Public safety minister denies liability to dispatcher diagnosed with mental health issue after shooting incident
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected an appeal by BC’s public safety minister and solicitor general, who challenged a judge’s refusal to summarily dismiss a claim alleging tortious conduct by a civilian member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
The RCMP swore in the respondent in British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Chatterton, 2026 BCCA 159, as a civilian member in May 2015. She worked as a telecoms operator at a Kelowna operational call centre.
In October 2019, the respondent served as a dispatcher in an incident that led to the shooting of a police officer. As she found the incident very stressful, the respondent asked her supervisor if she could attend a debrief.
The supervisor consulted with the call centre’s unit commander. The unit commander, who was also a civilian member of the RCMP, refused the respondent’s request and instead directed her to participate in a pre-scheduled training session on RCMP active shooter protocol.
The respondent alleged that she could complete only an hour of the session before experiencing severe anxiety and panic. Subsequently, she could not return to work. She received diagnoses for post-traumatic stress disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.
In June 2021, the RCMP medically discharged the respondent. In October 2021, she brought a civil claim asserting that the unit commander:
- failed to follow RCMP policy
- undermined the respondent’s trust in her supervisors to treat her fairly and ensure a safe work environment by denying her request to attend the debrief
- engaged in negligence that caused the respondent extreme mental and physical ailments and disabilities
The appellant minister applied for summary judgment under r. 9-6 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009. The minister cited s. 11(1)(a) of BC’s Police Act, 1996, which would hold the BC government liable for provincial constables’ torts in the performance of their duties.
According to the minister, even if the respondent proved negligence at trial, the provincial government was not liable under the Police Act because the unit commander, as the alleged tortfeasor, was not serving as a provincial constable under s. 11(1)(a) when committing the acts underlying the civil claim.
On July 18, 2025, a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the minister’s application upon finding a genuine issue for trial.
On an appeal assailing the dismissal of the summary judgment application, the minister alleged that the judge:
- misinterpreted s. 11(1)(a)
- misinterpreted Sulz v. Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2006 BCCA 582, which involved the same provision, as binding on the issue
- failed to engage meaningfully with the evidence
Claim to proceed to trial
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia saw no reversible error in the judge’s decision. The appeal court noted that the judge did not:
- interpret s. 11(1)(a)
- review a 20-year written agreement for the RCMP to provide policing services in various areas of BC
- assess the agreement’s impact on the statutory interpretative analysis
- address whether the minister’s proposed interpretation aligned with the Police Act’s scheme or object and with the legislature’s intention
Instead, the appeal court pointed out that the judge simply held that the minister had failed to establish beyond a doubt that the respondent’s civil claim was bound to lose. Citing Sulz, the judge did not consider the minister’s suggested interpretation so obvious that it doomed the claim to fail.
The appeal court found the judge’s decision on the r. 9-6 application consistent with L.D. (Guardian ad litem of) v. Provincial Health Services Authority, 2012 BCCA 491, and Fraser-Fort George (Regional District) v. Chingee, 2025 BCCA 437.
Seeing no palpable error, the appeal court declined to interfere with the judge’s exercise of her discretion and her reasonable conclusion that the trial could best address the minister’s position, which required a full interpretative analysis of s. 11(1)(a), including:
- the statute’s language and context
- the agreement’s intention
- Sulz
- the specific evidence
Given the judge’s refusal to conduct an interpretative analysis of the statute and the agreement, the appeal court saw no error in the judge’s failure to assess the minister’s factual evidence to support their proposed interpretation of s. 11(1)(a).
