Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Adequacy of full and frank disclosure on the ex parte Mareva motion, including failure to file bank statements and complete text communications.
• Existence of a strong prima facie case of civil fraud against the primary borrower, centred on alleged misrepresentations about a Desjardins “guarantee” of principal.
• Proper characterization of the dispute as either a fraudulent Ponzi-style scheme or a high-risk/high-return lending arrangement not yet in default.
• Contractual effect of detailed loan clauses, including guarantees, “entire agreement,” no-amendment and conditional interest adjustment provisions, and tolerance for delayed payments.
• Whether there was a real and continuing risk of dissipation of assets justifying continuation of the Mareva injunction against each respondent.
• Evidentiary sufficiency of the record to link the employee-respondent to any fraud and to show that funds moving through his account supported asset-freezing relief.

Background and lending relationship

The dispute arises from a series of private lending arrangements between the plaintiffs, Dana Kolodzey and her partner Eric Nijjar, and the defendant borrower, Dapinder “Rony” Kaur Juneja. The relationship was initiated in late summer 2025 when Ms. Kolodzey approached Ms. Juneja after hearing from her boyfriend and his uncle, Mark Poyser, that Ms. Juneja provided attractive investment returns and had previously repaid loans with interest without difficulty. Relying on these assurances and early positive experiences relayed by her circle, Ms. Kolodzey began advancing funds to Ms. Juneja on the basis that the money would be invested and that the principal was “guaranteed and insured.” The plaintiffs say they were drawn into what they now characterize as a Ponzi scheme, in which earlier lenders were repaid from funds supplied by new investors, rather than from any legitimate investment activity. Ms. Juneja denies operating any fraudulent scheme and insists the parties entered into high-risk, high-return loan agreements that had not yet matured when the plaintiffs tried to exit.

The written loan agreements and key clauses

The first loan was made on 5 September 2025 for $30,000. According to the reasons, Ms. Kolodzey says she was told the money would be invested in gold mining and that it was insured by Desjardins. The First Loan Agreement promised a $9,000 interest payment in October 2025 and set repayment of principal between 17 and 20 October 2025. Importantly, it stated that the “principal was guaranteed and insured,” a phrase later central to the fraud analysis. A Second Loan Agreement was entered into on 26 September 2025, by which Ms. Kolodzey advanced a further $50,000. She agreed to forgo the $9,000 interest owed under the first agreement to have that amount applied toward the principal of the second. This second agreement contemplated interest of $48,000 in instalments and repayment of principal between 16 and 20 February 2026. It contained several notable contractual provisions: an Entire Agreement clause; a clause prohibiting amendments except in writing; and a Conditional Interest Adjustment Clause stating that while the stated interest rate was agreed, the actual interest paid could vary due to external factors. This clause emphasized that such variation would not be treated as a breach, provided the principal was repaid in full and “reasonable efforts” were made to maximize the return. The parties then moved to a more complex structure with a Third Loan Agreement signed on 18 November 2025. That agreement set a total principal of $240,000, consisting of $100,000 already advanced, an “expected interest return” of $100,000 and a further $40,000 to be advanced in January 2026. It contemplated a compound return beginning once the extra $40,000 was advanced, with an anticipated interest return of $315,134.58, a first interest payment of $250,000 in June 2026, and a plan for the remaining interest and principal thereafter. The Third Agreement explicitly provided that neither interest nor principal would be paid before the scheduled dates, effectively locking in the funds until June 2026 unless the parties otherwise agreed. Additional loans were made on substantially similar terms: a fourth loan on 23 December 2025 for $19,200 (with $10,000 interest payable through January 2026), a fifth loan on 24 December 2025 for $10,000 (with $11,000 interest payable in January and February 2026), a sixth loan dated 20 January 2026 for $31,500 (with $50,000 interest), and a seventh loan on 23 January 2026 for $10,000 (with $20,000 interest). These transactions promised very high interest returns over short periods, reinforcing the high-risk/high-reward nature of the arrangements. All of the loan contracts contained a clause acknowledging that the timing of interest payments could vary depending on payment method, banking hours, and business days. The parties agreed that some interest payments might be delayed beyond scheduled dates and that such timing delays would not constitute a breach, provided “reasonable and documented efforts” were made to complete the transaction. Starting with the fourth loan, the agreements added a further clause stating that the funds being lent were not required to meet the lender’s monthly obligations (such as bills or debt repayment) and that the lender was “comfortable with any slightly delayed payment” and understood that the interest payment was not income replacement. The court later regarded these provisions as part of the broader context: the contracts expressly contemplated both delay in payment and the lender’s acceptance of that risk, a point Ms. Juneja would rely on to argue that the plaintiffs were attempting to escape from a bargain they regretted.

Funding sources, other family loans and evolving concerns

While Ms. Kolodzey initially reinvested and “rolled” interest and principal into new loans, she also involved her wider family network. Her parents lent approximately $55,000 to Ms. Juneja, also on the expectation of significant returns, and Mr. Nijjar himself entered into loan agreements. To finance her own lending, Ms. Kolodzey drew on shareholder loans from her company. Over time, she received some promised interest payments but not all. She repeatedly communicated with Ms. Juneja, and on several occasions agreed to apply interest that was due into additional loans rather than insisting on cash payment. These patterns of rolling over principal and interest are consistent with both an aggressive investment strategy and, potentially, with a Ponzi-style operation. By 28 February 2026, Ms. Kolodzey advised that she wanted to cancel the Third Loan Agreement, despite earlier indications that she would “keep all her money” with Ms. Juneja until June 2026. In March 2026, the parties discussed reconciling the growing web of loans. During that period, Ms. Kolodzey advanced additional funds which she says were required in order to exit the arrangement and recoup what she had already lent. She remains unpaid on the principal advanced under the Third Loan Agreement and associated arrangements.

The role of employee Jalen Poyser

The other individual respondent, Jalen Poyser, was an employee of Ms. Juneja. The Mareva injunction had been extended to him because $32,000 of loan funds passed through his bank account. According to his evidence, he simply received the deposit and then distributed the money to various clients on Ms. Juneja’s instructions, without personally benefiting from it. He had limited work experience, having recently transitioned from playing basketball at university and professionally. He is the son of Mark Poyser, the uncle who had reassured the plaintiffs about Ms. Juneja’s business. The plaintiffs argued that the fact money moved through his account and the surrounding circumstances should have raised red flags, such that he was either a participant in or willfully blind to the alleged scheme. The court, however, accepted that this was his first job in the financial world and that he relied heavily on his father’s assurances of legitimacy. In assessing his role, the judge contrasted his position with that of Ms. Kolodzey: if a business owner such as Ms. Kolodzey could be deceived, it was not reasonable to expect a junior employee with no financial background to detect and denounce the operations or resign.

The Mareva injunction and disclosure obligations

The plaintiffs obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction on 30 March 2026 against Ms. Juneja and Mr. Poyser, later continued with modifications. The Mareva order effectively froze their assets pending resolution of the dispute. Ms. Juneja and Mr. Poyser then moved to set the injunction aside, while the plaintiffs sought its continuation (and agreed that it could be lifted as against another respondent, Ali Shafshak). The court restated the established test for continuing a Mareva injunction, which includes both procedural and substantive elements: the moving party must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts; give particulars of the claim, including grounds and amount; show that the defendant has assets in the jurisdiction; and establish a real risk that assets will be removed, dissipated or otherwise dealt with so as to frustrate judgment. Substantively, the plaintiffs must show a strong prima facie case, a real and continuing risk of dissipation, and that the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction. Against this framework, the respondents attacked the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ evidence on the ex parte motion. They argued that Ms. Kolodzey had only supplied a spreadsheet summarizing inflows and outflows instead of providing full bank statements, and that this rendered the financial record incomplete. They also complained that she had not been open about borrowing from her parents and other investors, which they said explained her later pressure to unwind the loans. The judge agreed that better evidence—particularly full bank records—should have been filed on the original motion, but held that the absence of bank statements did not materially affect the initial decision to grant a Mareva order, given that the loan agreements themselves were not in dispute and there was little controversy that some interest was paid while much remained unpaid. However, the judge was more troubled by the selective production of communications. Ms. Kolodzey had provided a log and summary of text exchanges with Ms. Juneja along with a small number of excerpts, but she did not exhibit key messages in which she told Ms. Juneja that her accountant recommended keeping the money with Ms. Juneja until June 2026 to minimize “back and forth” transactions. Because parties seeking ex parte relief must disclose even evidence that may favour the other side, the court found that this omission meant Ms. Kolodzey had not met her duty of full and frank disclosure. On that basis alone, the judge concluded that the Mareva injunction should be set aside. For completeness, the judge went on to address the remaining issues of fraud and dissipation risk.

Prima facie fraud analysis against the borrower and the employee

The court emphasized that a Mareva injunction is “exceptional” relief, capable of exerting significant settlement pressure and inflicting hardship on persons not central to the litigation. A strong prima facie case, especially where fraud is alleged, is a precondition to continuing such relief. For Ms. Juneja, the plaintiffs alleged deceit on the basis that, despite calling the documents “Loan Agreements,” she never invested the funds as promised, misrepresented that the principal was guaranteed by Desjardins, and used new lenders’ money to pay earlier investors. Ms. Juneja argued that under the written contracts she was not obliged to disclose where funds were invested and was free to use them as she saw fit until maturity. She maintained that delayed or partial payments did not amount to default, especially since the agreements rolled earlier loans into later, more complex structures with a June 2026 maturity date. In her view, the plaintiffs were seeking to enforce their claims prematurely. She also relied on the clauses that allowed for variation in interest and tolerated delays in payment. The judge applied the classic four-part test for the tort of deceit: a false representation; knowledge of falsity or recklessness; reliance causing the plaintiff to act; and resulting loss. Ms. Juneja contended that without a formal statement of claim there was insufficient specificity to the alleged misrepresentations and that, in cross-examination, Ms. Kolodzey had struggled to recall precisely what was said on particular occasions. She also argued that trust in Mr. Mark Poyser and the boyfriend’s prior experience, rather than any particular statements about investment type or guarantees, drove the lending decisions. Despite these arguments, the court concluded that the representation that the principal was “guaranteed and insured” by a recognized financial institution—Desjardins—was a determinative factor for Ms. Kolodzey. She had actively sought reassurance on that point from Mr. Mark Poyser. The judge regarded this as a fraudulent statement designed to give investors a false sense of security, and found that it induced Ms. Kolodzey to enter into the transactions. While she may have been prepared to gamble on extraordinary interest payments, she was not prepared to risk her principal, which was itself borrowed via shareholder loans. On this basis, the judge held that the plaintiffs had established a strong prima facie case of civil fraud against Ms. Juneja. By contrast, the allegations against Mr. Poyser were found to be weak. The sole direct link was the $32,000 deposit into his account, which he then distributed according to instructions. He had not profited from the funds. Given his limited financial experience and reliance on his father’s assurances about legitimacy, the court declined to find that he was willfully blind or a knowing participant in any fraud. Accordingly, no strong prima facie case of civil fraud was made out against him.

Risk of dissipation of assets and the ultimate outcome

Having found a prima facie fraud case against Ms. Juneja but not against Mr. Poyser, the court turned to whether there was a real risk that either respondent would dissipate assets so as to defeat judgment. The plaintiffs urged the court to infer such a risk from the very nature of fraud, from the use of employees’ accounts to move funds, from the failure to repay when demanded, and from the lack of transparency about where the money went. They relied in part on case law suggesting that in some fraud cases, risk of dissipation can be inferred from the circumstances rather than proven by direct evidence. The judge distinguished those authorities, noting that the leading example involved an employee who had falsified accounts over many years to benefit a family member and who abruptly resigned when an audit was announced—circumstances not present here. While acknowledging fraudulent misrepresentations at the outset of the relationship, the court found that the broader evidentiary record was equivocal: the facts were as consistent with a high-risk loan dispute as with an ongoing Ponzi scheme. Ms. Juneja had lived her whole life in Ontario, showed no indication of moving assets offshore or relocating, had cooperated with the process, and had disclosed her assets. On this record, the plaintiffs had not shown a real risk that she would dissipate assets before trial. For Mr. Poyser, there was even less basis to infer dissipation. He had cooperated fully, had not benefited from the funds that passed through his account, and there was no evidence he intended to abscond or make himself judgment-proof. In the result, the court set aside the Mareva injunction as against both Ms. Juneja and Mr. Poyser. The reasons left open the underlying claims for fraud and repayment, which will be determined at trial. On the narrow question of asset-freezing relief, however, the successful parties were the responding defendants, as the plaintiffs failed to sustain the exceptional order. As to monetary relief, this decision did not fix any damages or costs figures in favour of any party; instead, the judge simply set a schedule for written costs submissions if the parties cannot agree, so the total amount (if any) to be awarded to the successful respondents cannot be determined from this judgment.