Ruling sees no reasonable explanation from representatives at law school legal aid clinic
In an immigration matter, Canada’s Federal Court dismissed a motion for an extension of time to serve and file the applicant’s record, as it could not find that counsel pursued the application diligently or faced delays beyond their control.
On June 18, 2025, the applicant in Granderson v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 CanLII 53065 (FC), issued a notice of application for leave and for judicial review. The applicant missed the following due dates for the record:
- Nov. 14, 2025, under r. 10 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22 (FCCIRPR)
- Jan. 15, 2026 (considering the seasonal recess), under a practice direction and special order dated May 14, 2025, which extended the time by 45 days for an applicant in immigration proceedings to perfect a leave application
A law school’s legal aid clinic initially acted for the applicant. The clinic’s supervising lawyer assigned the file to a law student. In mid-November 2025, the first student requested the transfer of the file due to a heavy workload.
Another law student took over the file on Nov. 17, 2025, by which point the Nov. 14, 2025, deadline had passed. In early December 2025, the supervising lawyer reminded both students of the Jan. 15, 2026, deadline.
During a meeting with the supervising lawyer last Jan. 8, the second student advised that she could not complete the applicant’s record by Jan. 15. On Feb. 12, the applicant sent the record and an extension request to the respondent, the minister of citizenship and immigration.
On Apr. 25, the applicant appointed new counsel of record. On Apr. 27, over six months after the filing and serving of the tribunal’s reasons on Oct. 15, 2025, the applicant moved for an extension of time to serve and file the record.
The applicant, the supervising lawyer, and one of the student volunteers provided affidavits supporting the motion. The respondent did not oppose the motion.
Extension refused
Balancing all the relevant factors in Virdi v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2006 FCA 38, the Federal Court ruled that the applicant failed to meet the test for an extension of time. The court held that the other factors outweighed prejudice and merit, even if these factors favoured the applicant.
First, the court saw no reasonable explanation for the entire delay. The court did not consider the following reasonable explanations for the delay:
- counsel workload, given the Federal Court’s consistent jurisprudence
- the legal aid clinic’s limited capacity in December due to exams and the holiday break, which were foreseeable annual events
- the assigned student’s illness in late January and early February, which went beyond the Jan. 15 deadline
The court determined that the supervising lawyer, the student volunteers, and the applicant’s current counsel appeared not to take the filing deadlines seriously, prioritized other files, and showed no urgency to complete the record before the deadline or to file this motion.
The court saw a significant omission in the affidavits, which did not sufficiently explain why the second student could not comply with the deadline.
Regarding the supervising lawyer’s “mistaken impression” that the court would accept an extension request made relatively quickly, or within a month of the perfection date, the court said a second extension of time, beyond that in the special order, was not presumptively available.
Second, the court acknowledged that the applicant demonstrated an ongoing intention to pursue the proceeding by filing the motion to extend. However, the court stressed that the motion came six months after receipt of the tribunal’s reasons.
Third, the court accepted that the motion’s dismissal would prejudice the applicant. However, the court also found that the delay prejudiced the respondent minister.
The court added that the applicant’s lack of diligence defeated the special order’s purpose and increased the workload of the registry, which had to process motion materials for an extension of time.
Lastly, regarding the interests of justice, the court ruled that exercising its discretion in the applicant’s favour would require it to disregard the criteria for an extension of time and the absence of adequate evidence supporting the relevant factors.
Given the lengthy, unsatisfactorily explained delay, the court held that granting the motion to extend would go against the objectives in r. 21 of the FCCIRPR and ss. 72 and 74 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001.
