Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Whether URSU had just cause to summarily dismiss Haris Khan based on alleged absenteeism, time theft, and breaches of work-from-home and attendance expectations
• Credibility and reliability of URSU’s shifting allegations regarding the number and nature of Mr. Khan’s absences, including later “after-acquired cause” based on professional development expenses
• Interpretation of the employment contract’s dismissal clause promising “12 month’s notice or severance” and whether mitigation of damages applies to that provision
• Adequacy of URSU’s investigative and disciplinary process, including the absence of prior discipline, warnings, or documented performance management before dismissal
• Availability and scope of moral damages for bad-faith manner of dismissal, including public and regulatory comments suggesting “grave misconduct” without proof
• Impact of a negotiated severance/notice clause on the usual common law reasonable notice analysis and the employer’s attempt to rely on mitigation and after-acquired cause

Background and employment relationship

Haris Khan was a long-time participant in student governance at the University of Regina. As a student, he served on the Students’ Union of the University of Regina Inc. (URSU) Board of Directors, first as Vice-President and then as President, roles that came with full-time paid employment as URSU officers. After graduation, he continued his involvement as one of two paid Board Chairpersons, a non-voting position responsible for facilitating Board meetings. During this period, URSU’s then–General Manager (GM), Talha Akbar, approved and paid for a series of Harvard Business School Online (HBSO) management courses for Mr. Khan using URSU’s credit card, and URSU’s accounting department and management were aware of these expenditures. Mr. Khan later moved into a full-time, permanent out-of-scope role as Director of Programs and Public Relations (Director of PPR), beginning around March 20, 2023. His employment was governed by a brief written contract signed by Mr. Khan, Mr. Akbar, and the Vice-President of Operations and Finance. A central term was the dismissal clause, which provided that “[u]pon termination, you will receive 12 month’s notice or severance.” Similar language appeared in other URSU out-of-scope contracts, although URSU later moved away from such provisions.

Work-from-home expectations and attendance controls

Like many organizations, URSU had implemented a formal work-from-home policy (WFH Policy) during the COVID-19 pandemic. By late 2023, the Board decided to rescind this policy. Effective November 1, 2023, the WFH Policy was formally repealed and Mr. Akbar emailed staff on November 20, 2023, reminding them that if they were not in the office, they should be taking approved paid time off (PTO), earned days off, or other leave. At the same time, URSU rolled out a biometric sign-in/sign-out system, requiring all employees, including out-of-scope staff like Mr. Khan, to enroll. In practice, strict biometric compliance for out-of-scope staff was not consistently enforced, and there remained an informal ability for such employees to work from home on a case-by-case basis with their supervisor’s approval. Mr. Khan’s evidence, which the court accepted, was that he had a standing religious accommodation to work from home on Fridays, agreed with GM Akbar in August 2023. A January 5, 2024 text exchange where Mr. Khan stated that he worked from home on Fridays and Mr. Akbar responded “Ok” supported this understanding. Mr. Khan also gave evidence, accepted by the court, that a late November 2023 discussion about enrolling him in the biometric system was not disciplinary but focused on ensuring he and his staff were signed up. No written discipline, warnings, or performance management steps ever appeared in his personnel file.

Events leading to dismissal

On February 12, 2024, URSU dismissed GM Akbar, and URSU President Tejas Patel stepped in as acting GM. Mr. Muhammad, who later became GM and the sole affiant for URSU, was out of the country from mid-December 2023 until about February 16, 2024, and was not involved in the key decisions at the time. Mr. Khan worked in the office on February 12 and 14, 2024, a factual point corroborated by his own affidavit and contemporaneous photographic and email evidence and ultimately accepted by the court. On February 13, while feeling unwell, he told URSU Vice-President Oghenerukevwe Erifeta that he was working from home; she acknowledged this and met with him virtually, with no suggestion of discipline. Mr. Khan’s evidence, supported by documentation and not seriously challenged, was that he was working from home on February 13, 15 and 16, 2024, and remained engaged in work communications and tasks. On February 15, he emailed acting GM Patel indicating that he planned to work from home during the upcoming reading week (the week of February 19) when most staff would be away, and invited any concerns. February 19 was a statutory holiday. On February 20, Mr. Patel replied that he appreciated Mr. Khan expressing his intention to work from home and that he would speak with the executive and then revert. That same day, the executive met and, instead of deciding Mr. Khan’s work-from-home request, discussed alleged attendance and performance concerns and directed Mr. Patel to seek legal advice “on terminating Haris’ contract.” There is no evidence of any attempt to meet with Mr. Khan about concerns, to provide warnings, or to involve URSU’s HR consultant before that decision path was chosen.

Termination, reasons given, and later shifting allegations

On February 22, 2024, acting GM Patel issued a termination letter dismissing Mr. Khan for cause, effective immediately. The letter accused him of unexcused absences on February 13, 15 and 16, 2024, during what URSU described as a “crucial transition” following the GM’s departure. It alleged that he had not requested vacation or leave, had failed to communicate his whereabouts, and had engaged in “time theft” by receiving salary while allegedly absent. The letter asserted that this conduct fundamentally and irrevocably breached URSU’s trust and amounted to serious misconduct. No reference was made to a broader pattern of absenteeism, nor were any other grounds for termination included. After Mr. Khan commenced a wrongful dismissal action and URSU filed its defence, the employer’s explanation evolved. The statement of defence alleged both failure to meet performance expectations and repeated non-compliance with remote work and return-to-office policies, asserting that multiple warnings had been given. Later still, in affidavits sworn by new GM Muhammad in 2025 and 2026, URSU asserted that Mr. Khan was absent from the office for nine or ten consecutive days in February 2024 without pre-approval, and advanced “after-acquired cause” arguments based on the earlier HBSO professional development funding and an improperly processed loan request for a computer that was subsequently regularized. The court viewed these later allegations critically. It emphasized that the contemporaneous termination letter specified only three days of alleged absenteeism and did not mention a longer block of absences or misconduct related to professional development funding. Mr. Muhammad’s claim that ten consecutive days’ absence and the original allegation of three days’ absence could both be “true at the same time” undermined the reliability of URSU’s account. The court also noted that Mr. Muhammad had not been present during the relevant February dates and could not reliably testify about Mr. Khan’s physical presence in the office.

Evidence about attendance, discipline, and professional development

The evidentiary record before the court consisted of multiple affidavits from Mr. Khan and Mr. Muhammad, as well as transcripts of their cross-examinations and numerous documentary exhibits. The court drew several key factual conclusions: Mr. Khan was in the office on February 12 and 14, 2024, and working from home on February 13, 15, and 16. He clearly informed a vice-president that he was working from home on February 13 and later clearly advised acting GM Patel of his intention to work from home during reading week, pending any objection. There was no documentation in his personnel file showing prior discipline or formal warnings for attendance or performance issues, and executive minutes from November 2023 recorded that a complaint about his attendance had resulted in “no action” being taken. In cross-examination, Mr. Muhammad confirmed that URSU’s managers understood that staff could work from home with managerial approval even after the formal WFH Policy was rescinded, and that PTO would not be expected if such permission had been granted. On the professional development side, the evidence showed that Mr. Akbar had explicitly approved and arranged payment for Mr. Khan’s HBSO courses, that URSU’s accounting staff processed the charges, and that professional development was also reimbursed for other employees. There was no written policy limiting such approvals, and the Board Chairperson role did not vote on Board matters. The court accepted Mr. Khan’s view that he reasonably relied on his GM’s authorization and that the courses were relevant to his roles. It rejected URSU’s attempt to recast this as past misconduct or a conflict of interest severe enough to constitute cause or after-acquired cause.

Summary judgment and the appropriateness of the procedure

URSU argued that credibility concerns made this case unsuitable for summary judgment, but both parties had filed substantial affidavit evidence and conducted cross-examinations, and neither suggested additional witnesses would be called at trial. Applying Saskatchewan’s summary judgment rule, the court held that it could weigh the evidence, assess credibility, and draw inferences on the paper record. The issues were relatively contained: whether URSU had just cause, whether the dismissal clause was enforceable as written, and how to quantify damages. The court concluded that there was no “genuine issue requiring a trial” and that summary judgment was a proportionate, fair, and just mechanism to resolve the entire dispute between the parties.

Just cause analysis and rejection of the employer’s defence

Turning to liability, the court applied the established contextual test for just cause in employment law, focusing on the nature and extent of the alleged misconduct, the surrounding circumstances, and whether dismissal was a proportionate response. The employer bears the burden of proving cause when it has given no notice or pay in lieu. The court found that the core allegation—that Mr. Khan had been absent without notice or authorization—was contradicted by documentary and sworn evidence showing he was either physically present or properly working from home on the key dates. The court also took note that URSU had offered no prior progressive discipline, documented reprimands, or formal warnings and had not explained why lesser measures (such as a meeting, written warning, or performance plan) were inadequate. It found no reliable evidence of the longer period of alleged absenteeism asserted later in the litigation and gave little weight to after-acquired cause claims based on longstanding, GM-approved professional development expenditures. In short, the court held that URSU had not met the heavy onus required to justify termination without notice or pay. Mr. Khan’s conduct was not grossly deficient, the employment relationship remained viable in the absence of an organized restructuring, and termination for cause was disproportionate.

Interpretation of the dismissal provision and mitigation

Having found that the dismissal was wrongful, the court turned to the interpretation of the dismissal clause in Mr. Khan’s contract. The clause promised, “Upon termination, you will receive 12 month’s notice or severance.” The central question was whether this created a contractual right to a fixed payment equivalent to 12 months’ remuneration upon termination without notice, or whether it merely set a notice period subject to the usual principles of mitigation (i.e., deduction of income earned in alternate employment). Drawing on Supreme Court of Canada guidance in Sattva on contractual interpretation, as well as Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and Alberta authorities on severance and early-termination clauses, the court held that the clause conferred a contractual entitlement to either 12 months’ working notice or 12 months’ pay in lieu, at URSU’s election. It found that “severance” was intended to mean pay in lieu of notice and that the phrase “12 month’s” qualified both the notice period and the severance amount. On that reading, URSU had effectively negotiated a “golden parachute” for Mr. Khan and similar out-of-scope employees. The contract did not reference mitigation or deduction of other earnings. Based on appellate jurisprudence, where a contract specifies a fixed amount or formula for payment on termination, that amount is typically treated as a contractual debt or liquidated sum, not damages subject to mitigation. The court therefore held that Mr. Khan was entitled to 12 months’ salary plus the value of his RRSP contributions, with no reduction for his prompt re-employment or employment insurance benefits, though the two weeks’ statutory wages already paid under an employment standards assessment would be deducted to avoid double recovery.

Assessment of damages and refusal of punitive relief

The court quantified Mr. Khan’s contractual entitlement by reference to his annual salary of $73,000 and the 6% RRSP contribution valued at $4,380 per year, for a total of $77,380 representing 12 months of remuneration. Because the precise dollar value of the two weeks’ wages he had already received under The Saskatchewan Employment Act decision was not in evidence, the court ordered that this unspecified amount be deducted from the $77,380. Mr. Khan’s evidence about the monetary value of his health and dental benefits was insufficient and disputed in the pleadings, so the court declined to award additional damages on that head. Mr. Khan also sought $5,000 in relocation costs to Houston, Texas, but the court refused this claim, finding both causation and proof lacking. He had left a more lucrative government position in Regina of his own volition to pursue a preferred field in Houston, and the move could not be attributed in a compensable way to the earlier URSU dismissal.

Moral damages and the manner of dismissal

The court then considered Mr. Khan’s claim for moral and punitive damages. It reviewed recent Saskatchewan Court of Appeal authority confirming that employers owe a duty of good faith in the manner of dismissal and that employees may recover moral damages where the dismissal process causes mental distress beyond the ordinary sting of job loss. In Mr. Khan’s case, the court accepted medical evidence that his mental health was “considerably impacted” and found that URSU’s conduct went beyond the usual bounds. The problematic conduct included failing to conduct a reasonable investigation of attendance concerns; initially failing to pay even the statutory minimum pay in lieu of notice; making demeaning remarks about Mr. Khan in submissions to the employment standards officer (such as suggesting he might have a future writing “tragedy fiction”); and publicly characterizing the dismissals of Mr. Khan and several other staff in a student newspaper interview as being for “really grave misconducts” when such serious allegations were unsupported by the evidence. This pattern of behaviour, coupled with the entirely disproved just-cause allegations, justified an award of moral damages. Reviewing comparative case law, the court fixed moral damages at $10,000. It situated this amount in the lower half of the usual range for such awards, noting that URSU’s conduct, while improper, did not reach the level seen in cases where fraud allegations were repeatedly publicized or investigations grossly mishandled. The court also inferred that Mr. Khan’s relatively quick transition to better-paid employment tempered the overall impact.

No need for punitive damages and costs still to be determined

After setting contractual and moral damages, the court considered whether punitive damages were required to denounce and deter URSU’s conduct. It concluded that the combined effect of the 12 months’ pay in lieu and the $10,000 moral damages award—plus pre-judgment interest—was sufficient. URSU was an embattled students’ union in liquidation, not a large, profitable corporation, and an additional punitive layer was unnecessary to achieve the objectives of punishment and deterrence. Accordingly, punitive damages were denied. The court held that Mr. Khan was entitled to pre-judgment interest on both the contractual and moral damages under The Pre-judgment Interest Act but did not calculate the exact amount, leaving that to be determined by statutory formula. It also reserved the issue of costs, directing counsel to file written submissions; thus, no specific figure for costs was fixed in this decision. In outcome, the court granted summary judgment in favour of Mr. Khan, held that URSU had no just cause for dismissal, and enforced the dismissal clause as a binding contractual promise. The successful party was the plaintiff, who was awarded principal damages of $77,380 (less the exact, unspecified amount of two weeks’ wages already paid), plus $10,000 in moral damages and pre-judgment interest, with the final quantum of costs and the precise net monetary figure to be determined in subsequent written submissions and calculations.