Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope and nature of the right to interrogate the author of a sworn declaration under article 105 C.p.c. in the context of a class action
• Distinction between an interrogatory on a declaration under oath and a standard pre-trial examination (interrogatoire au préalable) governed by articles 221 and following C.p.c.
• Impact of prior case law limiting interrogatories on affidavits once a judgment has been rendered on the basis of that declaration
• Procedural management of complex class proceedings, including refusal of further document production and additional interrogatories that might delay the case
• Evidentiary sufficiency of Bell Canada’s sworn declarations explaining termination fees and the limits of available data for purposes of the class action
• Balancing parties’ discovery rights against judicial economy and the need to move a long-pending class proceeding toward trial without unnecessary evidentiary fishing expeditions

Background and facts of the dispute

The case arises from a Québec class action authorized on 10 February 2021 in favor of a group of business customers of Bell Canada. The class is defined as all enterprises domiciled or formerly domiciled in Québec that, between 26 June 2015 and the date of publication of the class notices, were parties to telecommunications service contracts with Bell Canada containing stipulated and imposed termination clauses or conditions, except public bodies and “Small Businesses” that signed contracts with arbitration clauses. The representative plaintiff is Société AGIL OBNL; the defendant is Bell Canada. The core factual backdrop is Bell’s practice of charging fees upon early termination of telecommunications contracts with business customers. AGIL alleges that these termination fee provisions and their application are unlawful or abusive. Bell, for its part, maintains that the fees were charged according to its standard contractual framework and within the bounds of the applicable legal and regulatory regime. Over time, the proceedings have followed the typical trajectory of a complex class action: filing of the originating application, exchanges of pre-engagement requests by each side, a rejected attempt by AGIL to modify the class definition to extend the group closure date, examinations of the plaintiff’s representative and a Bell representative, and extensive objections and rulings on those discovery steps. Bell also filed its Defence and responded to pre-engagement demands, notably through detailed written communications and sworn statements.

Procedural history leading to the contested request

As the case advanced beyond authorization, AGIL sought extensive discovery regarding the application of termination fees. Among other things, AGIL asked the Court to order Bell to provide: (1) amounts collected, by account, after billing of contract termination charges, including any credits applied; (2) all invoices containing termination fees issued during the class period; and (3) all contracts signed by class members that included an arbitration clause. Those requests were made in a modified case management notice dated 1 April 2025. On 2 December 2025, the case management judge (the same judge who issues the present ruling) refused AGIL’s broad requests for additional production from Bell. Subsequently, on 20 March 2026, Justice Alexandre Boucher of the Court of Appeal denied AGIL’s motion for leave to appeal that refusal, thereby confirming the earlier management decision. Parallel to these disputes, Bell had provided sworn declarations from its representatives to clarify the evidence around termination fees and the limits of its data. On 18 October 2024, Bell communicated responses to undertakings from the examination of its representative, including a sworn declaration from Stéphanie St-Amand explaining why certain requests could not be answered. On 21 March 2025, Bell filed another sworn declaration, this time by representative Rachel Bucknell, to give additional details about termination fees and to explain the reasons for limitations in the information Bell could provide regarding those fees.

Sworn declarations and the plaintiff’s attempt to interrogate the affiant

After receiving the Bucknell declaration, AGIL sought to probe it by oral examination. On 16 January 2026, AGIL requested a case management hearing to determine the next procedural steps. Then, on 4 February 2026, AGIL formally asked to interrogate Ms. Bucknell on her sworn declaration. Bell objected to this proposed interrogation. Later, on 24 April 2026, shortly before the scheduled 29 April 2026 case management hearing, AGIL wrote to the Court to “clarify” that the matters it intended to raise at that hearing included an interrogation of Bell’s affiant, Ms. Bucknell, concerning her March 2025 declaration. The request to examine Ms. Bucknell came in a context where AGIL had already complained that a new written testimony had been received less than a week before a prior hearing and that, in its view, the pre-trial examination would have to be resumed and new undertakings sought. AGIL argued in the modified management notice that an additional oral examination was imperative to avoid what it characterized as vague, approximate, and convoluted answers drafted by Bell’s lawyers, and that a further interrogatory was necessary in light of the ongoing debate over disclosure and discovery in the Bell file.

Key legal framework: article 105 C.p.c. and interrogatories on sworn declarations

AGIL’s central legal position was that interrogating the author of a sworn declaration is a “right strict” (a strict or absolute right) under article 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.p.c.). Article 105 governs situations where legislation requires a proceeding to be supported by a sworn act or permits a written declaration under oath as a means of proof. It states that the person who swears the declaration may be examined on the facts attested to, and that refusal to submit to such an interrogatory without valid justification results in the rejection of the act or declaration. AGIL relied on this text to claim that it was entitled, as of right, to examine Ms. Bucknell on the contents of her 21 March 2025 sworn declaration dealing with termination fees and the limitations of Bell’s records. The Court rejected this characterization. Drawing on Court of Appeal authority, particularly Lussier c. Luft, the judge held that even where the Code broadens the scope of pre-trial examinations, it does not guarantee a strict right to interrogate; instead, the trial court retains case management powers to determine whether pre-trial examinations are required and to set their conditions, including their scope and even their availability. That reasoning, the judge held, applies equally to interrogations under article 105 C.p.c. The Court further drew from a line of jurisprudence distinguishing between interrogatories on affidavits or sworn declarations (used to test the seriousness and veracity of the attested facts) and broader pre-trial examinations under articles 221 and following C.p.c. Decisions such as Immeubles André Gagné inc. c. Beauchamp emphasized that it can be contrary to the interests of justice to allow an interrogation on a declaration that has already been relied upon in a judgment, and that such an examination should not be permitted where it would be superfluous in light of the nature of the attested facts. Other cases—Sary c. Lakatos, 153565 Canada inc. c. Granit Bussière inc., and Villa Maria c. Soeurs de la Congrégation de Notre-Dame—stressed that an interrogatory on a sworn declaration is narrowly focused on verifying the seriousness and truth of the affidavit itself; it is not a vehicle for additional or exploratory proof, and it is distinct in scope and function from an interrogatoire au préalable, which is broader, exploratory, and tied to parties or their representatives and to undertakings.

Distinction between interrogatory on sworn declaration and pre-trial examination

In its 1 April 2025 management notice, AGIL had framed the requested interrogation essentially as an additional pre-trial examination, speaking of restarting the pre-trial deposition, obtaining new undertakings, and insisting on an oral interrogation to avoid allegedly lawyer-crafted written answers. The Court notes that the language of the notice clearly referenced the regime of articles 221 and following C.p.c. (interrogatoire au préalable), not a targeted examination under article 105 solely to test the seriousness of the affidavit. Yet the jurisprudence, including the Court of Appeal, has consistently underscored that an interrogation on a sworn declaration serves a single, precise purpose: to verify the seriousness and truthfulness of the declaration itself and not to expand the evidentiary record in the manner of a full pre-trial discovery. In Villa Maria, for example, Justice Ian Demers underlined that a declarant under oath need not inform themselves about matters they do not know, and that the examination is confined to the facts alleged in the declaration, whereas a pre-trial examination of a party or its representative is exploratory and aimed at all facts pertinent to the dispute, with obligations to take undertakings and the possibility of re-examination only to complete answers. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that AGIL was effectively trying to use an article 105-type interrogatory as a vehicle for further broad discovery after prior management rulings (and a denied leave to appeal) had already limited such discovery. The judge held that article 105 does not create an automatic right that overrides case management decisions, particularly once a judgment has been rendered that expressly considered the sworn declaration in question.

Case management considerations and the need to move the class action forward

Beyond the strict doctrinal analysis of article 105 C.p.c. and the distinction between different forms of examination, the Court grounded its decision in broader case management concerns. The class action was commenced in 2019 and had already seen years of procedural steps, including authorization, contested discovery, and extensive motion practice. The judge emphasized that it was now necessary to move the matter toward adjudication on the merits rather than allowing further procedural skirmishes to delay progress. As part of that forward-looking management, the Court noted that the defence expert evidence would be produced by 29 May 2026, and that the plaintiff did not intend, for the moment, to file its own expert evidence. To ensure that the action progresses to trial, the Court extended the deadline to file the case for hearing and judgment to 1 October 2026. This extension recognizes the remaining work to be done (in particular the integration of defence expert evidence) while also setting a clear outer procedural horizon. The refusal to authorize the interrogation of Ms. Bucknell thus fits within a larger pattern of judicial reluctance to reopen or expand discovery where it risks devolving into fishing expeditions, creates overlap with issues already resolved in earlier rulings, or undermines the efficient management of a complex class proceeding affecting multiple related files (notably those involving Videotron and Télébec).

Outcome, successful party, and monetary consequences

In this particular April 29, 2026 judgment, the Court squarely answers the litigation question it had identified: whether the interrogation of Ms. Bucknell should be allowed. The judge holds that there is no strict right under article 105 C.p.c. to interrogate the affiant in the circumstances, particularly once a prior judgment has already been rendered that considered and relied on the sworn declaration. The Court refuses AGIL’s request to examine Ms. Bucknell and decides instead to promote progression of the case by fixing a new deadline for inscription for hearing and judgment. As a result, Bell Canada emerges as the successful party in this decision, having successfully resisted AGIL’s attempt to conduct an additional interrogation of its representative. The judgment does not award any damages or monetary compensation; it is a procedural case management ruling, and the Court explicitly orders that it is rendered “sans frais de justice.” Accordingly, while Bell prevails on the contested motion, there is no monetary award, no costs, and no damages quantified or granted in favor of any party in this decision, and the total amount ordered in favor of the successful party cannot be determined beyond the confirmation that no financial sums were granted.