims to balance procedural economy with the requirement for a fair and just determination on the merits.
In this case, the court did not yet reach the suitability question. Instead, it focused on ensuring that, before any merits hearing is scheduled, the record will be complete and the application properly managed. To that end, Justice Robertson worked with counsel during the chambers appearance to craft an alternative schedule: the defendant must serve and file his affidavits by July 31, 2026; the plaintiff may serve and file any reply affidavit by August 31, 2026; questioning on affidavits is to occur within 60 days of the last affidavit; and briefs of law are to be exchanged and filed within 60 days after questioning is completed. Once those steps are done, the application can be brought back to chambers on 14 days’ notice for a first-stage readiness review under GAPD9.

Ruling, outcome, and financial consequences
The ruling in this decision is procedural rather than substantive. The court refuses to approve the parties’ initial Consent Order because it would bypass the first-stage review required by General Application Practice Directive #9 and schedule the summary judgment hearing prematurely. Instead, the court issues a new timetable that ensures all affidavits, questioning, and written arguments are completed before the summary judgment application returns for a readiness assessment. At this point in the litigation, there is no determination of liability on the loan, no ruling on the defendant’s limitation defence, and no adjudication on the merits of the summary judgment application. As a result, there is no clearly identifiable “successful party” for this particular decision: neither Farm Credit Canada nor Rylan Chance Jasper obtains a substantive win. Likewise, while FCC’s Statement of Claim seeks $302,863.33 plus significant contractual interest, this decision does not grant any money judgment, costs award, or quantified damages in favor of either side, and the total monetary award and costs ordered cannot be determined from this ruling.